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ABSTRACT
This study is designed to examine the regional economic integration
effort in West Africa under the ECOWAS Program. Within this exami-
nation is a special focus on the African Development Bank Group role
in advancing regional economic integration in West Africa. One of the
basic premises of this thesis is that the ECOWAS Program requires a
major investor, like the African DeveloDment Bank Group, to provide
the necessary capital to make regional economic integration a success-
ful venture in West Africa. This study considers the ability of the
African Development Bank Group to meet this requisite of the ECOWAS
Program.
The conclusion of the research was that the ECOWAS Program for
regional economic integration in West Africa would fail, without
large scale industry development in the relatively less developed
states of the region and interterritorial infrastructure development
to link the fifteen states of the region. The African Development
Bank Group has been recognized as a leader in meeting this investment
need of ECOWAS, but it is clear that without an expansion in the Bank
Group's resource base or the introduction of aid agencies to co-finance
with the Bank Group, the African Development Bank Group will be unable
to meet the investment needs of ECOWAS. Having to rely on the African
Development Bank Group to meet their investment needs, the ECOWAS
Program's success will be limited by the scope of the African Develop-
ment Bank Group's investment in regional development in West Africa.
Thesis Supervisor: Hassan Minor
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CHAPTER ONE
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE ECOWAS PROGRAM
OUTLINE
I. Why an Economic Union in West Africa?
A. Ideological Factors
1. Pan-Africanism
a. scope (continental union)
b. timing (political union before economic development)
c. power (centralized authority under federal system of
government)
2. Regional Economic Integration in Sub-regions instead of
Continent
B. Economic Factors
1. Goals and Means of Economic Integration
a. economies of scale (reduce inefficiency and duplication)
b. increase pool of savings and foreign exchange for
industrial development
c. develop intermediate industries (value added benefits)
d. improve gains from "multiplier effect"
e. increase pool of professionals and technicians
f. increase pool of unskilled labor (improved capital
accumulation)
C. Military Security
1. National Vulnerability to External Aggression
2. Uneven National Military Strength
3. Consolidation to Establish Security Net (maximize strength
through consolidation)
II. Regional Integration Theories (how they fit into West Africa)
A. Phillip Jacob and Henry Teune - "10 Influences for Integration
to be Felt"
1. Geographic Proximity
2. Homogeneity
3. Transactions (Karl Deutsch - communication theory)
4. Social Factors
a. cognitive proximity
b. shared functional interests
c. communal "character" or social "motive,"
5. Political Factors
a. structural frame or system of power and decision-making
b. sovereignty - dependency status of the community
c. governmental effectiveness
d. previous integrative experiences
B. Traditional Neo-Classical Economic Theory
1. Trade Creation - Trade Diversion
2. Basic Conditions for Economic Integration
a. percentage of trade within the region (high)
b. percentage of GNP in foreign trade (low)
c. less success if large disparities exist between member
states.
C. Federalist Approach
1. Focus on Declarations and Written Structure of Union
2. Main Concern is in Institutions and Institution Building
3. Regional Organizations in West Africa Leaning Toward
Federal Authority
D. Ernst Haas - "Neo-Functionalist Approach and Obsolescence
of Neo-Functionalist Theories"
1. Integrative Process Fueled by Inter-Regional Links (interest
groups and political parties) - "Spillover"
2. Sectoral Integration Producing "Spillover"
3. Incrementalism and "Fragmented Issue Linkage"
4. Absolescence of Neo-Functionalism - Exogenous Factors
Disrupt Process
E. Economic Development Theory
1. Structural Change in Development Process to Achieve
Industrialization
2. Areas of Potential Benefits from Regional Integration
(overcoming structural barriers)
III. Constraints on Regional Integration in West Africa
A. Political
1. Nationalism
2. Internal Political Instability
3. Absence of Pluralism to Promote Lobby Groups
4. Over-Politicalization of Regional Decisions
B. Economic
1. African Commodities are Competitive, not Complimentary
2. Competing Industrial Centres
3. Nationally Protected Industries Fear Economic Union
4. Imbalances in Development Between States
5. Foreign Aid is Usually Bilateral
6. Different Monetary Zones
C. Social
1. Differences in Language, Ethnic Identification, Religion
2. Differences in Administrative Apparatus Evolved from
Colonial
IV. Forms of Economic Integration
A. Laissez-Faire (free trade and CET only) - (Mano River
Union)
B. Economic Union Based on the Equitable Distribution of
Benefits
1. Redistribution Funds
2. Concept of Measuring and Balancing Costs and Benefits
a. basic indicators (impact on trade flows, level and
structure of production, balance of payments, revenue
growth rates)
b. trade creation - trade diversion
c. spread - backwash effects
d. concept of measurement - equality/proportion of size of
national income/proportion of size of national population
3. Redistributive Formula
a. single tax (taxe unique of UDEAC)
b. regional distribution tax (TCR-CEAO)
V. Chances for an ECOWAS Success Story
A. Established Regional Institutions (neo-functionalist/federalist
approach)
B. Stages of Economic Union Implementation (balancing effect)
C. Aims and Objectives of ECOWAS
D. ECOWAS Commissions:
1. Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission
2. Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development
3. Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission
4. Summary
VI. Gaps in the ECOWAS Program
A. Compensation Fund is Undercapitalized
B. No Control over new Industry Location
C. Limited Interstate Infrastructure to Facilitate infra-Africa
trade
D. Need for Investor like the African Development Bank
OAU
ADB
ADF
NTF
ADB Group
ECA
EEC
CDC
CCCE
FAO
IBRD
IDA
IDB
ITU
SUNFED
ASDB
ACP
States
OCAM
BADEA
Kuwait
Fund
SIFIDA
Africa Re
OMVS
UMOA
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Organization of African Unity
African Development Bank
African Development Fund
Nigerian Trust Fund
(or Bank Group) ADB/ADF/NTF
Economic Cammission for Africa
European Economic Community
Commonwealth Development Corporation
Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique
Food and Agricultural Organization
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank)
International Development Association
Inter-American Development Bank
International Telecommunications Union
Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development
Asian Development Bank
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific States signed to the Lome
Convention
Organization Comune Africaine et Mauriciene
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
Societe Internationale Financiere pour les Investissements
et le Developpment en Afrique
African Insurance and Reinsurance Corporation
Organisation pour la mise en valeur de fleuve Senegal
Union monetarie ouest-africaine (West African Monetary Union)
BCEAO Banque Centrale de Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CEAO Communate economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (West African
Economic Community)
AACB Association of African Central Banks
UDEAC Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
CIMAO Societe des Ciments d'Afrique de l'Ouest
RAN Regie de Chemin de fer Abidjan/Niger
CFA franc communate financiere africaine franc
CIC Capital Issues Committee of ECOWAS
CET common external tariff
DM Deustche mark
UA African Development Bank units of account
KD Kuwaiti dinar
Tables
-I. Foreign Nationals by Country of Nationality and Country of
Enumeration, circa 1975
II. Principal External Migration Streams, circa 1975
III. Employed Immigrants Aged 15 Years and Over by Country of
Residence and Sex, circa 1975
IV. Intra-ECOWAS Trade 1973 (US $ 1000)
V. Population and GNP (at Market Prices 1979) of ECOWAS Countries
VI. Import Duties as Proportion of Revenues for West Africa
Countries
VII. Workers' Remittances in Selected West African Countries,
1970-74
Maps
I. Heaviest Import/Export Flows within West Africa
II. Cammodities Traded Between Nigeria and West African States
(1975)
III. Commodities Traded Between Togo and West African States (1975)
Graphs
I. Percentage of Total Export within Africa by Country
II. Volume of Trade in Africa, by Largest West African Intra-
African Exporters
Appendix
I. Direction of Trade within the ECOWAS Community 1964-1973
II. Types of Products Exported to Ghana (Togo and Nigeria) from
Largest Intra-African Trading States (Jan. - Dec. 1970)
III. Direction of Exports from West African States 1964-1974
IV. Major Export by Nigeria to West African States (1st Quarter
1975)
V. Types of Products Imported by Togo from Largest West African
Exporters (Jan. - Dec. 1975)
I. Why an Economic Union in West Africa?
A. Ideological Factors
The concept of continental unity in Africa has its genesis in
the early days of the Pan-African Congress. Many of the original
theorists of continental unity were Afro-Americans or Afro-
Caribbeans; W.E.B. DuBois, George Padmore and Marcus Garvey are a few
of the most prominent. They were the leaders of a pan-Africanist
movement that began in the early twentieth century and culminated in
the pre-independence and early post-independence era of Africa.
Within Africa, the most vocal advocate for African unity was Kwame
Nkrumah. He spearheaded the Pan-African movement in Africa through
his efforts to establish a federal structure that would facilitate
continental unity. Despite the failure of Nkrumah to achieve the kind
of continent wide unity that he advocated, his vision of African
unity is the most ambitious and encompassing of any of the integration
programs attempted in Africa, and therefore, is instructive in under-
standing the current efforts at integration in Africa today.
The most dynamic element of Nkrumahism is its emphasis on the
establishment of continental political union preceding economic,
sectoral or sub-regional union. The Nkrumah model is based upon the
formation of a continental central authority that would supercede
national sovereignty, thereby, establishing a United States of Africa.
This model did not include continental unity that would be associated
with the European community, as in the Senghor model of African unity
which was tied to association with the European Economic Community.1
The scope of the Nkrumah model also extended beyond the sub-regional
or sectoral associations that began to emerge in Africa during the
independence era. Nkrumah's opposition to these sub-groupings in
Africa is indicated in the following statement;
"...such tinkering (inter-territorial associations
within customs unions, trade agreements, etc.) does
not create the decisive conditions for resolute
development, since it ignores the crucial requirement
of continental integration as the essential pre-
requisite for the most bountiful economic progress,
which must be based in the widest possible extension
of land and population."2
The continental unity that Nkrumah spoke of required the
individual African nations to transfer their national sovereignty to
a central authority. He cited the United States of America as a model
for Africans to use in forming a continent wide union. An essential
feature of this model was the formation of political union between
the states prior to the integration of economies between states. Any-
thing less than full political union in Africa was seen as being
ineffectual in reaching for economic development and continental unity.
The ordering of the process (political union before economic union)
was stated by Nkrumah in the following manner;
"For radical changes that are urgently needed in
economic planning can only be brought about quickly
and effectually if we are united politically.13
As indicated by the above statement, Nkrumah viewed the economic
development of Africa being prefaced upon the political unity of the
continent. The emphasis on political unity to achieve economic
benefits for Africa was apparent in the Nkrumah idea of an African
Common Market. Being politically united in a common marked around
commodities would allow Africa to negotiate with the world, as a
single bloc, on the prices of their commodities and other essential
terms of trade. The goal of achieving economic benefits from
political union was also applied to the development needs of
the continent.
Nkrumah believed that a central planning body was essential
for the coordination of intra-African infrastructure development.
He was also conscious of the possibilities of duplication by
individual states, with respect to mineral exploration and industrial
states, (with respect to mineral exploration and industrial
development.) A central body with decision-making power would serve
to avoid the inefficiency and cost of duplication that could occur
under a development program operated by autonomous states. The
increased development potential that could be realized by pooling
the available capital of the separate African states was also a
benefit to be derived from establishing a centralized, federal
authority in Africa.
The continental central authority in Africa that Nkrumah
advocated for was not conceptualized as merely a functional,
planning body for the continent. The Nkrumah model was designed to
achieve a federal government for the entire continent. The
central authority under this system would be analogous to the
executive and individual branches of government in the United States,
with state representation conducted through an apparatus similar to
the Congress. Each of the states would retain a measure of
sovereignty, as proscribed under a federal system, but ultimate
authority would rest in the central body. This model was far more
ambitious than the Organization of African Unity, which is designed
more as a concensus organization for Africa than as a federal
authority. The effort to establish a federal system of government
for Africa was initiated at the height of the independence movement.
The timing of this effort was important because, under the Nkrumah
model of federalism in Africa, it was important that the individual
states submit to a federal authority before initiating their own
development plans.
It has been stated at various points that Nkrumahism emphasized
the importance of political unity preceding economic development.
Applying this principle to the African scene during the independence
era translated to mean that newly independent African states were
being asked to relinquish their national sovereignty to a central
authority. Without these states submitting to federal authority, each
of them would proceed with their separate national development
program, which was seen as being injurious to a continental
integration effort. The necessity of these states entering a
continent wide political union was so important to the Nkrumah
model of federalism that he described it as "an indispensable
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precondition" for the development of the continent.. This feature
of the Nkrumah model, in addition to other obstacles, made the
application of Nkrumahism to Africa during the early post-independence
era unsuccessful.
During the early post-independence era, many African leaders
were skeptical about the idea of relinquishing the newly acquired
sovereignty that they achieved. The political base of these leaders
was on the national level and their rise to power was often the
product of a national independence movement. To concede their
power and authority, so soon after gaining independence, to an
amorphous continental authority appeared to be counterproductive.
For many of these leaders, other forms of continental unity that
required less power transfer from the states, was a preferred course.
These other, less ambitious forms of unity, were incompatible with
the strong federalist model advocated by Nkrumah. Without unanimous
participation in a continental union of states, under a federal
system of government, the realization of a United States of Africa
would not be possible.
One of the most damaging effects on the attempt at continental
unity under a federal government came from the entrance of eighteen
African states to the European Economic Community. This was the
form of African unity that Leopold Senghor pushed for, however, it
provided a select number of Associated States with commodity
preferences that the other African countries did not enjoy.
Continental political union would be difficult to achieve with some
of the states enjoying trade preferences that the others were denied.
Aside from this factor, several African leaders engaged their
countries in sub-regional economic groupings.
Prominent African leaders, such as Julius Nyerere, supported
continental unity, but also favored participating in sub-regional
economic unions. These sub-regional groupings fragmented the effort
towards continental union and served to continue the policy of
balkanization in Africa; only now on a grand scale. Houphouet-
Boigny of the Ivory Coast was another leader that participated
in forming sub-regional groupings through his creation of the
Entente Council. Other examples of these subdivisions are the Mali
Federation, the trade zone states of West Africa and Central Africa
and the East African Community. These sub-regional divisions, in
addition to the uneasiness of African leaders in relinquishing
national power and the association of eighteen African nations to the
European Economic Community posed major barriers to the movement
of continental unity under a federal system of government.
The economic rationale for continental unity in Africa under
a federal authority continues to be cogent. The ability of African
nations to seize the opportunity to create such a system, prior to
the implementation of their national development programs, was
inhibited by the constraints that have been outlined. Missing
the opportunity to form a continental union, African nations have
proceeded under a national development policy that has created many
of the economic ills that Nkrumah foresaw (competition on commodities,
duplication of effort between states, insufficient capital, etc.).
In an effort toaddress the economic problems that this policy of
separate national development has produced, many African nations
have chose to engage in regional integration schemes. None of these
schemes have been as ambitious or encompassing as the Nkrumah model
for continental union, but several have as their goal the eventual
integration of Africa's economies. Although continental union is
viewed today as a distant goal, the issues that Nkrumah uncovered
in presenting his concept of Pan Africanism reveal many other
economic factors that demonstrate why at least economic integration
is essential for African development to be achieved.
Regional economic integration of the African sub-regions is
the most ambitious level of integration that is being attempted
in Africa today. The West Africa region, with fifteen separate
countries, is one of the most interesting African sub-region that
is attempting to integrate. The economic factors that Nkrumah
considered when he fought for continental unity are clearly present
in the West African environment. Before considering each of these
factors, there should be a clear separation of those elements that
West African policy makers would consider as factors that would
serve as means for achieving a desired outcome and those that would
be categorized as goals of the integration process.
B. Economic Factors (Goals and Means of Economic Integration)
Most of the gains that Kwame Nkrumah visualized resulting from
continental unity were related to the benefits of economies of
scale. He viewed the fragmentation of the continent into relatively
small nations as denying each state the capacity to develop. Pooling
all of the resources, technology, capital, labor power, etc. of the
continent was seen as a strategy to achieve industrial development
in Africa.5 The economic goal of continental unity was to modernize
the continent of Africa through accelerated industrial development.
The pooling of the entire continents resources and capacities was
recognized by Pan-Africanist to be the means for achieving this goal,
although the actual process of drawing resources may have also
produced desired outcomes. This same reasoning of those that
supported continental unity is the motivating force behind the
West African movement toward regional unity.
The ultimate goal of each of the West African states is to
achieve lasting industrial development. These states have faced
varying degrees of stagnation in their national industrial development.
The potential benefits of pooling their resources to achieve a higher
level of industrial development has moved many states to engage in
regional economic integration. Among the economic factors that have
been considered in making the decision to pool national resources in
a regional development effort are;
1. economies of scale (reduce inefficiency and duplication)
2. increase pool of savings and foreign exchange for industrial
development
3. develop intermediate industries (value added benefits)
4. improve gains from "multiplier effect"
5. increase pool of professionals and technicians
6. increase pool of unskilled labor.
Some of these economic factors that have been considered as tools
to achieve industrial development (which is another way of saying
modernization) are, actually, desired outcomes on their own. For
example, the development of intermediate industries within the region
will tend to curtail expensive imports and aid the development of
capital goods industries, but it will also produce positive value
added benefits to the region. This is a positive feature of a
factor that was initially thought of as a device to achieve another
goal. The other factors include positive features on their own,
however, they are more tailored to produce the goal of industrial
development. An example of this point is, economies of scale.
Economies of scale reduce inefficiency and duplication, which is
beneficial to the region, but these outcomes are more of a benefit
to those that are engaged in trying to develop industry. As will be
seen when examining each variable closely, they offer immediate
benefits in their implementation, but they are all designed to
reduce reliance on foreign support and, most importantly, achieve
industrial development in the region.
Economic Factors
There are fifteen states within the West Africa region, including
Cape Verde. The population of the region is 144.3 million, with the
state of Nigeria comprising 57% of the total regional population.6
Thirteen of the remaining states have less than 5% of the total
regional population, ranging from 6.4 million in Mali to .3 million
in Cape Verde. Given the relatively small size of the national
consumer markets that these countries have, local industry is limited
in its ability to flourish and grow. To adequately meet local demand,
national industry must operate at a small scale, which often means
that it is being forced to operate at an inefficient level. The
problems of inefficiency are exascerbated to the degree that national
government needs to protect nascent local industry from foreign
competition. Inefficiency of local industry is more apparent when
considering the amount of duplication that occurs across national
boundaries. With separate national development, each country has
its own small, inefficient industries that are trying to tap a small
consumer market. By removing tariffs to protect national industries
and opening up local consumer markets, inefficiency could be reduced
and the region would be able to realize the benefits of the economies
of scale and develop larger scale industry. The ability to invest
in domestic industry would also be enhanced by pooling local
finances.
The financial resources necessary to support local industry on a
national scale are limited for most of the countries of the West
Africa region. In light of the small size of the national populations
and the low per capita incomes that these countries have, national
savings are modest. Looking only at the regions gross national
product, which was US $79.9 million in 1979, twelve of the fifteen
West Africa countries have less than 2% of the regional GNP; Nigeria
boasts 69.2% of the regional GNP. The range of gross national
product for these twelve states is from $1.47 million for Guinea
to $.l million for Cape Verde. Having such a low level of GNP
would make it difficult to amass sufficient national savings to
provide enough credit to support the development and expansion of
local industry. With respect to the level of per capita income,
Reginald Green referred to the problems of financing local industry
in the following way;
"...the lower the average income per person, the
higher the total national product needed to support
efficient manufacturing plants and especially an
industry producing capital goods." 8
Disregarding the potential availability of foreign aid to close the
gap for local industrial financing, the only path that these twelve
countries could follow to attain a higher level of financing to
support industry would be to pool the savings of the region. This
would increase the credit pool and allow for larger individual
investments, thereby, again, providing for the realization of the
benefits of economies of scale. Beyond the benefits of pooling their
national savings, the countries could also pool their foreign
exchange reserves, which would also establish an increased source
of finance for industrial investment.
The regional development of industry would probably threaten the
security of the small, national industries that would be unable to
compete with larger scale industry, however, it would aid in
establishing more varied intermediate industries. Planning
industrial development on a regional scale, as mentioned earlier,
would eliminate duplication, in addition to offering an opportunity
for deciding the coordination of industrial exchange. Intermediate
industries could be planned for regional industries that would be
supplying capital goods for the region or for export. Without
economic integration for the region the area is deprived of the value
added beneftis from strong intermediate industries. The absence of
regional planning and investment in West Africa also deny the region
the benefits of the "multiplier" effect of local investment.
Investment on a national scale produces a "multiplier" effect,
which spreads the gains of an initial expenditure throughout the local
population. These benefits are usually translated into new employment
opportunities, higher wages, increased industrial purchases, and
improved buying power of the consumer. In West Africa these gains
are limited by the smallness of the national population and the modest
size of initial investments. Greater benefits from the "multiplier"
would be achieved within a broader consumer market, with larger
initial capital outlays being made. Given the potential proliferation
of intermediate industries and the increased capital investments to
support their development, the "multiplier" should produce far greater
gains within a regional market than in a national market.
Opening national boundaries into a regional market offers the
opportunity to utilize a broader base of professionals and experts
within the region. Many of the West African countries, like other
third world countries, are in need of professionals and technicians to
provide essential services and operate their governments.
Individually, each of the countries suffers from varying degrees of
need in different professional skills. By pooling their available
labor resources and coordinating their use throughout the region,
the problem of inadequate technical support could be alleviated. This
rationale for tapping regional labor markets also would apply to
unskilled labor.
A regional pool of unskilled labor would provide industry with
a greater growth potential. Industrial expansion would be more
feasible with the increased labor supply to work in assembly line
type positions. This increased labor could pave the way for increased
output and profits, which would aid in industrial expansion. Beyond
the benefits of utilizing a broad unskilled labor market is the added
security of merging the military base of the fifteen national
governments into a regional defense base.
C. Military Security
The small size and lack of military sophistication of most of the
West Africa states make them vulnerable to external aggression. Some
West Africa states, such as the Gambia, do not even possess a standing
army with which to defend itself.9 The degree of military security
within the region is uneven, with countries functioning close to or
at Gambia's modest level and Nigeria commanding the largest standing
army in "Black Africa". The issue of national security was a
prominent one in the minds of African leaders during the early days
of independence. Many leaders were fearful of external penetration
into their countries, as they witnessed against Patrice Lumumba in
the Congo. As time elapsed in post-independence Africa, this fear
has subsided, although the possibilities of external aggression
continue to be quite real. The only manner in which to effectively
deal with this problem of uneven military strength, under capitalized
and undermanned national armies, is to consolidate the existing
military complexes of the different states into a regional authority.
Short of large infusions of outside capital with which to build up
their national military or security agreements with large regional
powers like Nigeria, regional consolidation appears to be the only
way to insure security to the territories within West Africa.
In summary, the arguements for economic integration in West
Africa have not lost their cogency from the days of Kwame Nkrumah's
Pan-Africanist doctrine. Nkrumah's call for a United States of
Africa may no longer be viewed as a tenable option by African
leaders, however, his rationale for advocating continental unity
maintains its relevance to African development economics. Nkrumah's
idea of central planning for infra-African infrastructure is, perhaps,
the inspiration for the African Development Bank and the creation of
the numerous river basin commissions that have cropped up around
Africa. To be sure, the economic factors that support the move
toward economic integration, such as, economics of scale, increased
pool of savings and foreign exchange, enlarged consumer market,
the multiplier effect and increased labor pool, are relevant to the
West African scene today as much as they were during the early days
of independence. Considering all of these factors, in addition to
improved military security, one would question why'economic integration
has not already come to West Africa. The theories of regional
integration offer insight into the possible constraints to achieving
economic integration in West Africa, in addition to revealing the
potential areas for establishing a greater level of integration in
the area.
II. Regional Integration Theories (how they fit into West Africa)
Many of the theorist on regional integration, whether it be
political or economic, have developed their theories within the
context of the European community; with Latin America emerging as the
new center of interest. The theorist have paid scant attention to
the African environment, with respect to the possibilities for
effective integration there. Because of the neglect of the theorist
to consider integration within the African context, caution must be
exercised in imposing the available integration theories to the
African environment. Each of the theoretical principles must be
tested for its applicability to the African milieu, and perhaps,
rethought to allow for a clearer sense of how regional integration
can be achieved in Africa.
One of the more prominent theories concerned with regional
integration has been the "communication" theory developed by
Karl Deutsch. The essence of his theory was that integration, or
rather, its potential realization could be gauged by the quantitative
transactions between the respective members within the observed
community. The intensity of transactions would indicate the level of
cohesion between the member states. Phillip Jacob and Henry Teune
developed this concept of measuring integration into a list of ten
influences that can allow a regional community to realize
positive integration. The presence of these influences would assure
cohesion between the member states of the union. Ernest Haas, a
respected integration theorist has criticized Jacob and Teune's
approach for being overly concerned with the outcome of integration,
rather than the achievement of an effective integrative process.10
Despite this potential flaw in their theory, the applicability of
Jacob and Teune's theory of integration to West Africa might serve to
highlight the problems and potentialities for integration in the
region.
A. Jacob-Teune - 10 Influences That Can Help Produce Integration
The first of the ten variables (although sequential order does
not appear to be a crucial variable) that Jacob and Teune consider
in their theory of the achievement of integration is geographic
proximity. The importance of this factor is based upon the belief
that, in order for the movement of factors to be facilitated, national
boundaries must be contiquous. Aside from the contiquity of borders,
the physical distance separating communities, travel time between
communities and the cost of transportation should be considered
as indicators of whether the geographic proximity is close enough
for integration to be achieved. In the European community, where
most of the borders are contiquous and intra-European transport is
consistent and rapid, this variable would be evident; this variable
is not easily seen in the West African environment.
Although the borders within the West Africa region are contiquous,
the physical distance between countries is pronounced by the poor
transportation between (and within) countries. The most rapid
means of transport in West Africa is by air, which is neither cost
efficient nor practical for the movement of factors and goods. The
other form of transport in West Africa that can be used for intra-
territorial transit is by rail. The existing railroad infrastructure
in the region does not hold much promise for enhancing the level of
interaction nor in making the geographic position of the states
closer. The only existing inter-territorial railroad links within
the West Africa region is between Dakar, Senegal and Bamako, Mali
and between Abidjan, Ivory Coast and Ouagadougou, Upper Volta.1 2
Considering these factors, it would appear that the West Africa
region does not possess first integrative influenced cited by
Jacob and Teune. This would be so, however, if the factor flows
and trade flows of the region were related to geographic proximity.
In the case of West Africa, trade and factor flows fail to fully
comply with the consideration of geographic proximity.
In the area of inter-regional migration within West Africa,
the migration flows do not always appear between neighboring states.
By looking at Table 1, it is clear that there are some distinct
exceptions to Jacob and Teune's theory of factor flows that require
close geographic proximity. The data on Table 1 indicates that none
of Nigeria's closest neighbors receive Nigerian immigrants, although
countries further removed, such as Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Sierra
Leone receive a significant proportion of Nigerian immigrants. A
similar situation applies to Sierra Leone, where a significant
proportion of its immigrants receive them from neighboring states,
however, there are enough exceptions, such as, Senegal, which sends
almost 33% of its immigrant population to the Ivory Coast, to begin to
Table 1
FOREIGN NATIONALS BY COUNTRY OF NATiONALITY AND COUNTRY OF ENUMERATION, circa 1975
Country of Enumeration
Upper
Volhtaj* Se.nea~l
Sierra
LeoAne Togo Liberia Gambia Mali
Total
EmigrantsNaL ona ty ana , g
3hana X 42,500 17,300 1.000 4,600 30,000 6,600 ... .. 102,000
Ivory Coast 18,300 X 44, 400 1,400 ... ... 1,500 ... 7, 900 73,500
pper Volta 159,300 726,200 X 13,700 800 8,000 - ... 47,700 955,700
Senegal 100 19,200 21 X , ... 200 25,300 11,500 58,400
Sierra Leone 3,000 1,100 400 800 X ... 4,800 400 1,000 11,500
Togo 244,700 12,100 2,900 ... ... X 100 ... ... 9,800
Liberia 4,600 3,400 700 700 11,000 ... X 300 1,000 21,700
Gambia 100 100 100 45,600 3,400 ... ... X 1,000 50,300
Mali 13,400 348,500 21,800 28,900 ... ... 1,400 5,500 X 419,500
Guinea ... 105,800 ... 180,200 41,000 ... 25,400 17,000 24,100 396,100
Nigeria 55,500 49,600 2,000 ... 7,3 ... 1,700 ... ... 116,100
Other 63,100 117,400 8,300 82,700 11,300 22,000 14,000 3,800 5,800 325,800
(Immigrants) Total 562,100 ,1,425,900, 100,000 355,000 79,400 60,000 55,700 52,300 100,000 2,7909400
... Negligible - Not Applicable \*Estimate only
Source: Migration in West Africa: Demographic Aspects, Zachariah & Conde
Country of Ivory
Gh% Coas ncv
question the relevance of geographic proximity to the integrative
process. Another area in which the consideration of geographic
proximity is questionable in the West African context is the trade
flows of the region.
Intra-African trade continues to constitute a miniscule
proportion of total trade in the West Africa region. Some of the
exceptions to this are states, such as Niger, Mali, Upper Volta
and the Ivory Coast. Despite the modest level of intra-African trade
in the region, there are several distinct trade flows that exist
between West Africa states. As illustrated in Map 1, and Appendix 1
the trade flows in the region do indicate a degree of intensity
between neighboring states, although there are some clear exceptions.
Nigeria demonstrates a substantial level of trade with distant
West Africa states, such as Senegal, Sierra Leone and the Ivory
Coast. Although most of Nigeria's exports to these regional states
is confined to petroleum products, there are other trade flows in the
region that link distant states. Looking again at Map 1, it is
clear that there is active import and export occuring between Senegal
and the Ivory Coast. In the case of Senegal, there is active export
with a far off state; Benin. Given these trade links between
distant states within the region, geographic proximity would
appear to have limited predictive capacity for determining the
climate for integration. This is not to suggest that geographic
proximity is not a relevant consideration when attempting to form an
economic union. The point here is that geographic proximity may not
be the element that will signal success or failure for integration
in the region. Regardless of the problems of gauging the predictive
MAP 1
Heaviest Import/Export Flows Within West Africa
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capacity of geographic proximity in West Africa, it must be conceded
that, despite the presence of contiquous borders, the region ranks low
on the variable of geographic proximity as a result of its poor trans-
port and communications infrastructure.
The second variable that Jacob and Teune consider as an
important influence on integration is social homogeneity. Within this
term are several measures to determine whether social homogeneity is
present. Among these indicators are; wealth or income, education,
class or status, religion, race, language, ethnic identification,
values, and "character". The validity of some of these indicators
have to be questioned on their face before considering their place
within the West African context. In the European community, where
Jacob and Teune's theory was first considered, the relevance of some
of these indicators is not apparent. A step by step review will bear
this point out.
On several of these indicators, Europe would demonstrate itself
to be more homogeneous than other regions of the world. In areas,
such as wealth, education, race and class, the European region
tends to have countries that are fairly equal. In the other areas,
such as religion, language, ethnic identification and values, the
European community is far more diverse. Although there is a degree
of religious tolerance in Europe, there are many well established and
large religious denominations in the region. In this regard, religious
affiliation would not be a strong integrative factor, unless each
of the denominations called across the national borders for
continental unity. The diversity in language and ethnic identification
within Europe surpasses the scope of religious divisions in the region.
The values of the member states of the European community would also
have to be considered more heterogeneous than homogeneous, as a result
of the spread of communism and socialism within the, traditionally,
capitalist West Europe. On each of these variables Europe has shown
itself to be heterogeneous.
Despite these areas of social incompatibility, the European
Economic Community has been successful at achieving the integration
of its member state's economies. It is doubtful that the indicators
described above for measuring social homogeneity will be any more
reliable in gauging the integrative capacity of West Africa. The
various indicators seem to be better geared to point out potential
connective links that could be exploited to achieve integration, than
in signalling areas of possible cleavages within the region. The
Jacob and Teune social homogeneity variable is far more complexed
in West Africa, than in Europe, with West Africa experiencing
incomplete consistency of these indicators within national borders.
The national borders of West Africa, established during
colonialism, often divided ethnic groups on either side of an
international boundary. Throughout the colonial era and into the
post-independence era, ethnic groups that have been split by
international borders have defied the divisions and moved freely across
borders.13 Aside from this connective link between people within
the region, major languages of the region, such as French, English,
Hausa and even "pidgin" English have served to facilitate greater
interaction between people of the West Africa area. Religion has
also spanned the national borders of West Africa, with large
Christian, Muslim and traditional faiths flourishing throughout the
region.14 Despite these connective links, combined with a traditional
belief in African unity, there are many internal, national imbalances
within West Africa. As mentioned earlier, none of these should
necessarily signal the hopelessness of regional integration. Each of
these national cleavages should be accounted for, however, since they
do reflect a degree of internal volatility that may be injurious to
national stability. As will be seen later in the research, instability
within a member state can be damaging to regional integration.
All of the states that comprise the West Africa region have
prominent ethnic and religious minority groups.15 These minority
groups are often at odds with the politically dominant national
faction, which has, at times, led to internal disorder. This was the
case in Nigeria, during their civil war, when the Ibo minority
attempted to secede from Nigeria. In the area of ethnic and religious
minorities, they can serve as inter-territorial links by which to
establish regional cohesion, but they can also cause internal political
instability. The role that they play is not easy to predict, and
therefore, it is an uncertain game to attempt to use ethnic and
religious homogeneity as an evaluative indicator of integrative
capacity in West Africa.
Other obvious internal imbalances within the West Africa states
include large inequalities in national income distribution, literacy,
rural to urban population densities and professional and skilled
workers to unskilled workers. Each of these variables could be the
basis for internal dissent and instability. Paradoxically, these
variables could also be utilized to develop inter-territorial links
with others of the same class. The volatility of these variables,
internally and inter-territorially, make predicting integrative
capacity on Jacob and Teune's social homogeneity criteria in West
Africa a risky proposition. Given the volatility of these variables,
it is not clear how the West Africa region measures on the variable.
Measuring the number of interactions between member communities,
as the third of the Jacob and Teune integrative influences, was
originally developed as a theory of regional integration by Karl
Deutsch. Commonly known as "communication theory" of integration,
Deutsch postulated that the cohesion of an integrated community could
be measured by the "quantitative densities of transactions" between
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member states. Haas criticized this method of measurement because
it failed to consider the quality of interactions and how an
integrative process could be structured.17 In the West Africa context,
with little communications infrastructure connecting states in the
region, there would not be many opportunities to increase the density
of transactions between states. This does not, however, mean that
interation between states in West Africa is non existent. Despite
the suggested weaknesses of Deutsch's communication theory, West
Africa does display an encouraging amount of interaction within the
region.
The variables that Deutsch used to measure inter-regional trans-
actions were telephone messages, radio broadcasts and mail deliveries.
The difficulty of measuring these within West Africa is far greater
than in Europe, where Deutsch was initially applying his theory. Aside
from problems of measurement, given the poor communications
infrastructure in West Africa, one would assume (based on Deutsch's
theory) that interaction between sub-regions in West Africa was
virtually impossible. Data on West Africa migration illustrate,
however, that this is not the case. The number of immigrants that
move throughout the region, on a regular basis (seasonal, temporary
employment), indicate that a significant level of interaction occurs
in West Africa.
Table 2 illustrates the volume of emigrants that have settled in
countries within West Africa. Although many of these emigrants
chose to permanently settle in the country of destination, a large
number return on a regular basis to their country of origin.18 This
would suggest that there is a substantial level of interaction being
conducted by the people of the region. Given this data, which
indicates a moderate to high influence on this variable, it would
appear that on the variable of community transactions, West Africa
has a foundation for establishing a degree of integration of its
population.
The final seven integrative influences outlined by Jacob and Teune
can be subdivided into social, attitudinal factors and political
factors. The social factors include indicators, such as "cognitive
knowledge", shared functional interests and communal "character"
or social "motive" of community. Among the political indicators are,
"the structural frame or system of power and decision-making, the
sovereignty-dependency status of the community, governmental
effectiveness and previous integrative experiences".19 The social
factors are tangentially related to many of the indicators discussed
under the variable of social homogeneity. The distinguishing.
element between these two sets of variables is that the social factors
considered now are concerned more with values and attitudes as they
Table 2
PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL MIGRATION STREAMS, circa 1975
Number of Total
Origin Destination Emigrants Emigrants
Gambia Senegal 45,600 49,300
Ghana Togo 100,000
Ivory Coast 42,500
Upper Volta 19,200
Subtotal 161,700 173,900
Guinea Senegal 180,200
Ivory Coast 105,800
Sierra Leone 41,000
Liberia 25,400
Gambia 17,000
Subtotal 369,400 369,700
Ivory Coast Upper Volta 49,100
Ghana 18,300
Subtotal 67,400 72,300
Liberia Sierra Leone 11,000 21,300
Mali Ivory Coast 348,500
Senegal 28,900
Upper Volta 24,000
Ghana 13,400
Subtotal 414,800 421,900
Nigeria Ghana 55,500
Ivory Coast 49,600
Subtotal 105,100 116,400
Senegal Gambia 25,300
Ivory Coast 19,200
Subtotal 44,500 47,300
Togo Ghana 244,700
Ivory Coast 12,100
Subtotal 256,800 260,500
Upper Volta Ivory Coast 726,200
Ghana 159,300
Subtotal 899,200 908,100
Source: Migration in West Africa, Zachariah & Conde
relate to the integrative process.
Cognitive proximity and shared functional interest are similar
indicators that concern the degree of common interests between two or
more groups. Cognitive proximity, more precisely, means the knowledge
that each party has of the others commonality, measured by attitudes
and images held by each party of the other.20 Shared functional
interests can be thought of as the operationalization of cognitive
proximity, with the interests of each party "to devote major effort
for fulfillment of a common goal".21 In the West Africa context,
there are variant levels of commonality between groups and equally
variant degrees of common interests.
As mentioned under the section on social homogeneity, religion,
language, and ethnic identification can all serve as factors that are
regionally integrative and internally disintegrative. The knowledge
of each groups commonality on these variables is established in
West Africa, with language groups freely associating across borders,
in addition to ethnic and religious groups. Translating the common
knowledge of these sub-groups into a directed regional action is not
clear. Other groups, based on class, appear to have more of a basis
on which to amass regional action or to work against an integrative
process.
Unlike in Europe, where there is a measure of "elite complimentary"
and continental pressure groups, such as labor, business and
legislators,22 West Africa lacks integrative links between its elite,
or even among its working class. National elite within West Africa
tend to be somewhat skeptical of regional integration. Many of them
enjoy their elite status as a consequence of tariff protected
national industries or the national bureaucratic machinery. Regional
consolidation signals to many the loss of these privileges derived
from national government. Links between national labor groups are
also weak. The costs and benefits of regional integration are not
clear to labor, despite the commonality of their condition and their
common knowledge of each other's position. On the variables of
cognitive knowledge and shared functional interests West Africa would
not be judged as an area conducive to regional integration. The area,
in fact, on these two variables, might be seen as being prone to
regional disintegration. The final social indicator of Jacob and Teune
would seem to hold greater promise for West Africa regional integration.
Communal "character" or social "motive" refers to the "attitudes,
values and patterns of overt behavior which may be the product of
cultural inheritance that makes a whole group act in a distincitve
manner." 23 This variable is designed to measure the degree of
receptiveness of the group to the concept of political action that
would produce regional integration. In the European context this might
apply to the Protestant work ethic and its compatibility with industrial
capitalism or European pride as a rallying point around which to base
regional unity. West Africa has similar foundations on which to base
regional unity, however, this unifying "character" has not proven to be
sufficient in binding the states of the region into an integrated
community. One of these unifying ethics has been Leopold Senghor's
concept of "negritude".
Senghor advocated that the "common cultural heritage, values and
spirit of Black civilization could serve as the cement and building
blocks for economic and political unification or integration of
Africa."24 This concept had good currency in West Africa during the
early independence era. Nkrumah added to Senghor's "negritude"
philosophy by arguing for Pan-African unity based upon the common
political, economic and cultural history of all Africans. Nkrumah
and Senghor used their political positions of "negritude" and Pan-
Africanism as the basis for forming the Mali Federation and the Union
of African States. Both of these attempts at regional integration
failed quickly, despite the rallying cry of the leaders, and the
receptiveness of their constituents. For the European community, the
unifying principles of European solidarity and pride may have been
positive influences on the integrative process. In West Africa, the
political rallying cries of African unity, racial pride and common
opposition to colonialism have proven to be ineffective influences on
the move toward integration. This is not to suggest that the philosophy
of African unity, based upon the commonality of the African experience,
is not a sound foundation through which to establish regional
integration. The point here is that the use of this variable as the
sole connective tie between states in West Africa is insufficient
for meeting the demands of regional integration.
Among the political variables that have been outlined, the West
Africa region satisfies the variable of previous integrative experience.
The former French West Africa sub-region has a legacy of regional
integration that extends throughout the French colonial presence in
West Africa. Attempts at regional integration since independence
have displayed varying degrees of success. The most rewarding regional
initiatives have been those tailored for regional cooperation, such
as the Entente Council. More ambitious efforts at political and
economic integration, such as the Mali Federation, have faced un-
successful outcomes. Other forms of regionalism among the former
French West Africa states that have been successful, such as the
organizing of national currencies in the francozone nave been under the
auspices of the French government. In spite of external involvement
in the sub-region, the former French West Africa region has a better
established history of attempts at regional integration than former
British West Africa.
The French government administered its colonies under a federal
system, with the central governmental authority based in Dakar. The
British governed their West Africa colonies individually, with little
coordination between states. By governing their West Africa colonies
separately, the British failed to establish and cultivate a tradition
of cooperation between the states. Upon independence, the former
British colonies continued to demonstrate scant interest in regional
cooperation. During the 1970's, the former British states have shown
more interest in regional cooperation and have joined in several
regional groupings.25 Considering the former French and British
West Africa states experience at integration efforts in the past,
including current initiatives, the West Africa region would rank high
on the variable of previous integration experience as outlined by
Jacob and Teune.
The structural frame of these groupings, in addition to the
national political structure is another variable among the political
factors that Jacob and Teune have outlined in their ten variables.
The consideration of structural frame refers to the arrangement of
political action and whether the system is amenable to cooperative
relationships.26 Factors to assess within this variable are whether
the political structure is pluralistic or monolith, socially :
stratified or mobile and whether political authority is centralized or
dispersed. Each of these factors reveal a different level of influence
on the integration process, depending whether it is applied in a
national or regional context. For example, having political authority
centralized within a nation may be beneficial to internal cohesion,
but may operate as a disintegrative force on a regional scale. Ernest
Haas, in citing the problems of integration in the third world, has
pointed to the lack of internal pluralism as the cause of poor
integrative links between lobby groups. For Haas, a nationally
centralized, monolithic state is counterproductive to the integrative
process on a regional scale. Expanding on the Haas perspective, lobby
groups that operate on a regional scale are essential to the integrative
process. These lobby groups are unable to develop within a
authoritarian, centralized nation state. The existence of pluralism
and popular dissent within West Africa operates to varying degrees
throughout the region.
In states like Nigeria, there are several political parties,
however, it was not long ago that Nigeria functioned under a military
government. The same degree of volatility has existed in Ghana.
Another side of this story is countries, such as the Ivory Coast and
Guinea, which have maintained the same leadership since independence.
Perhaps, the uncertainty of the political climate or the tendency
toward centralized national authority has discouraged viable lobby
groups. Regardless of the political environment, though, the mutual
interests of inter-regional groups with which to establish lobby
groups is not as apparent in West Africa. This situation was described
under the section on shared functional interests. Given the tendency
to centralized political authority on the national level, the variable
of sovereignty-dependency status appears to be an influence that
West Africa would have a difficult time producing. In light of the
inapplicability of the sovereignty-dependency status variable to the
West Africa environment, the consideration of governmental effectiveness
of a regional authority seems to be premature. To better appreciate
the incompatibility of these two variables to West Africa, a definition
of what they measure should be given.
Sovereignty-dependency status is a scale by which to measure the
degree of political authority centered within a community. As described
by Jacob and Teune, "Sovereignty is synonymous with absolute integration
within a community and absolute disintegration among communities."28
It is the presence of absolute integration within a community that
Kwame Nkrumah sought for Africa when he advocated for a continental
central authority to govern the states of Africa. It may be recalled
that Nkrumah set the political unity of the continent as a precondition
to economic unity and development. The indicators of sovereignty
within a community consider the political and economic union of the
member states, rather than focusing on only one variable. Within the
political realm, the primary measure of community sovereignty is the
extent to which authority is centralized and the ability of the central
authority to enforce its rules and laws. The realization of Nkrumahism
in Africa would have produced a high score on this indicator, with the
federal government of the continent legislating and 'enforcing laws for
all of Africa. The reality of Africa is that nowhere on the continent
is there a continental or regional central authority that has the
power to legislate or enforce laws. Not even the OAU has the level
of authority necessary to supercede the national sovereignty of the
individual states.29 The ECOWAS Treaty calls for the creation of a
commission to enforce certain elements of the treaty, however, it is
still too early to assess the effectiveness of this regional
organization.30 On the economic side, (West Africa is less on the
economic side,) West Africa is less integrated, based upon the
variable of sovereignty, than it is in the political domain, although
there are some interesting exceptions.
One of the measures on the economic side for assessing community
sovereignty is the percentage of the tax base that is shared. There
are redistributive formulas used in several West Africa regional
bodies, such as the Entente Council and ECOWAS, however, these are
based upon lost tariff revenues of the poorer states resulting from
economic integration. At present, there is no central taxing authority
in West Africa. The redistributive activity of the regional groups
in the area could possibly be judged as centralized taxing, however,
the taxing is not comprehensive enough throughout the region and funds
are not drawn enough for this to be considered a shared tax base.
The other measures deal directly with infra-Africa trade and
population flows. One of these measures specifically looks at the
"percentage of population directly dependent on (employed by or in)
other political communities."31 As Table 1 had illustrated earlier,
there is a sizeable West Africa population that migrants throughout
the area. The table does not indicate the dependency of the migrant
population on employment from the destination countries. Table 3
shows the number of immigrants that are employed in their country of
residence. This data would suggest that, on this single measure of
the economic factor, there is a measure of community sovereignty.
On other measures, such as mutual trade within the region as compared
to external trade, the West Africa region is not consistent. As
indicated in Appendix 1, there are some West Africa states that conduct
a large percentage of their import/export of goods within the region.
This data, however, is not conclusive, since there are many more West
Africa states that conduct little trade within the region. Apparently,
the international migration in West Africa is the only measure on which
the region displays any level of community sovereignty.
Without community sovereignty, it would be difficult to measure
governmental effectiveness. Governmental effectiveness concerns the
ability of the central authority to meet the needs of its constituents.
The absence of any regional government authority, in West Africa, makes
the consideration of this variable meaningless.
In summarizing the ten integrative influences of Jacob and Teune,
with respect to its applicability to West Africa, there are several
shortocmings in the theory. As pointed out be Haas, their theory
over-emphasizes the achievement of an outcome without considering
the process needed to establish a foundation for integration to
develop. This point is particularly relevant for West Africa,
where the concern is more in how to structure an effective integration
process, than to test whether their existing institutions and region
met a list of integrative influences. The question in West Africa is
how to get to the destination; not whether they have requisite
influences.
Table 3
EMPLOYED IMMIGRANTS AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER BY COUNTRY
OF RESIDENCE AND SEX, circa 1975
Country
Ivory Coast
Ghana
Senegal
Togo
Sierra Leone
Upper Volta
Liberia
Gambia
Total
Total
698,800
224,300
157,200
49,800
43,700
38,200
35,400
32,700
1,280,100
Male
580,900
165,400
116,600
33,900
35,800
25,100
28,300
26,600
1,012,600
Female
177,900
58,900
40,600
15,900
7,900
13,100
7,100
6,100
267,400
Source: Migration in West Africa, Zachariah & Conde
Assuming that one were to place themselves within the Jacob and
Teune theoretical framework, there are additional flaws with the theory.
It is not clear how much of each variable is necessary for integration
to be achieved. Is geographic proximity more important than shared
functional interests of is social homogeneity crucial to the entire
theory? Kwame Nkrumah stressed the variable of sovereignty-dependency,
which produced little success. In short, is there any logical ordering
of variables to achieve the desired outcome. Aside from this issue,
there is no indication of what is the required mix of variables and
whether their sequential order is relevant to the outcome. Does one
achieve a predetermined level of transactions before establishing
the structural frame of power and decision-making that will allow
integration to occur? There is also no discussion of the political
and social level at which these variables become relevant to the cohesion
of the community. For example, is there a certain volume of trans-
actions that would indicate the achievement of integration or a degree
of social homogeneity that would be sufficient for integration to
occur? Beyond these gaps in the theory, there are variables that
are used to measure integration that do not fit well into West
Africa.
As discussed earlier, West Africa conducts exchange of goods and
factors despite constraints of geographical distance. This is not to
say that greater interaction could not be realized with improved trans-
port. The point here is that the constraints of geographical distance
have not prevented interaction within West Africa. Other variables,
such as social homogeneity and transactions have shown themselves to be
more complexed and poor measures of the integration process in West
Africa. The political variables, with the exception of previous
integrative experience, are not measurable in West Africa as a
consequence of the absence of the necessary institutions. These
variables could only evaluate existing.integration efforts; not the
climate for integration in West Africa. Jacob and Teune's list of
integrative influences and Deutsch's communication theory of integration
are not the only theories of regional integration that could be tested
in West Africa. A theory that has been used in analyzing European
integration is the traditional, neo-classical economic theory of
integration.
B. Traditional Neo-Classical Economic Theory
Traditional neo-classical economic theory provides member states
within a region an evaluative criteria for assessing the economic
costs and benefits of regional economic integration. The basic
evaluative measures of this theory are trade creation and trade
diversion. The concept of trade creation refers back to the
phenomenon of national industry displacement resulting from regional
competition. To the extent that high cost, inefficient industries in
member states are displaced by low cost competition from within the
economic community, trade creation has occured.32 The benefits of trade
creation are felt by the consumer within the region, who pays less for
goods produced in the region, and by larger industries, which enjoy
the returns of increased economies of scale. The costs associated
with trade diversion result from the lack of commitment of member
states to purchase each others goods, in favor of low cost external
imports. This most typically occurs when the costs of goods from
member states exceeds the cost of external imports.33 Measuring trade
creation and trade diversion prior to forming an economic community
is difficult. How does one measure opportunity costs? How can the
comparative costs of goods be determined before the establishment of
new industries? This is particularly complexed in the West Africa
context, where attempts at economic integration have not been fully
implemented and are still new. To provide guidance for those that are
concerned with whether economic integration is a pragmatic course for
their country and who realize the difficulties of measuring trade
creation and trade diversion, the neo-classical economic theory
includes a list of basic conditions for economic integration to be
successful.
The basic conditions for economic integration enumerated by the
theory are similar to the Jacob and Teune approach, in that it uses
indicators to determine the climate for economic integration. By
using static, economic indicators, the neo-classical economic approach
is limited to examining the product of current integrative action,
rather than observing the process that leads to improved regional
integration. Despite this gap in the theory, the neo-classical economic
approach allows for an assessment of the intensity of integration
between member states. The theory makes use of trade data as the
basis for determining the degree of integration between member state
economies, and in this regard, may be helpful to those involved in
economic integration, who may be interested in knowing how their efforts
are progressing. One of the basic conditions that the theory uses
to gauge the intensity of regional economic integration is the
percentage of trade that is conducted within the region.
Using the percentage of trade within the West Africa region as a
measure of economic integration conveys an uneven picture of the trade
patterns in West Africa. Graph 1 illustrates the percentage of total
export within West Africa from 1964 to 1973, charting the states with
the highest percentages. As shown on the graph, Upper Volta and Mali
conduct the highest percentage of their national export within the
region, with Niger a distant third. The graph fails to indicate,
however, the types of commodities that these countries export to the
region. The major export items of these three countries to the West
African region are bovine cattle and other livestock.34 These items
could be easily displaced by external imports, and more importantly,
they are disposable goods that do not add to the economic growth of
the importing states. Aside from this point, the weakness of the
percentage of trade indicator is heightened by the relatively low
volume of trade conducted by Upper Volta, Mali and Niger.
Graph 2 shows the volume of trade in Africa by the largest West
Africa exporters. As revealed by the data, in spite of Upper Volta
and Niger's high percentage of intra-community exports than the Ivory
Coast and (since 1971), Senegal and Nigeria. It should be added that
these high volume exporters, export raw materials, in addition to
essential intermediate goods, such as cement, cotton fabrics, and ply-
wood.35 The high volume and diversity of goods that are traded by
these states within the region would appear to signal a measure of
reliance by the importing states on the export of these goods. It
should be noted at the same time, that the high percentage of national
export to the region by Upper Volta, Mali and Niger would also indicate
a degree of reliance on regional markets, which would reflect their
receptiveness to regional economic integration. Looking at the high
Graph I
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volume exporters in the region and their primary importing states does
not diminish the relevance of focusing on the percentage of national
export to the region, but rather, offers a broader picture of the trade
patterns within West Africa.
The West Africa states with the highest volume of intra-community
imports are generally the states with the highest percentage of intra-
community imports; with the exception of Nigeria and Senegal. The
matrix on Table 4 shows the direction of trade between West Africa
states, with the volume and percentages given at the bottom. Among
the states with a high volume and percentage of West Africa imports
are: Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leona
and Upper Volta. It should be noted that the Ivory Coast and Ghana
have a modest percentage of intra-regional trade, however, their
numbers are considered significant in light of their, historical
extra-regional reliance on imports. An interesting piece of data is
the high percentage (30% and 25% respectively) and volume ($US25,319,000
and 21,775,000) of intra-regional imports for Mali and Upper Volta.
Their economies appear to be the most highly integrated in the West
Africa region, with 51.2% of Mali's export and 54% of Upper Volta's
export in 1971 conducted within the region.36 The degree of integration
measured by the intensity of trade within the region for these economies
and the other major importing and exporting states of the region can be
better observed by detailing the major commodities traded between
states.
The types of commodities traded within the region can reflect
the degree of potential complimentarity between member state economies.
Complimentarity, or rather the potential for complimentarity, is one
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of the basic conditions enumerated by neo-classical economic theorist
who try to assess the climate for regional economic integration.
Complimentarity is important in that it reflects the extent of
commodity exchange that could potentially occur between states. To be
sure, potential complimentarity of economies is a broader variable than
existing complimentarity between states and is also more difficult to
quantify and measure. Existing trade patterns between West Africa
states may offer a foundation for determining the current condition
and allow for a more solid basis for conjecturing about future
potentialities.
One of the more interesting trade flows in West Africa is between
Nigeria and the West Africa community. Nigeria conducted more than
US $64 million of export trade within West Africa in the first quarter
of 1975, however US $63 million was in petroleum related products.37
Outside of petroleum products, Nigeria does not involve itself in West
Africa trade. This is not to diminish the importance of Nigerian fuel
exports to the region. These exports are essential to the national
industries and overall economic well being of the importing states.
In this regard, Nigeria's export to the region is complimentary with
the economies of the region; none of which export fuel (other than the
Ivory Coast). Map 2 (see Appendix A) illustrates the trade flows
between Nigeria and its major regional customers, in addition to
showing its major area suppliers. As shown by the map, outside of
meat, cement (and in 1975 a large order of trucks and lorries) and
small food items, Nigeria does not import much from the region, nor
does it export much to the region other than fuel products. This
scenario does not hold true for a smaller West Africa state like Togo,
56
MAP 2
Commodities Traded Between Nigeria and West African States (1975)
which has a more diverse composition of commodities in its West Africa
trade.
Although in 1973 Togo received only .6% of its imports from the
West Africa region, 1975 data shows Togo trading a wide range of goods
(primary and some secondary) with West Africa states. Contrasted with
the high volume trade of Nigeria, Togo displays a wider selection of
complimentary goods between West Africa states than Nigeria. The scope
of commodities traded between Togo and the West Africa states is
displayed on Map 3 (see Appendix 5). The import flows for Togo are
more heavily concentrated from the former French West Africa states
than from the anglophone West Africa states. Part of the reason for
this is the inclusion of Togo in the CFA franc zone and its membership
in the Entente Council, both of which will be discussed later in the
paper. The diversity of commodities that Togo imports and exports,
whether within the CFA franc zone states or beyond, suggests the
existence of a degree of complimentarity between Togo and several
West Africa states. The intermediate goods that the Ivory Coast
(aluminium worked, plywood, chemical products, finished parts
aluminium) and Ghana (lumber and other paper) export to Togo offer
a hopeful sign for enhancing the potentialities for increased inter-
state trading and industrial growth in Togo. The increased trade of
intermediate goods is an important variable to focus on, when
attempting regional economic integration, because it translates into
more viable intermediate industries and a more intricate input-output
matrix for the region.
The West Africa region does not have complimentarity on most of
its raw material exports. Most of the countries of the region are
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competitive with each other on these type of exports to external
markets. Given that countries, such as the Ivory Coast and Ghana
will compete with each other on commodities like cocoa, the
potentialities for interstate exchange would not be with these raw
materials, but instead, on non-competitive commodities. As in the Togo
case, these commodities could be in the field of intermediate, or even
capital goods. A basic condition for the neo-classical economic
theorist, who attempts to ascertain the potentialities for this type
of expanded inter-regional trade is a low percentage of GNP in foreign
trade.
West Africa, like most developing countries, has a high percentage
of its GNP in foreign trade.38 Even for the relatively industrialized
countries of West Africa, such as Nigeria or the Ivory Coast, a high
percentage of their GNP is attributable to foreign trade. As shown
in Table 4, most of this foreign trade is with West Europe. On
this basic condition of the neo-classical economic approach, West
Africa would not be judged a region conducive to economic integration
since a high percentage of GNP in foreign trade is felt to be dis-
integrative. On the positive side, one of the basic premises of neo-
classical economic theory, with respect to economic integration, is
that a larger economic union equals larger absolute benefits. If
this is a valid premise, the West Africa region should offer greater
benefits than the former French West Africa community and other sub-
regional unions that have been attempted. The down side of this is
that neo-classical theorist assume that large disparities between
member states will result in an unsuccessful economic union. This
would be particularly problematic for the West Africa region, where
there are tremendous disparities between states.
In the area of population and gross national product, many of the
West Africa states are similar. Grave disparities exist between the
West Africa states and the Ivory Coast, Ghana, and most particularly,
Nigeria. These disparities are clear when looking at Table 5,
which shows Nigeria possessing 57.16% of the region's population and
69.2% of its gross national product. Although there are some theorist
that believe it is beneficial to have large, powerful nations serving
as "prime movers"39 in developing an economically integrated community,
the neo-classical theorist may have a valid point, in the West Africa
context, when they suggest that large disparities can work as a
disintegrative force.
Many of the smaller West Africa nations are fearful of the power
of their larger neighbors. They are concerned about the possibilities
of being politically, if not economically, overpowered by the shear
force of countries like Nigeria. Ironically, Nigeria has been an
active force in the creation of the Economic Community of West Africa
States, and is making accomodations to relax the anxieties of the
smaller states in the region. Given this latest turn in West Africa
affairs, perhaps the concept of "prime movers" will come to take the
place of the belief that large disparities are absolutely dis-
integrative. Whether there will be modifications in the neo-classical
approach is not known, but it is clear that there are problems with
its application to West Africa.
The concept of trade creation and trade diversion provides a
helpful way to look at the costs and benefits of integration. The
emphasis here is on who is receiving trade and who is gaining from the
Table 5
POPULATION AND GNP (AT MARKET PRICES 1979) OF
ECOWAS COUNTRIES (1979)
Country
Benin
Cape Verde
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
Upper Volta
Total ECOWAS
Population
(000)
3,427
306
586
11,327
5,269
779
8,076
1,802
6,569
1,589
5,155
82,503
5,525
3,383
2,494
5,642
144,332
% of
Total
2.37
.2
.4
7.84
3.65
.53
5.59
1.24
4.48
1.1
3.57
57.16
3.82
2.34
1.72
3.9
100%
GNP
(US $ Millions)
860
80
150
4,540
1,470
140
8,560
890
930
510
1,410
55,310
2,370
840
860
1,000
79,920
Source: 1980 World Bank Atlas: Population, Per Capita Product and
Growth Rates
% of
Total
1.0
.1
.18
5.68
1.83
.17
10.7
1.1
1.16
.63
1.76
69.2
2.69
1.05
1.0
1.25
100%
trade flows resulting from economic union. A drawback of this concept
is that prior to actually entering an economic grouping it is hard
to determine the scope of potential gains from trade creation or
losses from trade diversion.40 Given this constraint, the use of
this measure can be restricted to the regular evaluations that
economist will make of the costs and benefits while participating in
an economic group.
The fundamental problem with the basic indicators (as mentioned
previously) is that they are static economic indicators that fail to
consider issues of process; instead focusing soley on outcome. With
regards to the West Africa region, the proportion of trade conducted
within the region provides an incomplete measure of economic inte-
gration. Some of the states reflect a high proportion of trade within
the region, while others, often neighboring states, demonstrate very
low percentages. This uneveness within the region, in addition to the
complexities of trade volume as opposed to trade percentages, makes
the data produced from this variable inconclusive. There are also
problems with using the percentage of GNP in foreign trade as an
indicator of the integrative potential of West Africa.
African leaders realize that a high percentage of their GNP is
in foreign trade. Many of those that are eager to change this
situation view regional economic integration as a means to alter the
current structures that lock them into this condition. Being told
that the existence of this problem will deny them the possible remedy
places them in a circle in which they cannot escape. Neo-classical
theorist fail to appreciate that to African leaders who are pushing
for economic integration, the process is designed to make structural
changes in the regional economy; not to satisfy a list of preconditions
that only exist in the industrialized world. This perspective will
be discussed under the section on the economic development theory of
regional economic integration.
C. Federalist Appraoch
A commonly referred to theory of regional integration is the
federalist approach. This theory is distinguished from the three
theories discussed thus far in that its focus is completely within
the political realm. Federalist stress the importance of declarations
and the written structures that lead to regional union when assessing
the degree of success of an integration process. Unlike the theories
referred to thus far, the federalist perspective considers questions
of process, as well as those of product. The theory asks whether the
treaty structures between states are designed to produce a higher
concentration of authority within a federal institution, or if
authority is being diffused. In short, federalist are concerned with
the transfer process of authority from local institutions to regional
bodies. The product side of the theory is devoted to the development
of institutions that will facilitate federalism and the transfer of
resources from local bodies to the federal institutions. This
slow transfer of authority from local states to a federal authority
was observed by Haas when he studied the European Economic Community.
He cited the existence of supranational trade associations, unions and
political parties, in addition to a common assembly of legislators
from the member states and a High Authority to arbitrate disputes as
providing the federal infrastructure for a significant level of
positive "spillover" to occur.41 Haas' concept of spillover will be
discussed later, however, with respect to the federalist approach,
the development of federal institutions helped to foster regional
integration in Europe. The incidence of authority transfer to a
federal body in West Africa is uncommon, although there has been a
recent proliferation of regional institutions.
The most ardent supporter of federalism in Africa has been
Kwame Nkrumah. The basic foundation of Nkrumahism is that the
unification of the continent requires the formation of a central
authority that would serve as the head of a federal system of govern-
ment. It has been stated at various points that Nkrumah viewed the
formation of the federal apparatus, with its continental institutions,
as a necessary precondition for economic integration and development.
Another important feature of Nkrumahism was that the newly independent
African nations agree to the transfer of power and authority to a
central body prior to implementing their national development programs.
Federalist tend to view the process of regionalism through institution
building as being a gradual movement of power from the local to the
regional. Perhaps one of the weakenesses of the Nkrumah model of
federalism was that it emphasized the immediate transition from the
local to the regional, with respect to the division of power and
authority. Other variables have been considered, when assessing to
demise of the Pan-African movement (based on Nkrumahism), with each
of them playing a role in narrowing the integration movement to sub-
regional economic integration. Within the West Africa region this
form of regional integration has included the recent establishment of
several regional bodies.
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa has been an
active force in promoting regionalism in Africa. The ECA has conducted
numerous feasibility studies, sponsored many seminars and has
contributed to the formation of almost 30 regional organizations in
Africa.42 Most of these regional organizations have not been
structured to facilitate the transfer of national authority to a
federal apparatus with which to enforce the agreements of the regional
organizations. The majority of these organizations are cooperative
ventures between autonomous states that have chosen to work together
around a functional interest. This format is compatible with early
recommendations made by the ECA on the issue of establishing an
African Common Market;
"One conclusion to be drawn is that any integration
scheme in Africa must include cooperation in such
strategic fields as basic industries, transport and
development of natural resources, and must provide
for concerted action on projects of multinational
scope. "43
This should not suggest that political federation for Africa was
not endorsed by the ECA, but rather that, until the idea was judged to
be feasible, ad hoc authorities (typically a joint commercial venture)
and inter-governmental organizations (body that requires unanimous
support and execution and implementation of decisions are left to
member states) were the recommended types of regional associations.44
It should be noted that even the Organization of African Unity, which
is made up of 50 independent African nations, is limited in its powers
to implement resolutions, which are passed by a two-thirds majority.45
Considering the limitedness of Africa's regional organizations,
particularly in the area of authority transfer to federal institutions,
the processes necessary for regional integration in West Africa appear
to be lacking. This assumption, however, should be prefaced with an
understanding that the number and powers of regional bodies in West
Africa have grown considerably in the last ten years.
There are presently thirty regional organizations in West Africa.
Eighteen of these thirty organizations were established after 1970.46
Most of these organizations follow the pattern of early ECA
recommendations; ad hoc authorities or inter-governmental organizations.
Clearly, none of these bodies involve the type of authority transfer
that federalist look for in regional integration efforts, however,
there are several regional organizations that do display a measure of
authority transfer.
Of the thirty regional organizations functioning in West Africa,
there are four regional entities that have as their objectives, the
economic integration of West Africa. Aside from these four
organizations, there are four regional organs that provide functional
support to the integration efforts of the Entente Council, CEAO and
ECOWAS. These four are particularly interesting because they possess
a degree of central authority over the regions currency and exchange
operations.
The West African Monetary Union (UMOA), which covers most of
former French West Africa, is operated by a Council of Ministers,
consisting of two ministers from each member state.47 The objective
of UMOA is "to maintain a legal common tender in the interests of the
economies of the Member States."48 UMOA also operates Banque Centrale
des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Quest (BCEAO), which issues the CFA franc
in UMOA countries. This centralized authority of UMOA and BCEAO aids
in the integration process of the states of the West African Economic
Community (CEAO) by maintaining a single regional currency and
controlling its issuance. Following the federalist position, the
shift of monetary authority from the nation state to a regional
institution is the important variable to consider in gauging the
integration process. It should be noted before closing on UMOA that
the Council of Ministers direct and control the Banque ouest-africaine
de developpement, which works toward the promotion of even development
in the region and economic development. This is but another area in
which UMOA power and authority is centralized, in the federalist mold,
to promote regional integration.
The West African Clearinghouse, headed by the Governor's of all
the West African central banks, aids the ECOWAS countries in conducting
intra-regional exchange of currencies. They also try to promote the
use of member state currencies for regional trade, in addition to
encouraging member states to liberalize trade among themselves.49
Admittedly, the West African Clearinghouse lacks the central power
of UMOA, but it does serve to centralize the currency exchange process,
which will eventually allow for multilateral currency exchange in the
region. Being able to provide this service to the region will aid in
the integration process and make the implementation of the ECOWAS
Treaty easier, (more will be discussed about the ECOWAS Treaty in the
following pages). Regional bodies, such as UMOA and its affiliates
and the West African Clearinghouse offer modest levels of authority
transfer by the member states, but they do signal a new shift in
the region. The larger regional bodies that are specifically concerned
with regional integration point to a different kind of shift in
authority; monetary transfers from the state to the regional level.
The major regional groupings in West Africa, that have regional
integration as their goal, have special funds that are centrally
distributed to the member states. The exception to this format is
the Mano River Union which operates as a "laissez-faire" customs union
between Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. These centrally controlled
funds are subsidized through the contributions of the member states.
Each regional group has its own formula for determining the
contributions to be paid by the states; all the regional groupings use
the funds to redistribute benefits to the poorer member states. The
establishment of these funds, controlled by a central authority, dis-
plays a degree of authority transfer of finances from the states to
a federal body. The Entente Council uses the Mutual Aid and Loan
Guaranty Fund as its central budget authority, the West African
Economic Community (CEAO) uses its Community Development Fund and the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) uses its Fund for
Cooperation, Compensation and Development. CEAO and ECOWAS have gone
a step further in transferring authority to a federal level by
establishing, respectively, a Court of Arbitration and a Tribunal
of the Community, to settle disputes between member states. As will
be seen later in the paper, ECOWAS has gone forward in setting up
other federal authorities that have shifted power to the regional level.
Following the federalist perspective, each of these initiatives
indicate an increasing move toward regional integration. Applying
Ernst Haas'concept of "spillover", each of the positive integrative
moves contributes to the intensity of integration between the member
states of the region.
D. Ernst Haas - "Neo-functionalist Approach and Obsolescence of
Neo-functionalist Theories"
The federalist perspective on regional integration offers insights
into the political processes that lead to regional integration. Unlike
the theories discussed thus far, the federalist approach considers the
structural changes that are required to achieve greater integrativeness
between states. This is a. theory that coincides with the perspectives
of many African leaders that look for regionalism to produce structural
changes in the political and economic environment of the continent.
Ernst Haas' theory of incrementalism and "spillover" provides sharper
focus on the federalist perspective by suggesting that a gradual
move toward federalism, produced by interregional links, can be the
foundation of a successful integration process. This is an idea that
has enjoyed good currency in Europe, even while Haas has made
modifications in his theoretical perspective on integration.
A basic premise of Haas' theory of regional integration was the
understanding that integration is a process which can intensify or
recede as a consequence of changing values and interests of member
states. As stated by Haas when defining political integration;
"Conceived not as a condition but as a process, the
conceptualization relies on the perception of
interests and values by the actors participating
in the process."50
As conveyed in this statement, Haas views the values, ideologies and
interests of member states as the moving force in the integration
process. This perception is somewhat analogous to the social homo-
geneity variable of Jacob and Teune, or even the shared functional
interest variable. The distinguishing factor between the Haas approach
and Jacob and Teune's is that Haas argues that the values, ideologies
and interests of "elites", more than the masses, is the crucial
variable in a successful integration process. This position is so
fundamental to Haas' theory that it is included in his list of
indicators of whether a political community can be established. These
indicators include;
1. interest groups and political parties at the national level
endorse supranational action,
2. interest groups and political parties organize beyond national
level,
3. interest groups and political parties coalesce on the basis
of common ideology,
4. interest groups and political parties succeed in evolving
doctrine common to all of supranationalism,
5. interest groups, political parties and government show
evidence of accepting rule of law of supranational court
decisions, administrative directives, etc.,
6. governments negotiate with each other in good faith.51
When Haas speaks of interest groups and political parties, he is
referring to the national elite that operate to enhance or deter the
integrative process. The elite are seen as being the connective force
between states. Their closeness to power and the decision-making
process within their countries give them the unique ability to
influence national policy. Given the organization of national elites
in member states around a regional agenda, with their shared interests
being satisfied, the national elite have the potential power to
establish strong connective links between states and to direct national
policy more towards a regional authority. The concept of "spillover",
as conceived by Haas, refers to the gradual shift to regionalism
produced.by the continual inter-regional links of interest groups and
political parties, who push, incrementally, for increased supranational
power. The "spillover" concept considers the broad array of interest
groups and political parties that have the political sway to gradually
accelerate the process of integration. The broadness of this base,
which allows for maximum spillover effects, has been enumerated by
Haas;
.'elites' are the leaders of all relevant political
groups who habitually participate in the making of
public decisions, whether as policy makers in government,
as lobbyists or as spokesmen of political parties.
They include the officials of trade associations,
the spokesmen of organised labor, higher civil
servants and active politicians. 5 2
In the European community, where trade associations, unions and
businessmen in coal and steel served as regional lobby groups for
European unity, Haas was able to observe positive "spillover" effects
from interest groups and political parties. In West Africa, the
extent of positive spillover would be limited by the modest size and
weakness of inter-regional lobby groups.
The recent move in West Africa toward regional integration has
been led, primarily, by African leaders. The move has not been
inspired by national elites that have organized on a regional scale.
The national elite of West Africa, in fact, have tended to be opposed
to local initiatives for broader union.53 As stated previously, there
are almost no real supranational union lobby in West Africa with which
to fill the void left by the national elite. Aside from the absence
of these two lobby groups in the region with which to initiate
positive spillover, the political structures of the member states of
West Africa do not allow for the cultivation of regionally based
political parties. Haas noted this problem in his evaluation of
integration efforts in the third world when he stated that;
"The absence of pluralism makes the formation of
voluntary groups on a regional basis very difficult." 5 4
This situation was referred to earlier, when discussing the fragile
political environment in most West Africa states (see section under
Jacob and Teune's shared functional interest variable). One of the
areas in which West Africa has been able to enjoy positive spillover
effects from regional cooperation has been in its numerous integration
efforts in sectoral areas.
The European community realized positive spillover effects from
regionally organizing nuclear development and research under Euratom
and from organizing the European coal and steel industries. This
form of integration brings together technicians and planners from
member states in a joint endeavor that is narrow in scope. The
specificity of interest and the minimal degree of conflict between
states often allows for successful cooperation. Given an initial
success at interstate cooperation, a sound basis for future joint
action is established and a foundation for greater regional cohesion
is developed.55 Haas observed the positive spillover effects of
sectoral integration when he studies European integration;
"Sectoral integration, however, begets its own impetus
toward extension to the entire economy even in the
absence of specific group demands and their attendant
ideologies."36
In the area of sectoral integration and the subsequent spillover
effects, West Africa has acquired an increasing level of activity.
Of the thirty regional organizations operating in West Africa,
twenty one are based on specific sectors or functional interests.
There are four regional organizations based on commodities, four
river basin authorities or commissions, three highway coordinating
committees and several service related regional bodies that are
included in the twenty one sectoral, regional organizations. In the
area of heavy industry, Togo, Ghana and the Ivory Coast are cooperating
on the development and operation of a cement plant under the tri-
state authority of UMOA.57 The activity of these regional bodies has
been limited by the lack of capital to implement their group objectives,
however, modest gains have been made in many cases and bold steps
foward have been achieved on occasion.
The positive spillover effects of these sectoral groupings can
be appreciated by noting that the proliferation of these groupings
has accelerated since 1970. An additional indicator of the positive
spillover effects of these groupings is displayed by the increasing
degree of coordination between the regional bodies. This was
observed in the case of UMOA, a service related body that helps
facilitate the successful operation of BOAD, BCEAO and the West
African Economic Community. The same phenomenon has occurred between
the Association of African Central Banks, the West African Clearing-
house, the African Insurance and Reinsurance Corporation, the African
Development Bank and ECOWAS. Spillover has yet to be fully evidenced
in West Africa from its elites participation in supranational lobby
groups, but the effects of spillover are just beginning to be felt
from sectoral integration groupings.
Spillover is one concept utilized by Ernst Haas as a device to
theorize about the success or failure of integration efforts by a
regional community. The theory of regional integration that Haas has
been associated with is neo-functionalism, or rather, incrementalism.
This theory does not diverge from the concept of "spillover", but
rather, looks deeper within the process of integration to explain
why communities integrate. Incrementalism, with respect to regional
integration, suggests that authority transfer occurs as a consequence
of "deepening patterns of mutual dependence among actors" based on
mutually recognized needs.58 Based on this theory, the common needs
and interests of member states bring communities together in a forum
in which each party is willing to compromise. The basis of mutual
accomodation is grounded on the recognition by each party that meeting
their individual and collective needs is primary. Placing member
states of a regional organization within a forum in which compromise
is agreed to and practiced allows for "incremental accretions of
authority" and results in "successive programmatic compromise
decisions", which produces greater regional power.59 This process
of regional integration contrasts with the federalist approach,
which views regional unity being achieved through "dramatic
constitutional change and proclamations." 60 It could be argued, how-
ever, that the agreement to form a regional group is a dramatic shift
in the federalist mold. This would not, however, consider the
processes required to sustain and increase the intensity of the shift
to regional authority. The problem with the incrementalist approach,
however, is that it assumes that objectives, interests and needs of
member states are unchanging and continually compatible.
The problems of turbulence and shifting agendas did not invalid
incrementalism, but instead, permitted the theory to be modified.
Haas, in fact, viewed change within a regional community (integrative
and disintegrative change) as a consequence of turbulence, which
results from mutual confusion among actors of costs, trade-offs, and
potential gains.61 The existence of change is seen as being potentially
beneficial to the integration process, to the extent that shifting
agendas and needs produce compromise among actors. This was formally
referred to by Haas as "fragmented issue linkage", which entails joint
resolution on crisis related issues, thereby fostering greater regional
unity. The likelihood of "fragmented issue linkage" causing states to
reject compromise and to fall back on a policy of autarky is real. It
is postulated, however, that the common need of participants and the
commitment to compromise will lead to greater unity in times of
crisis. This concept appears to be a variant of the adage, "adversity
brings people together." In the West Africa context, there are several
areas of common need and interest between states, which are sometimes
not recognized by the actors because of areas of conflicting needs
and interests.
Cooperation between leaders in West Africa was at its greatest
level during the independence movement. The masses and their leaders
perceived a common enemy and regional political parties, such as
the RDA (Rassemblement Democratique Africain), were popular and enjoyed
wide membership. During the early days of the post-independence era,
when fears of external penetration and neo-colonialism were
heightened by the downfall of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, African
nations were uniformly opposed to non-African infiltration on the
continent. Although African leaders and the masses were united on
these points, there were areas of disunity that kept them at a distance
from each other.
Many African leaders feared internal dissension and the
possibilities of a coup de tat. Leaders, such as Sekou Toure,
suspected neighboring states, like Senegal, of harboring Guinean
refugees and plotting a coup in his country. Some states have come
to fear and respect the large military and economic strength of Nigeria.
Each of these fears and concerns have played a part in militating
against the movement toward regional unity. Other constraints to unity
will be discussed in the following pages, but first, let us consider
the current fields of camnon interest between West Africa states that
has allowed for incremental moves toward regional integration to be
realized.
The political movement of the New International Economic Order
and the organization of the Third World into the Group of 77 has had
a unifying influence in West Africa. Each of the West Africa states,
as members of the Group of 77, appreciates the need to restructure
the international terms of trade between the North and South. These
states have often joined together, as a unified block, in negotiating
for improved terms of trade with the West. An example of this unity,
resulting from the joint political and economic interests of the
West Africa states, was the Lome Convention, which resulted in a
commodity and aid agreement between the European Community and the
states of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.62 Beyond the
common interests of the West Africa states in their relations on the
international scene, they demonstrate other areas of common interests
within the West Africa region.
One of the most unifying forces in West Africa that grows from
the common interest of the states is the desire to industrialize.
Although many national industries are protected against regional
competition by the state, the logic of regional.integration as a means
to develop industry is compelling. Industrialization, in fact, is
often the outcome expected by the member states that agree to regional
integration initiatives. This rationale for integrating economies in
Africa into regional units is described by Lynn Mytelka in the
following manner;
"Integration in many developing areas of the world
is, in fact, a paradigm for industrialization."63
In short, regional integration is viewed by these states as being a
force through which structural change in the region's economies can
be realized, thereby allowing for industrialization. Unified around
this common desire to industrialize, many West Africa states have
made the bold move toward regional integration. This move establishes
the forum for states to compromise and cooperate around joint needs
and interests, and thereby, follow a process of integration based upon
incremental accretions of authority to a regional body.
The above scenario offers hopeful signs for the future of regional
integration in West Africa. The neo-functionalist approach has, thus
far, only been able to predict difficulties and failures in Third
World integration efforts, by citing the fragmentation of interests
among self interested actors.64 The actors that are pinpointed as
being most destructive in the Third World have been the national elite,
who have a difficult time adapting to the mandates of regional inte-
gration. This same problem is very real in the West Africa context,
where national elites are safe behind their protected borders. Ernst
Haas' revised perspective on neo-functionalism suggests that the
regional community is vulnerable to these internal schisms, in addition
to, exogenous forces that can weaken any integration effort.
In examining the European community, Haas noted the economic
cost that member states would bear if they were forced to purchase
goods from each other which were higher priced than United States
goods (or other foreign producers). The absorption of cost, realized
by the presence of lower priced goods outside the community, could be
disruptive to the integrative process. Other international issues
loom larger as disintegrative forces for a regional cammunity.
External factors, such as an oil crisis, rising militarism and foreign
aid flows are but a few that are beyond the control of a regional
community, but can have a major impact upon the integration process.
Regions in the Third World, such as West Africa, are particularly
vulnerable to these external disruptions, due to their present
reliance on the industrialized world for markets, aid and technical
assistance. Despite these potential disruptions from external forces
cited by Haas, the West Africa region is more capable to sustain
these impacts if regional supports exist than if each state attempts
to go it alone. The need to survive and to achieve fundamental
changes in their condition as underdeveloped countries is the real
blow for regional integration efforts in West Africa; regardless of
the poor climate for integration in the region or the presence of
external disruptions.
E. Economic Development Theory
The utility of the neo-functionalist perspective on regional
integration, with respect to the West Africa region, is that it
provides a direction for the integration process. The theory points
to the relevant actors in the process and suggests the roles that
these actors can play in making incremental moves toward integration.
A weakness of the theory, it its application to West Africa, is that
it requires the various interest groups within the region to come
together around a common interest and/or need and compromise in
formulating solutions for the region. West Africa lacks the powerful
interest groups that can span their influence across the region. The
interest groups that West Africa does have are bound by national
interests, which do not tend to coincide across borders. The possible
spillover benefits that the neo-functionalist school suggests will come
from sectoral integration offer a hopeful sign for West Africa, which
has become increasingly active in this area. In spite of these
conflicting signals given by the neo-functionalist theory, when
applied to West Africa, it does not impinge upon the real motivator
for West Africa leaders, who push for regional integration; the
quest to make structural changes in their economies to allow
industrialization to occur.
There has been several references made to the structural changes
desired by African leaders to achieve industrialization. It has been
stated that they tend to view regional integration as the means by
which these structural changes can be made and industrialization
achieved. What are these structural changes? How can regional
integration produce the changes necessary to accelerate industrial
development? The economic development theory of regional integration
outlines the present structural barriers to industrial development in
West Africa and explains how these barriers can be overcome by
regional integration.
Economic development theory of regional integration was applied
in an earlier section of this research, when discussing the economic
reasons for moving toward West African economic integration. The
variables that were enumerated in that section are those that are
considered, by most advocates of West African integration, as the
most compelling arguments for regional integration. Some of the
variables, such as improved military capacity, are not within the realm
of economic development and industrialization, however, most of the
variables that were cited are related to the economic benefits of
integration. A brief listing of these variables include:
1. improved economies of scale for industry
2. larger consumer markets
3. larger pool of capital and foreign exchange for investment
4. improved gains from "multiplier effect"
5. increase pool of professionals and technicians
6. value added benefits
7. reduce inefficiency and duplication of local industry
8. improved bargaining power with Europe on commodities
9. central planning of intra-Africa infrastructure.
The inverse of these benefits are the structural barriers that
presently exist in West Africa. Operating under a policy of separate,
autonomous development programs, the majority of the fifteen West
Africa states confront structural barriers to economic development,
and specifically, industrialization in the following areas;
1. diseconomies of scale for national industry
2. small consumer markets
3. small pool of savings, capital and foreign exchange with
which to invest
4. limited "multiplier effect" from national development
5. small pool of professionals and technicians
6. fragmented input-output matrix - modest value added benefits
7. inefficiency and duplication across borders of national
industry
8. weak bargaining power on commodities
9. poor coordination of intra-Africa infrastructure development.
The variables listed above are the indicators that African leaders
respond to in making decisions concerning whether it is better for
their country to integrate or go it alone. The other variables offered
by integration theorist, such as Jacob and Teune, Deutsch, Toscano
and even Haas, are not viewed as being dispositive by these decision-
makers. The bottom line in West Africa is whether their integration
strategy will eradicate these problems and produce the benefits they
hope for, or will it leave these problems unresolved and the benefits
unachieved. It is for this reason that African leaders listen to the
various theories, but generally respond to the economic factors,
III. Constraints on Regional Integration in West Africa
It is puzzling that West Africa states have not moved sooner and
made serious steps toward regional integration, given the cogency of
the economic arguments for regional integration. There were radical
attempts at regional integration in the early post-independence war
of West Africa; the Mali Federation and the Union of West African
states disbanded as a result of inactivity and poor political
coordination.65 One of the few regional organizations that has
survived since its beginning in 1959 is the Entente Council. This
organization, however, had never professed regional integration, but
instead, called for interstate cooperation on specific functional
interests. Since the Entente founding and the failures of the Mali
Federation and the Union of African States, many African states have
approached reigonal integration with caution. This sense of caution
has endured through the 1970's, when many of the regional organizations
were founded. The cause for caution is partially related to the
past failures of these type of organizations, but is primarily related
to political, economic and social constraints in the West Africa
region that make regional integration a risky undertaking.
A. Political Constraints
1. Nationalism:
For many, if not most of the West Africa states, the fight for
independence was waged on a national basis. Regional links were made
at various points, however, France and Britain's insistence on
framenting the region during the independence movement, as a device
to weaken their opposition, shifted the struggle to a fight for national
sovereignty. African leaders within this setting, organized the masses
on a national scale; not regional. Carrying their strugle at this
level produced a growing sense of nationalism among the masses. Beyond
the nationalist sentiment of the masses, these political leaders rose
to power with a nationally based constituency. In light of this
history and the present base of power that the leadership possesses,
it is difficult for them to concede national sovereignty to a wider,
amorphous entity. This is especially true for political leaders who
are uncertain of their political survivability in a regional setting.
The disintegrative influence of nationalism in West Africa
conflicts with theories applied to Europe, which view nationalism
as a foundation for greater regional unity.66 The reality of the
West Africa setting, even in states that acquired independence from a
regional political base, is that nationalism among the individual
states has served as a barrier to regional integration. This
political dilemma was discussed by Isebill Gruhn in the following
manner;
"It is not surprising, in historical retrospect, that
the leadership emerging out of the national movements
was not keen on divesting itself of its newly acquired
authority. The failure of the Mali Federation showed
that even contiguous territories with the same colonial
heritage found it difficult to join national interests
in a single union; the forfeiture of national decision-
making in favor of collective decision-making was not
facilitated by the newness of the states." 6 7
2. Internal Political Instability:
An extension of the problems created by nationalism and related
to the political security of national leaders, is the problem of
internal dissention and instability. The West Africa region has
experienced numerous "coups" and even more attempted "coups". In an
effort to contain internal dissention and maximize political control,
national leaders often try to consolidate their power around a
disciplined one-party state. For leaders with these concerns, the
idea of relinquishing power to a regional organization is unthinkable.
"Leaders with fragile internal support are not anxious to concede any
more power than is necessary."68 This is but one constraint on the
integration process caused by internal political instability.
Another constraint results from the frequent changes of national
leaders in the region.
African leaders tend to be weary of making agreements with leaders
fram neighbor states. Although relations may be good with a particular
regime and policies compatible, a change in leadership can occur over-
night. With these constant changes it is not easy to establish
consistency between states on policy, nor reliability between leaders.
The volatility of the internal political scene among states in West
Africa "erodes regional cooperation and prevents regional planning."69
As described by Timothy Shaw;
"The frequency of political change advances regional
conflict rather than cooperation."70
3. Absence of Pluralism to Promote Lobby Groups:
Referred to earlier, the political environment in most West Africa
states is not conducive to the development of political pluralism
within the member states. Without political pluralism it is difficult
to establish special interest groups and political parties that will
have inter-regional links. The likelihood of these type of lobby
groups on a regional scale is scant when the apprehensiveness of
national political leaders toward external intervention is considered.
Beyond these basic deterents to the establishment of lobby groups is
the incompatibility of interests between national elites in West
Africa is their desire to protect their national interests by remaining
behind national borders and resisting integration.
4. Over Politicalization of Regional Decisions:
In the European community many of the technical or low level
decisions are made by technocrats or representatives of national
government. Under this arrangement the decision-making process is
diffused of its political potency and judgements are made on
"objective" criteria. This process tends to militate against
controversy and enhances the degree of functional cooperation between
member states. The West Africa community lacks this level of
political detachment and technical cooperation, preferring instead to
politicize minute detail.
This problem of politicizing technical, as well as minor issues,
was evidenced in the Mali Federation, where "problems originating
anywhere in the federal political system were forced to the top and
were perceived as involving the prestige and relative standing of
Mali's leaders.71 The tendency to have political leaders supplant
the responsibilities of technicians makes the durability of a regional
organization dubious. It is conceivable in this scenario to have a
minor decision, that casts a particular leader in a negative light,
destroy the union. In short, the premature politicization of
technical decisions detracts from integration efforts by "preventing
incremental bargaining on relatively non-controversial shared
objectives."72
B. Economic Constraints
1. African commodities are competitive, not complimentary
The major foreign exchange earner for West African economies
continues to be agricultural exports to the industrialized world;
with the singular exception of petroleum revenues for Nigeria. There
is a limited range of agricultural commodities that the region exports,
with most states having a competitor on several commodities within
the region. Major cash crop earners are generally not monopolized by
a single state, but instead exported by two or more states. The Ivory
Coast and Ghana each export cocoa as a major cash crop, while Senegal
and the Gambia each export peanuts. On most export cammodities,
states within the region compete for external markets, with little
complimentary existing on goods between states. The intensity of
competition between states in West Africa has eased as a consequence
of the Lome Convention, which includes a duty free access for most
agricultural exports to the European Economic Community (all West
Africa states are among the ACP states of the Lome Convention) and
price supports for agricultural commodities to insure against price
fluctuations.73 Despite the easing of competition between states on
export items, there are few complimentary goods with which to facilitate
greater intra-regional exchange.
Noted exceptions to this norm are states, such as Upper Volta,
Mali, Niger and Mauritania.74 These states rely heavily on trade
within the region, with almost 50% of their export directed to the
region and 25% to 30% of their imports coming from regional
producers.75 The goods they exchange, however, are typically
disposable commodities that do not create a significant level of
value added benefits in the region. There are possibilities for
establishing wider regional markets and expanding the commodity
selection within a regionally integrated community, however, at this
juncture, these goods are not being produced and the market is unknown.
Without greater complimentarity of goods between states, the process
of regional integration is slowed.
2. Competing Industrial Centres
The classic competition between industrial centres in West Africa
is between Dakar, Senegal and Abidjan, the Ivory Coast. During the
colonial era, under French federalism in the West Africa sub-region,
Dakar prospered as the administrative nucleus of the regional
community, in addition to servicing as the trade outlet for French
West Africa. Railroad infrastructure connecting Senegal to Mali gave
Dakar direct access to a regional consumer market, which provided the
foundation for the growth of Dakar as an industrial centre. Under this
arrangement of the French West Africa community, Abidjan was unable
to realize its full potential as a trade and industrial centre,
although there was always a measure of competition that Dakar con-
fronted from Abidjan.76
The Ivory Coast's opposition to close economic cooperation in
Francophone West Africa sprang from her loss of revenue in the West
African federation, in addition to the constraints on its industrial
development from Dakar's established dominance.77 The idea of
continued regional association, under a federation of states, was
strongly opposed by Houphouet-Boigny, the Ivorian leader, who, from the
time of the "loi-cadre", moved against an economic community that
included his chief competitor.78 The continued need of national
governments to protect the viability of their nascent industrial
centres has created a barrier to the realization of economically
integrated communities. In light of the Ivory Coast's resistance to
competition with Dakar, it is questionable whether they would feel
comfortable in a wider regional community that included Accra and
Lagos. Perhaps, through time, as the industrial centres become more
established and viable, regional integration will not be viewed as
creating competition between centres, but instead, as a means by which
centres could expand. Ultimately, this industrial expansion could
one day translate into linkages on intermediate goods between the
formerly competing centres.
3. Nationally protected industries fear economic union
The anxieties of those that operate nationally protected
industries, resulting from the possibility of economic union, has
been referred to at various points thus far. These businesses are
often protected from foreign competition by way of tariffs and/or
quotas. These protections, combined with the small size of national
consumer markets tend to product inefficiency. The inefficiency and
high cost of these national industries would be fully revealed under
regional competition. Considering the extent of duplication across
national borders, regional integration would produce intense
competition, which would inevitably drive out the small and inefficient
industries. The industries that would survive regional competition
would most likely be the transnational corporations; African enterprises
would be cut down to a few (mostly government owned or part owned
industries).
The possibilities of destroying local industry under a system
of regional competition creates a measure of skepticism for West
Africa states that are small and vulnerable to outside competition.
The skepticism held by these states holds back the process of
regional integration, even though corrective, balancing measures can
often be provided in a regionally integrated community. The fear of
transnational corporations driving African industries out of business
in a regional market place is held by many West Africa states and also
serves as a disintegrative force. The controls that have been worked
out in various regional agreements to restrict regional benefits to
African industries have not subsided the concerns of many states.
4. Imbalances in development between states
The presumption that imbalances between states is not disinte-
grative and that the large, powerful states serve as "prime movers"
in the integration process, defies many of the real concerns of the
smaller states. Although Nigeria, as a large political and economic
power, has been a prime mover of the Economic Community of West African
States and other regional integration initiatives, there continue to
be apprehensions held by the leaders of the region's smaller states.
It continues to be true that "countries which start from a position
of relative weakness tend to be suspicious of economic integration
for fear of becoming victims of exploitation by more powerful
neighbors."79
The imbalances between states in the area of total population
and gross national product have been illustrated on Table 5. On these
variables, the majority of West Africa states are dwarfed by the
enormous size of Nigeria. This large disparity between Nigeria and
the area states should naturally cause concern on the part of the
smaller states. A more important concern than disparities in
population and gross national product that is felt by the smaller
states is their heavier reliance on import duties for national
revenues.
There are several forms of economic integration that are used to
unite a community. A common principle of all the various types is
that trade is freed between states and a "common external tariff"
(CET) is erected around the community. A CET is designed to
discriminate against import of foreign goods to the community and
maximize exchange within. To accomplish this goal, each member
state erects the same tariff wall on foreign imports. For some states
the CET is higher than their original tariff rates; for others it is
lower. The uniformity of the CET cuts down on the volume of imports
to all states of the community. For many West Africa states, the
loss of import duties is a major blow to their national revenues.
Table 6 lists the proportion of national revenues received from
import duties for twelve of the fifteen West Africa states. As the
data shows, there are some states, such as Upper Volta and Senegal
that receive almost half of their revenues from import duties, with
Benin depending on 55% of their revenues in import duties. It is
difficult for these states to consider a CET policy when they are so
heavily reliant on import duties. The table reveals the uneven level
of dependence on import duties between the states, which may indicate
one of the reasons why states with less reliance on import duties
are able to assume an energetic role in regional integration schemes.
To be sure, there are redistributive formulas that can be worked out
to balance the loss of import duties for some states, however, this
does not eliminate the hesitation of some West Africa states in moving
toward regional integration.
5. Foreign aid is usually bilateral
There are few interstate transport links in the West Africa
region. The infrastructure inherited from the colonial era is
directed to European export, with minimal links existing between states.
In the absence of transport infrastructure, in addition to inter-
Table 6
IMPORT DUTIES AS PROPORTION OF REVENUES FOR
WEST AFRICA COUNTRIES
Benin
Gambia
Ghana
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
Upper Volta
Year
1971
1973
"
"
"
Import Duties as % of Revenues
55.0%
35.0%
10.4%
19.4%
18.9%
26.7%
10.5%
18.3%
43.4%
30.9%
19.9%
45.0%
Source: African Statistical Yearbook 1974, Part 2, West Africa
(NY: UN 1975) and John P. Renninger, Multinational
Cooperation for Development in West Africa, p. 49.
regional communication links, it is difficult to implement an economic
integration program. Interstate trade is limited by poor transport
routes and coordination of operations is hampered by weak communication
links. In order to develop the infrastructure necessary to facilitate
a higher volume of interstate trade, capital investment is required.
Special focus into the role of the African Development Bank Group
in providing multinational infrastructure investment will be given in
the following chapter, however, at this juncture the role of foreign
aid in promoting regional integration will be examined.
Foreign aid tends to be issued in Africa on a bilateral level,
with funds distributed for specific projects. The regional integration
process is denied the opportunity to realize much of its potential
in the West Africa region as a result of insufficient foreign aid to
multinational infrastructure development. Between 1972 and 1980 the
breakdown of foreign aid to multinational projects in West Africa has
been;
1. World Bank Group $128.5 million ($60 million of which went
to a cement plant project in 1976)
2. Commonwealth Development Corporation $0
3. European Development Fund $18 million (all of which went to
the cement plant project in 1976)
4. European Investment.Bank $25.9 million (the cement plant
project - 1976)
5. Kuwait Fund $73.6 million
6. BADEA $32.6 million
7. Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE) (France)
$8.78 million (cement plant project -
1976).80
The paucity of these funds betray the lack of commitment on the part
of foreign aid organizations to provide the necessary capital for
multinational infrastructure development. As described by Reginald
Green in his study of economic cooperation in Africa;
"...refusals to provide economic assistance in support
of multinational projects and decisions not to invest
in regional market based industry can either prevent
the formation of multinational economic groupings or
limit them to purely formal existence without significant
substance."81
6. Different monetary zones
With the ratification of all the West Africa states to the Lome
Convention and European Economic Cammunity trade preferences offered
to each state, African Association with the EEC is not as injurious
to interstate cooperation as it was when only select states enjoyed
EEC preferences. The divisions between states that has endured and
continues to be a barrier to economic integration in West Africa is
the separate monetary zone associations of each of the different states.
Franc zone association has tended to unite the francophone West
African states (not counting Guinea and Mauritania), but has created
difficulties on currency exchange with the non-franc zone countries of
the region.
Issued by the Banque des etats de l'Afrique de l'ouest (BCEAO),
the CFA (communaute financiere africaine) franc is the single currency
for the franc zone states. The currency is fully backed by the French
treasury, which provides the BCEAO with overdraft facilities.82
Exchange between states is effected on the Paris market, where reserves
are held on the richer states to offset deficits incurred by the
poorer states.83 This system allows for easy exchange to be conducted
between member states, with balance of payments accounts centrally
managed to permit bilateral and multilateral exchanges within the
community. One of the principle drawbacks of the franc zone for the
West Africa states is the loss of sovereignty over national monetary
policy and weakened control over foreign reserves. This loss of
sovereignty over national policy and weakened control over foreign
reserves was calculated by French policy makers when the franc zone
was first established;
"A French Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs has
candidly declared that the franc zone was originally
created with a clearly defensive character, conceived
essentially for the profit of a metropolis which
assumed, at the same time, in an authoritative and
centralized fashion, all the responsibilities of a
geographically heterogeneous and dispersed group." 84
The French dominance of the monetary policy and foreign exchange
earnings has sustained throughout the history of the franc zone.
Dominance is maintained by the French through the West African
Monetary Union (UMOA), the policy making body of the franc zone.
Representation on UMOA is divided into two-thirds for African
governors and one-third for the French government, but it should be
noted that all policy decisions require a three-fourths majority,
thereby, assuring the French veto power on UMOA.
Commonwealth association in the sterling zone does not involve
the same level of foreign control as the franc zone. African sterling
area states have complete control over their foreign exchange earnings,
and in fact, the Commonwealth does not have a constitution nor is it
organized into a centralized federation.85 The problem that these two
currency zones present, with respect to regional integration efforts,
is that it is difficult to clear currencies between the franc and
sterling zone. Commonwealth states are able to control their
currency accounts individually, while franc zone states have their
currency regulated by a larger monetary union. The convertibility of
these two currencies should make exchange between monetary zones
fairly simply, however, the separation of accounts and the balancing
of payments in the franc zone makes coordination difficult. One of
the functions of the Association of African Central Banks and the
West African Clearinghouse will be to coordinate the smooth exchange
of currencies between the various states of the region and to keep
accounts of balance of payments within the region. These two
organizations offer hopeful signs for overcoming the constrain to
regional integration of poor monetary exchange between the franc and
Commonwealth zones.
C. Social Constraints
1. Differences in language, ethnic indentification, religion
The internal divisions of language, ethnic identification and
religious affiliation within member states of West Africa could be
exploited to establish irter-territorial links. As mentioned
previously, when discussing the social homogeneity of a regional
community, differences on these variables in West Africa, can be
unifying forces on a regional scale, while being disintegrative on a
national scale. In West Africa where there are numerous minority
groups within nations, internal disintegration within separate nations
can (and has occurred) occur. Minority groups that face an oppresive
national regime would tend to be supportive of initiatives toward
regionalism, since it would diminish the presence of nationally dominant
factions. To the extent that minority groups serve this function,
differences within nations are positive influences on the integration
process. To the extend that differences across borders fortify
nationalism, or overemphasis language, ethnic and religious
identification, these subgroups constrain the integration process.
The disintegrative potential of language differences in West
Africa has recently been addressed by several West Africa states.
These countries have begun bilingual education programs that will in-
sure that future generations will be able to communicate in French and
English. .The volatility of the other variables makes prediction of
their influence on the integration process unsure. In some instances
the connective ties of ethnic groups and religious denominations
across borders aid the process, while in other instances they produce
clashes between groups, and thus, hinder the process. In short, the
various subdivisions in West Africa will have to be viewed as "double-
edged swords" that can be injurious or beneficial to regional
integration.
2. Differences of administrative apparatus evolved from colonial
era
The differences of administrative organization between franco-
phone and anglophone West Africa states can produce difficulties in
cooperation between member states within a community. This is an
extension of the problem cited earlier between states of different
monetary zones. The bureaucratic systems and accounting practices
of the individual states have been inherited from the former colonial
system, and therefore, conflicts between the French and British
structures are highlighted when the African states attempt to
integrate their operations.86 This constraint appears to be a
technical problem that could be resolved through joint consultation
between bureaucrats from the francophone and anglophone states.
Organizations, such as the Association of African Central Banks
and the West African Clearinghouse are already confronting this
problem in the areas of monetary policy and intraregional currency
exchange.
The political, economic and social constraints to regional
integration in West Africa that have been enumerated have all played
a role in delaying the process of integration. Some of these barriers
have been addressed by African leaders, who have been careful to
insert protections and special clauses to regional integration agree-
ments, in the hope of overcoming these problems early in the process.
The commitment to overcome constraints to regional integration has
been based on the desire of most African leaders to realize fundamental
changes in their underdeveloped economies; changes that will lead to
industrialization.
Integration has been attempted at various levels, in an effort
to arrive at an effective formula for achieving positive change for
the region. These levels have included integration around a political
agenda, as in the Organization Comune Africaine et Mauriciene, which
represented the African states that first negotiated with the European
Economic Community (EEC) for Associated Status to the EEC. Some
integration schemes have been wholly in the area of trade and finance,
as in the West African Economic Community (CEAO), which coordinates
trade and, under the BCEAO, issues the CFA franc to the franc zone-
states. Another level of integration that is common to the West
Africa region is the sectorally based regional organizations. These
organizations have included the African Groundnut Council and the
African Society for the Development of Millet and Sorghum Based
Food. The mission of these organizations is specific and is analogous
to the multisectoral organizations, which include river basin
cnmissions the lake coissions, and other regional authorities,
such as the Liptako-Gourma Region Integrated Development Authority.
Each of these levels of integration are being applied in the West
Africa region. The only level of integration that is specifically
trying to integrate the economies of the various states of the
region into a unified economic community is the trade and finance
organizations. As there are several levels of integration, there are
several forms of economic integration followed by regional trade
and finance organizations.
IV. Forms of Economic Integration
A. Laissez-Faire
A common market based on a laissez-faire policy by the member
states involves the free movement of factors and the erection of a
common external tariff. The only regional organization that follows
this policy in West Africa today is the Mano River Union, which
includes Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. These types of regional
organizations have had a poor success record in the Third World, due
to the uncontrolled flow of benefits resulting from a laissez-faire
policy. Freeing trade, by removing national barriers and setting a
common external tariff, tends to enhance inequitable distribution if
applied the same way to all member states of a union.87 It has been
noted that the West Africa region suffers from great economic dis-
parities between states. Applying a common market based on laissez-
faire economics between most states in the region would create
even larger disparities. Larger benefits would inevitably go to the
more developed states because;
1. a more varied production structure enables them to more
easily exploit intra-regional trading opportunities,
2. they possess more attractive sites for new industry.88
Perhaps more importantly than the loss in trade flows and industrial
development for the weaker partner states, is the potential loss of
revenue from import duties as a consequence of the comon external
tariff.
Partner states in a laissez-faire economic grouping could be faced
with absorbing costs as a result of a common external tariff, to the
extent that they are bound to purchase higher cost items within the
tariff barrier (trade diversion).89 Although this is a real cost
that is not compensated for in a laissez-faire economic union, the
major concern of the weaker member states is the losses realized from
reduced revenues from import duties. Recalling the data from Table 6,
several countries in the West Africa region are heavily dependent
upon revenues from import duties for foreign exchange. The common
external tariff (CET) tends to discriminate against outside imports,
and therefore, curtails the volume of revenue from import duties. 90
The purpose of the CET is to increase interstate trading by alienating
outsiders. This policy would tend to benefit the major suppliers of
the region, which would generally be the larger states. Given this
scenario, the CET would further imbalance the economies of member
states by giving additional revenues to the richer countries, from
their increased volume of trade, and denying the poorer countries of
their prior revenues, by curtailing their volume of revenue from
import duties. It is clear that this arrangement would not hold the
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interest of most West Africa states. The basic flaw in this policy,
with respect to its application in West Africa, is that it lacks a
strategy for redistributing the gains from economic union. Without
assuring benefits to all of the participant states, the union is
destined to fail. Recognizing this factor, the other regional
economic organizations in West Africa have a strategy for re-
distributing costs and benefits throughout the union.
B. Economic Union Based on the Equitable Distribution of Benefits
The major economic unions in West Africa, such as the Entente
Council, the West African Economic Community (CEAO) and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have redistribution factors
within the structure of their union. These economic unions' have the
basic features of a laissez-faire economic union, i.e. free trade
and factor flows and a CET, however, they also have special funds.
These special funds are contributed toby the richer member states,
to compensate those states that absorb costs from their participation
in the union. These losses often include trade diversion costs and
lower revenues from import duties. It is assumed that certain
member states are benefiting at the expense of others, and therefore,
should be willing and able to contribute to a redistribution fund.
It should be noted, however, that in most cases the redistribution
is of the type where the poor are subsidizing the poorer. An additional
point to consider when trying to determine how redistribution should
be structured is, how does one measure the benefits of integration and
how does one decide on a formula for taxing states to contribute to
the redistribution fund?
Before examining how benefactors should be taxed, let us consider
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all the factors that might measure the costs and benefits of economic
integration. The following list of factors include the variables that
most policy makers study prior to entering an economic community:
1. impact on trade flows
2. level and structure of production
3. balance of payments
4. revenue (import duties, export commodities)
5. growth rates.91
It is difficult to gauge the impact that integration will have on
these variables prior to formally entering into an economic community.
Nations that are cautious tend to look at these variables for the
slightest change, as a reference for choosing between regional
community or autonomy. Aside from these basic indicators, national
policy makers try to estimate the extent of trade creation or diversion
that union is producing. 92
The basic concepts of trade creation and trade diversion have
been explained under the section on traditional neo-classical economic
theory. As indicated previously, these two variables are not easy to
measure prior to actual participation in an economic community. Once
in an economic grouping, it is clear that trade diversion (member
states pay higher cost for goods within tariff than they would have
paid for foreign imports) can have a strong disintegrative effect.
A nation that realizes the costs of trade diversion, and is not
compensated, will not remain in the economic community very long. 93
Trade diversion can be measured by variation in cost between internal
community prices and foreign import prices. Trade creation can
similarly be measured.
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Trade creation (high cost industry in each country being displaced
by low cost competitors in other members of the union),94 can be
noticed by the increase in trade among members of a grouping. Trade
creation leads to specialization in industry, which can provide lower
costs for consumers.95 The problem with specialization that results
from trade creation is that it does not control for the concentration
of industry in developed centres. To the degree that specialization
is over concentrated in certain growth poles, trade creation can
product "backwash" effects in a regional community.
The ideal outcome of an economic community is that each member
state realizes the benefits of positive "spread". Spread refers to the
increasing output and specialization of industry in the member states,
which results from the larger market size of a regional community and
the benefits of economies of scale. In industrialized regions, such
as Europe, integration produces positive spread effects. This appears
to occur because benefits are being distributed through existing
industrial centres in the member states. In West Africa, where
industrial centres are few and modest is size, positive spread is not
achieved, but instead, "backwash" occurs.
"Backwash" refers to the tendency for investment and industrial
development to concentrate in a select number of regional "growth
poles", which leaves the outer areas underdeveloped. The tendency
for this to occur is due to the limited infrastructure in the region
and the concentration of existing infrastructure in select regions.
The Economic Commission for Africa recognized this problem when first
studying the potentialities for regional economic integration in
West Africa;
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"Economic integration in Europe seeks to fuse existing
industrial economies...in Africa, economic cooperation
is not designed to integrate existing industries, but
rather to build them."96
The imbalances that "backwash" effects produce can cause
disintegration within an economic community. There are certain
controls used by economic unions to alleviate the pressures from back-
wash. In addition to the use of redistributive funds for investment
in underdeveloped member states, they can use a combination of fiscal
incentives and controls on industry. This does not correct for existing
imbalances in infrastructure and industry location, but it does serve
to redirect future investment and industrial expansion.
Having examined the measures of cost and benefits in an economic
union, it is clear that gains and losses can be tabulated for each
member state. It is already understood that a laissez-faire policy
toward imbalances caused by integration is not a tenable policy option;
redistribution is required to insure that, at least, no member is worse
off from entering the union. The problem that arises is not whether
benefits should be shared among states, but rather, how are contribution
levels to be decided for the richer states to pay to a regional fund.
This problem opens the question of balance between member states.
It could be argued that benefits from integration should be
redistributed equally among the states. The weakness with this position
is that it does not account for the relative size and wealth of the
various states. In light of the flaw of this approach another formula
for redistributing benefits would be to set contributions in relation
to the size of a states population. Using this approach, a poor state,
such as Mali, with a large population would be commited to making a
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large contribution. Obviously, using just population size as a
criteria for measuring contribution levels is not an effective
strategy. A third balancing formula is to compute contribution levels
in relation to the size of a states national income. Economic
communities, such as ECOWAS, use a combination of this formula and per
capita income to determine state contributions to the fund.97 These
various approaches attempt to balance benefits within a regional
community. Other commonly used redistributive formulas have included
a "single tax", as in the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa,
and the regional distribution tax (TCR), used by the West African
Economic Community (CEAO).
Single Tax (taxe unique)
The "taxe unique" of the Customs and Economic Union of Central
Africa attempts to increase regional trade, by reducing the tax burden
on industry, in addition to redistributing gains, by applying
differential tax rates on products (depending on the country of origin
where they're produced). The terms of the "taxe unique" require the
abolition of all indirect taxes on raw materials and other goods
used in production, in favor of a single tax on the final product,
paid at the point of consumption.98 This taxing system provides an
incentive for the development and expansion of intermediate industries,
with inputs to production being free from taxation. The successful
operation of this program would allow for the development of viable
import substitution industries, in addition to facilitating greater
trade links of manufactured goods in the region. One of the re-
distributive elements of the tax is that it "operated like an excise
tax and proceeds were allocated according to consumption (tax was due
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from the moment the goods left the factory)." 99 Under this arrange-
aent, industry is subsidized by lower tax rates, and the purchasing
state is subsidized through the distribution of tax revenues
(compensating for any trade diversion). Another redistributive element
of the "taxe unique" system, which aids the weaker industries of the
region, is the differential tax rates on products, based on the
country of origin where they were produced.
Poorer member states were allotted lower tax rates on their
products than the more wealthy competitors. An example of how this
taxing system worked as a balancing formula in the regions industrial
trade is given by Beverly Watson;
"Bicycles are assembled in both Cameroon and the
Central African Republic. The Cameroon firm pays
15 per cent tax irrespective of where they are sold,
while the other firm pays 15 per cent on its homes
sales but only 11 per cent on items sold elsewhere."100
This taxing system directly addresses the disintegrative influence of
"backwash", with respect to existing national industries thrust open
to regional competition. Participation by the industries of the
various member states in this tax system has been high, with over 90%
of intra-UDEAC trade consisting of single tax products.101
Among the drawbacks of the "taxe unique" policy of the Customs
and Economic Union of Central Africa is that it does not influence
the location decisions of new industry. Those that invest in new
industries are more concerned with fiscal incentives, such as tax
holidays related to their investment, and sound infrastructure
and other area amenities,102 than they are in tax benefits realized
after production is completed. The problems of "backwash" can still
be produced by industry locating in the regional growth poles. The
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only apparent means of addressing this problem would be to establish
a regionally based, decision-making body that would allocate
industries in the region. A variant of this idea would be to have a
regional development bank, such as the African Development Bank, invest
in infrastructure and industries in the weaker states (the role of
the African Development Bank in this area of development will be
discussed more fully in the following chapter). Absent this form of
intervention, the imbalances caused by "backwash" will have to be
endured in the economic unions of West Africa. It is not certain that
the problems related to the imbalances caused by "backwash" will not
ultimately, have a disintegrative effect on the economic groupings
presently functioning in West Africa. Other redistributive strategies
have not effectively dealt with the problem of "backwash" within their
economic communities, with industrial investment by the special funds
proving to be insufficient.
Regional Distribution Tax (TCR)
The regional distribution tax (TCR) that is used by the West
African Economic Community is similar in its structure to the "taxe
unique". As with the "taxe unique", the TCR replaces all indirect
duties on products used in production originating in the community.103
The TCR is lower than the total amount of duties payable on similar
products imported from non-community importers, thereby, supporting
the purchase of regional products. The TCR is also similar to the
"tax uniuqe" in that rates vary according to product origin, as a
device to balance benefits among the weak and strong producers. It
should be noted that the TCR is supplemented by a tax refund system;
"Countries exporting industrial products are required
107
to contribute to a Community Development Fund (FCD)
which refunds to the countries importing Community
industrial products the equivalent of two-thirds
of the loss in budgetary revenue caused by the
intra-Community preferences. During an initial
period, the remaining one-third of the overall
tax loss will be earmarked by FCD for investment
in the relatively less advanced countries members
of ECWA (West African Economic Community-CEAO) ."104
This fund serves the dual function of compensating the poorer states
for losses in revenue caused by community trade preferences and tackling
the imbalances caused by "backwash" through their investments in
relatively less developed member states.
The TCR possesses the same drawbacks as the "taxe unique",
despite the investment fund. The funds that the community has at
its disposal (5,000m francs CFA as initial capital, with an annual
supplement of 1,500m francs CFA),105 are not sufficient to counter-
balance the tendency of new industry to locate where the economic and
social climate is best; at the growth poles. Additional capital is
required to effectively meet this problem (i.e. African Development
Bank, World Bank, BADEA, etc.). Beyond these sources of capital,
a larger economic union would offer promise in amassing additional
capital for redistribution. The most ambitious attempt at economic
union in West Africa has been the Economic Community of West African
States.
V. Chances for an ECOWAS Success Story
The ECOWAS community includes more West African states (fifteen)
than any other economic union in the region. These states include
those within the franc zone and the sterling zone, socialist and
capitalist oriented governments, in addition to states from the three
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European language groups; French, English, Portuguese. The ECOWAS
community overlaps three existing economic unions, the Entente Council
and Mano River Union, CEAO. These other unions continue to function
as economic unions, although, based on the provisions of the ECOWAS
Treaty signed in 1976, ECOWAS supercedes all other regional agreements
signed by ECOWAS members.106 The ECOWAS community is also distinguished
as an economic union in West Africa by the number of institutions that
have been established to implement the integration program of the
treaty.
Recalling the neo-functionalist theory of regional integration, it
was postulated that the establishment of a sound integrative process
was dependent upon the development of regional institutions that
would bring together technicians and governmental bureaucrats from
the member states. The basic premise of this perspective was that
greater cohesion and interdependency between states could be
achieved by bringing technicians and bureaucrats from member states
together in a cooperative effort. It was further suggested that
authority would begin to transfer from the local to the regional as
decisions, infrastructure and manpower shifted to the regional
institutions. The federalist perspective, of course, would have viewed
the creation of a regional institution, with any measure of authority,
as being a positive influence on the integration process. The
institutions of the ECOWAS community, with their responsibilities
defined and technicians available from the member states to carry
them out, are a positive influence, in the neo-functionalist/federalist
mold, on the integration process in West Africa. Aside from the
integrative force of the ECOWAS institutions, the functions of the
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separate commissions help to coordinate relations between states, and
perhaps more importantly, maintain economic balance between states,
in addition to enhancing economic links between states.
Before examining the specific functions of the individual ECOWAS
commissions and how they work toward achieving greater regional
integration in West Africa, it should be pointed out that one of the
initial moves of the ECOWAS Treaty to balance costs and benefits
between states was the gradual implementation of the treaty provisions.
This approach allowed the member states the time they needed to
adequately plan their economies for the changes that the treaty
called for, in addition to permitting states a time table for gradually
entering into the economic union. The deliberate, incremental move
toward economic union also offers the states an opportunity to make
a fuller assessment of their costs and benefits, in addition to
providing ECOWAS the time to calculate compensation to the states or
possible changes in the treaty provisions. A review of the ECOWAS
Treaty aims and objectives and the stages of implementation should
present a clearer picture of the accomodations being offered to the
states entering the union:
Aims and Objectives
1. elimination of customs and similar duties between member States
2. elimination of other restrictions on trade among members
3. establishment of common customs tariff (CET) and commercial policy
toward third countries
4. members undertake to remove obstacles to free movement of factors
(labor, capital, services)
5. harmonization of agricultural policies and promotion of joint
projects in agricultural marketing, research and agro-industry
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6. joint development of transport, communications, energy and other
infrastructure
7. harmonization of monetary policies
Schedule of Implementation
1. fifteen (15) years transitional period for establishment of
customs union
2. customs and similar duties (with agreed exceptions) may not be
increased within the next two (2) years
3. within eight (8) years after freeze of customs duties, members
are to reduce and ultimately eliminate import duties against each
other
4. after the eight (8) years and during the subsequent five (5)
years, members will adopt a common customs nomenclature.107
Reviewing the aims and objectives of ECOWAS, it is clear that
their goals are similar with CEAO and the Customs and Economic Union
of Central Africa. ECOWAS has the same basic clauses as the other two
prominent unions (elimination of trade barriers, CET, eliminate duties
between states, joint infrastructure development and harmonization
of agriculture and monetary policy). ECOWAS also has a redistributive
formula for balancing benefits between member states. The formula
used by ECOWAS, however, is different from the "taxe unique" of the
Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa and the TCR of CEAO.
The formula for determining contribution levels for member
states of ECOWAS entails a coefficient of the national GNP and per
capita income. The actual calculation is as follows:
The budget is derived from a coefficient calculated
as one-half of the ratio of the gross national product
of each member state to the total gross national product
of all member states, plus one-half of the ratio of
the per capita income of each member state tojthe
total per capita income of all the member states.
The balancing effect of this formula is realized by placing less weight
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on the relatively poor and more on the relatively rich. For example,
the poorer states, which have large differentials in GNP and per
capita income with the wealthier states (i.e. 10:1) would pay one-half
of a very small number. Carrying this same logic to the wealthier
states, with ratios of 2:1, 3:1, or even 1:3, they would pay one-half
of a much larger number. Based on this redistribution strategy,
Nigeria, with close to 60% of the regions gross national product
and a moderate level of per capita income ($670 in 1979, compared to
Ivory Coast's $1,060 in 1979),108 would pay a significant proportion of
the redistribution fund, while a poor state, such as Cape Verde, would
probably pay almost nothing at all. Of the 1979 paid up capital of
the fund, in fact, Nigeria was the major contributor.109 The ECOWAS
formula does not, however, address the issue of "backwash" or industrial
output, as the "taxe unique" and TCR do. The problem of "backwash"
and the related difficulties of industrial imbalance is confronted
by the commissions of ECOWAS.
The Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission is
responsible for developing a "uniform industrial climate" in the
region and "to avoid rivalry and waste of resources."110 This
commission is also charged with making recommendations about the
harmonization in exploitation of natural resources. In the field of
industry, the Commission will serve as a depository of feasibility
studies and similar reports on industrial projects in the territory.
They will attempt to coordinate cooperation between states that have
overlapping interests, and in fact will sponsor joint industrial
studies and projects. The Commission's limited in its ability to
cut down on duplication and, through joint industrial development,
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create industrial centres that are beneficial to member states.
These activities of the Commission are not viewed by the ECOWAS states
as the panacea for remedying the problems of industrial concentration
in the wealthy states, but they are seen as offering a central location
for debating the issues of industrial location. As in the other
economic unions, capital investment in setting up industry in the
relatively poorer states, is recognized as the only real effective
means to overcome the problems of "backwash". ECOWAS, like their
counterparts, has a development fund to invest in industry in its
relatively poorer states.
The Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development operates
in much the same manner as the redistribution funds of the Entente
Council,CEAO, and the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa.
The Fund receives its' budget from contributions from member states
(unlike the "taxe unique", which obtains funds from industry), although
it is prepared to secure monies from "income from community enterprises,
receipts from outside the community and subsidies and contributions
from all other sources." The purpose of the Fund is to balance
benefits between states, by compensating states that lose revenues,
as a result of entering ECOWAS, and investing in community projects
in the less developed member states. Isolating the relatively poor
member states is accomplished by looking at gross national product and
per capita income data for the individual states. Measuring losses
is typically done by accounting for lost revenue from import duties
or the absorption of costs resulting from trade diversion, although
there are some data that may mis-portray the economic standing of a
country.
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It is commonly believed that the inter-territorial flows of
workers out of Mali and Upper Volta into Ghana, Senegal and the Ivory
Coast are injurious to the development potential of Mali and Upper
Volta. Most typically cited, after considering the loss in labor
supply, is the loss in national savings resulting from the drain of
paid workers in the country. Unless the Fund took the time to look
below this basic data, they would not realize the gains obtained by
Mali and Upper Volta in the remittances of workers salaries back to
the home country. Table 7 gives an indication of the degree of
financial gain realized by Mali and Upper Volta:
Table 7: Workers' Remittances in Selected West African Countries,
1970 - 1974 (US $ millions)
Country Amount Received Amount Sent Out Net Receipt
Gambia n.a. 7.9 - 7.9
Ghana n.a. 35.9 - 35.9
Ivory Coast 18.8 502.3 -483.5
Mali 44.6 n.a. 44.6
Senegal 32.1 111.8 - 79.7
Togo n.a. 21.0 - 21.0
Upper Volta 137.0 26.3 110.7
Net Gain 153.3
Net Loss -628.0
Total 232.5 705.2 -472.7
n.a. Not Available
Source: Migration in West Africa: Demographic Aspects, K.C. Zachariah
and Julien Conde.
This data is not to suggest that Mali and Upper Volta are enjoying
absolute benefits from uncontrolled migration, nor is it now being
argued that they would do better to curtail immigration. The point
here is that the Fund has a difficult task in assuming cost figures
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for nations, which makes the allocation of compensation funds a
difficult task. Beyond compensation to the states for lost revenue
and absorbed costs from integration, the Fund can easily assertain
which states are the poorer members when they try to decide where to
invest in community projects. The investment in projects in the
poorer member states, however, is not the only activity that the Fund
uses to balance development between states.
The fund provides guarantees on foreign investment in ECOWAS
states, with an emphasis being given to the relatively poorer states.
By offering guarantees to foreign investors in the poorer states,
the Fund is enhancing the investment potential of the poorer states.
Should this increased attractiveness of investment in the poorer states
translate into heavier industrial investment in these areas, the
Fund would have made a significant contribution to balancing development
between states and eliminating the disintegrative effects of "back-
wash". It should be pointed out, before leaving this issue, that
the Fund also tries to mobilize internal and external finance for
members and the community. This feature provides ECOWAS with a
unified voice abroad, in its attempt to secure additional capital for
development. To the extent that the Fund can amass a significant
level of external finance and use it to invest in industry in the
poorer states, ECOWAS will be able to begin working on the problems of
imbalance between states. One of the more immediate tools that
ECOWAS is applying to reduce imbalances between states is being
carried out by the Capital Issues Committee (CIC).
The most promising effort of the CIC in dealing with imbalances
within the community in industrial development is its activity in
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harmonizing interest rates within ECOWAS. With interest rates set
uniformly throughout ECOWAS (and other monetary policies harmonized by
the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission),
the cost of money for investment would be equal throughout the region.
This policy would have the potential for equalizing investment between
states, although other investment criteria (infrastructure, labor
availability, etc.) would continue to be biased to the wealthier states.
Beyond this constraint, equalized interest rates would allow entre-
preneurs throughout the region to seek financing for business enter-
prises, which would have the dual effect of increasing entrepreneual
activity in the traditionally less active states and heightening
investment activity on the part of lending institutions. The
equalization of interest rates is an objective of CIC, however,
they lack the authority to mandate uniformity from the ECOWAS member
states. The extend of compliance on the part of member states will,
hopefully, be enhanced by the wide representation of states on the
CIC (one representative from each state).ll2 Absent of state
compliance of CIC recommendations, the CIC will be unable to enforce
its policy for interest rates. Although this is a weakness which
the CIC will be forced to confront, CIC is able to facilitate greater
investment activity between states, through its work on West African
stock exchanges.
One of the functions of CIC is to maximize the exchange of
information about stock quotations and share issues in the member
states and to establish a timetable for the removal of controls of
movement of capital between states.ll3 This will allow for the
interlocking of capital markets and stock exchanges within West Africa,
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and increase the level of investment between states in the region.
One of the major attractions of this policy is that it broadens the
pool of entrepreneurs that would be investing in many of the member
states. This variable is similar to the one that considers the
benefits of a wider community realized from tapping a wider pool of
African technicians and professionals operating in the member states.
An important factor to consider in this policy of ECOWAS is that
once controls on the movement of capital between states are removed,
the CIC requires little authority to implement the exchange of
information on stock quotations and share issues. This feature of
this policy makes the implementation of it by CIC less challenging
than that of the equalized interest rates. Another ECOWAS commission
that handles economic and fiscal policies of the ECOWAS community is
the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission.
The long range objective of the Trade, Customs, Immigration,
Monetary and Payments Commission is to harmonize the economic and
fiscal policies of the community. This Commission lacks the authority
to implement any harmonization policy, however, its representation does
include governors and other representatives of central banks in the
region, which should give their recommendations an aire of technical
expertise and national detachment. Given the extended timetable for
the implementation of the ECOWAS program, the harmonization of
economic and fiscal policies appear to be goals to be realized in the
far distant future. More immediate operations of the Commission
concern its activity in the West African Clearinghouse and its
regulation of the CET.
When discussing the constraints to regional integration in
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West Africa, one of the variables listed was the problem of payments
between monetary zones. It was pointed out how the franc zone states
had their monetary policies and balance of payments accounts controlled
by BCEAO, which made exchange with sterling zone states awkward. The
West African Clearinghouse, which is operated by the governors and
other officials of the region's central banks, serves as a go between
for the franc and sterling zone states, in addition to those that
maintain a non zone related currency. In this function, the West
African Clearinghouse, facilitates the settlement of accounts between
ECOWAS member states. The ability of this institution to perform this
function is a consequence of the mixed franco-anglo participation with-
in the organization. Information on balance of payments between
states is available for all the states, thereby removing the burden
from national governents, that had to struggle to piece together
information when trading outside of their zone. In this respect, the
West African Clearinghouse is performing a vital function in aiding
the integration process of ECOWAS. The Trade, Customs, Immigration,
Monetary and Payments Commission plays a vital role also by insuring
that only African producers realize the benefits of the economic
union.
Many of the member states of West Africa fear the potential ill
effects that regional competition can produce on their national
industries. Although some of the poorer states fear the competition
that their industries will face from larger, wealthy African
competitors, all the member states are anxious about the possibility
of large transnational corporations devouring African industries, if
given a regional market. To protect against this possibility, the
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ECOWAS Treaty has narrowly defined the benefactors of the CET. The
Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission safe-
guards against the misues of the ECOWAS CET.
ECOWAS protects against the use of the CET by transnational
corporation through its definition of "rules of origin" for goods
subject to CET treatment. The rules on product origin are;
1. must be wholly produced by enterprises whose headquarters
are located within the ECOWAS community, and
2. of whose equity at least 51% is held locally and at least
one-half directors represent member states.ll 4
The commission, in applying these two rules on product origin,
establishes closure of the community to include only African
producers. This insures that the benefits of the ECOWAS are realized
by only the member states and not diverted beyond the community.
The establishment of regional institutions to carry out the
ECOWAS program has been a positive influence on the integration process
in West Africa. These institutions have brought together technicians
and bureaucrats from the member states in a cooperative effort toward
regional integration. The gradual implementation of the treaty has also
had a positive effect on the integration process. The concerns and
apprehensions of member states have been eased by allowing them time
to restructure their economies and to make a fuller assessment of their
costs and benefits. The aims and objectives of ECOWAS have followed
a similar pattern of other successful economic unions in Africa (CEAO
and UDEAC). The aims and objectives appear to be more attainable for
ECOWAS than for the other economic unions, because of the various
commissions of ECOWAS. Without a doubt, the commissions are limited
in their ability to implement their policies, however, they do form
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a basis for incremental accretions of authority to be made to the
regional level. Despite all of these advantages of the ECOWAS
program, there are fundamental gaps in ECOWAS that constrain the
integration process in West Africa.
VI. Gaps in the ECOWAS Program
The problems of imbalances between states in the area of industrial
development caused by "backwash" that the other economic unions have
faced are not effectively dealt with by ECOWAS. The compensation
fund that is used to redistribute benefits and invest in industrial
development in the poorer states is undercapitalized. In 1979, the
paid in capital was $32 million, which is insufficient for industrial
investment in all of the poor West Africa states. The compensation
fund ultimately translates into a formula for the poor to subsidize
the poorer. Without additional capital with which to invest, the
ECOWAS is impotent at dealing with the problems of "backwash" through
investment policy.
Another approach to reducing imbalances in industrial development
is to have a central authority control the location of new industry
in the region. This approach is beyond the scope of ECOWAS, and has
not been attempted by the other West African economic unions. Given
the absence of a central body to control the location of new industry,
the investments of a regional development bank, like the African
Development Bank could be tailored to redirect new industry toward
the lesser developed states. The African Development Bank could further
advance the ECOWAS program by investing in multinational projects and
interstate infrastructure (transportation, communication, etc.).
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The limited interstate infrastructure in West Africa is a
barrier to intra-Africa trade in the ECOWAS community. Major roads
and rail links between states are not fully developed, with most
infrastructure still resembling the colonial pattern of export trade.
ECOWAS needs investment institutions, like the African Development
Bank, to develop interstate infrastructure. The capital of the
economic unions is too small to fill the gaps of industrial
imbalances and poor interstate infrastructure. The African Development
Bank, in addition to foreign aid from development agencies, is
needed to make regional integration in West Africa a reality. The
following chapter considers the role of the African Development Bank
in promoting regional development in the ECOWAS Community.
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APPENDIX I
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Direction of Trade within ECOWAS Community
Senegal
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 ' 1965 1966'
Mauritania
Benin
Mali
Ivory Coast
Upper Volta
Niger
Guinea
Sierra Leone
Liberia
(C4
c4 Ghana
Togo
Nigeria
Gambia
G Bissau
20
60
8.
3
401
107
61
32
352
200
240
11
322
54
937
167
135
45
60
16
228
238
63
1,292
791
73
1,301
24
85
136
343
192
111
407
111
42
1,450
169
92
430'
19
589
235
326
268
170
361
53
94
29
1,674
1,118
1,908
5,244
361
800
215
332
247
77
365
61
105
1,866
833
4,066
3,659
260
800
527
1,139
376
48
448
127
6,365
2,264
3,884
10,604
305
2,407
634
790
413
292
284
858
- -10,285
- 3,281
- 8,595
- 10,922
- 537
- 230
1,358 1,137
- 1,079
- 434
356 145
320 705
- 606
149 225
.7 j88l7 12fl54 18 Q52 23 096 35 400 5.660 44.282
NOTE:
EQ Customs
Union
South Africa
1,410
971
514
1,383
1,435
1,576
826
1,012
883
860
1,105
136
1,249
30
- 1,869
NOTE:
Ivory Coast and Mauritania largest ECOWAS importers of Senegalese products. (Mali and Benin have acquired
Senegalese products.
2,471
access to
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
AFRICA
13,874
4,189
7,374
16,189
548
305
1,048
1,280
549
185
874
496
R 37A
148
53.876
1964 1965 1970 1971 1972
,1 ,1 ,7 , , ,1 ,1' ,2 O 0 6 4 2 2 S 7
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Direction of Trade within ECOWAS Community
Niger
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
Mauritania
Senegal
Mali
Ivory Coast
Upper Volta
Benin
Guinea
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Ghana
Togo
Nigeria
Gambia
G Bissau
AFRICA
1964 1965
5 1
705 177
121 226
114. 423
84 183
156 463
373
55
5,122
264
39
6,425
6 846 9~ 082 8.Q967 7 A7 ii 'AR ~ AQA 1.6 386 1.7 74, ,
1966
1
45
205
668
278
730
555
107
6,066
196A7
50
16
487'
205
700
427
64
5,262
196 Q(
67
21
472
581
999
365
145
5,623
196
1
57
32
803
482
743
2
590
144
3,898
1970
41
45
1,272
436
1,344
2
840
486
6,256
1971
5
53
50
948
184
1,706
431
331
9,817
1972
38
686
1,188
418
575
348
190
14,942
1973
34
200
240
645
687
1,218
677
98
13,035
6 
846
9 
082
I of' r, OK7 1971
A qRL 10.963 13 826 18 973 1746
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Direction of Trade within ECOWAS Community
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 - * 95 1966
Mauritania
Senegal
Mali
Upper Volta
Benin
Niger
Guinea
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Ghana
Togo
Nigeria
Gambia
5
4,178
1,584
2,564
501
702
27
3
64
93
351
456
112
7,438
1,628
2,123
591
767
102
17
356
157
266
275
26
- ' 8,711
- 2,216
2,154 4,501
702 987
1,024 1,737
12 3
25 366
155 232
120 162
245 391
475 626
G Bissau
28,324 26,629 38,427 32,576 37,581 38-,866 36,999 26,998 62,102 104,239
NOTE:
EQ Customs Union -484 364 452 866 974 1,696
420 482 964 1,016
1,451 - - -
1,295 - 2,219 2,690
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
78
9,104
2,565
4,651
1,092
1,140
8
95
502
324
521
869
276
8,742
2,404
5,562
1,941
1,298
9
146
496
262
553
1,485
439
10,371
2,889
5,320
1,729
1,803
3
146
381
727
529
1,572
8,448
4,851
5,243
1,833
1,268
194
13,192
9,011
9,344
2,663
4,517
1,066
634
3
AFRiCA
180
15,664
15,310
17,429
3,207
4,486
1,361
1,329
4
I OAL I I a A r% AA 1970
Cameroon 345 444
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Direction of Trade within ECOWAS Community
Upper Volta
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Mauritania - - - 2 2 - - - - -
Senegal 23 41 3 29 33 35 3 13 17 21
Mali 772 628 617 428 542 341 497 627 1,034 1,504
Ivory Coast 3,705 7,272 8,141 8,851 11,368 8,338 6,140 6,480 9,209 12,564
Benin 323 296 329 250 152 71 45 52 9 23
Niger 183 77 304 287 249 272 101 162 165 181
Guinea - - - - - - - -
- -
Sierra Leone
Liberia - - - - - - - - -
Ghana 3,371 2,628 2,423 2,435 2,156 2,250 1,804 1,712 1,100 618
Togo - - - 21 35 133 192 74 209 353
Nigeria - - - 17 4 47 - -- -
Gambia - - - - - - - - - -
G Bissau
V)7 in 01.9 Ii S117
2' 117 i 4 127 I I qO 1A0~ O 1 7,1 RQ~A 9.120 11.743 15.564Ar' LLA
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Direction of Trade Within the ECOWAS Comunity
Mali
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Mauritania 53 195 161 96 108 76 - 529 - -
Senegal 1,848 2,634 2,582 2,641 1,653 823 3,150 3,150 - -
Ivory Coast 4,307 4,779 4,704 2,279 2,707 6,794 10,641 10,641 - -
Upper Volta 405 1,923 991 349 213 445 973 973 - 2,885
Benin 18 - - - 2 - 55 55 - -
Niger 40 179 206 94 16 35 710 710 -
-
Guinea 7 4 23 14 6 85 340 340 - -
Sierra Leone 104 - - - - 3 9 9 -
Liberia 233 89 72 64 79 212 68 68 -
% Ghana 833 3,842 3,108 1,272 1,027 3,633 3,079 3,079 - 1,604
Togo 248 24 - - - - -
-
Nigeria 3 -
Gambia 
-
G Bissau
7 flA A A9346LF 20 025 20.025 4,7929 5. 4 ft . -J2,730 .L a t1 L -- , :1 1 1,AFRICA
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Direction of Trade within ECOWAS Community
Nigeria
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Mauritania 120 - 1 - 10 - - 4 - 59
Senegal 132 108 436 34 29 20 31 2,158 4,810 7,255
Mali 2. 23. 3 - 5 1 4 19 18' 41
Ivory Coast 897- 576 1,424 393' 147 54 171 6,623 10,451 10,949
Upper Volta 5 .2 3 53 2 1 1 1 45 21
Niger 139 63 401 701 588 70 9 247 1,716 3,238
Guinea 8 10 11 17 3 31 8 288 - 15
Sierra Leone 792 1,018 664 731 563 1,399 2,806 4,380 5,141 6,715
Liberia 125 133 500 217 420 64 552 145 311 468
Ghana 10,543 3,692 2,229 2,094 1,296 3,763 774 11,670 7,026 24,561
Togo 222 152 255 73 65 97 72 97 539 217
Benin 116 80 217 178 153 164 69 90 1,195 489
Gambia 34 41 60 60 48 29 24 21 14 28
C Bissau - - - -
AFRICA 20,951 10,946 12,866 7,874 17,147 8,439 8,815 27,196 47,843 69,218
112 -1,530 1,183 884 38 89 286 13,946 509EQ Customs Union 558
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Direction of Trade within ECOWAS Community
Benin
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 * lb 10 1O . 04 965 196  1967 178
Mauritania
Senegal
Mali
Ivory Coast
Upper Volta
Niger
Guinea
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Ghana
Togo
Nigeria
Gambia
G Bissau
.726 1 51
1
203
83
156
1
256
187
2
314
311
71
156
1
140
22
40
61
847
514
182
72'
4
285
81
826
686
410
12
236
1
141
45
1,324
1,233
676 1,254729
118
13
382
99
524
3,539
- 18
150 322
- 24
447 679
333
547
2,055
2
22
100
850
1,631
160
697
1,000
881
, 166 2436 .3641 6029 .. 64-9-4AFRICA
I (~O
1969O 19070 1971 1972 1973
4,5-36 4,799 4, 681
2 
066
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Type of Products Exported to Ghana from Largest Intra-African Trading States
Jan-Dec 1970
US $ 1,000
Mali
Bovine Cattle 3,746
Sheep, Lambs and Goats 42
Meat of Bovine Animals 53
Edible Offals 5
Other Fresh Meat Offals 3
Fish, Salted, Dried, Smoked 114
Upper Volta
Bovine Cattle 2,094
Sheep, Lambs and Goats 441
Meat of Bovine Animals 3
Niger
Bovine Cattle 876
Sheep, Lambs and Goats 77
Meat of Bovine Animals 3
Other Fresh Meat Offals 6
Fish, Salted, Dried, Smoked 2
Serums, Vaccines 5
Nigeria
Bovine Cattle 23
Meat of Bovine Animals 64
Meat of Swine 5
Edible Offals 6
Preparation of -Cereals 4
Tomatoes 2
Sugar Confectionery 2
Coffee Extracts 1
Tea and Mate 79
Food Wastes 154
Food Preparations 2
Cork, Raw and Waste 1
Crude Potash Salts 13
Petroleum, Crude 970
Lamp Oil, White Spirit 1
Lubricating Oils, Greases 761
Groundnut Oil 71
Other Organic Chemicals 1
Inorganic Acids 1
Other Metallic Salts 14
Serums, Vaccines 2
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APPENDIX III
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Ivory Coast
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Africa 28,324 26,629 28,427 32,576 37,581 36,866 36,999 26,998 62,102 104,239
Europe - 202,695 192,275 208,706 230,965 298,937 328,150 327,205 316,326 391,216 618,196
America 61,065 43,486 53,682 45,951 64,918 67,477 89,740 77,317 79,432 96,874
Asia 5,113 9,489 14,900 9,348 16,409 13,807 9,309 8,602 14,088 27,565
Oceania 98 251 296 203 399 268 318 0 0 320
(unspec-
countries)
Miscel. 4,842 5,033 4,701 6,098 6,660 6,578 5,244 26,492 6,122 10,248
World 302,137 277,163 310,544 325,144 424,904 453,146 468,815 455,735 552,960 857,442
% 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Africa 9.3 9.6 9.2 10.0 8.8 8.1 7.9 6.0 11.2 12.2
Europe 67.1 69.4 67.2 71.0 70.4 72.4 70.0 70.0 71.0 72.1
r-4
America 20.2 15.7 17.3 14.1 15.3 15.0 19.1 17.0 14.4 11.3
Asia 1.7 3.4 4.7 2.9 3.9 3.0 2.0 1.8 2.5 3.2
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Miscel. 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.1 5.8 1.1 1.2
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23,
Upper Volta
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
8,327 10,942 11,817 13,598 14,959 11,735 8,950 9,120 11,743 15,569
3,302 2,997 3,764 3,808 4,989 6,295 5,763 6,865 7,852 16,170
0 0 0 7 1 5 2 34 28 52
384 194 360 526 1,468 2,611 3,425 792 294 1,257
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
789 0 643 3 21 0 65 64 578 1,312
12,802 14,133 16,584 17,942 21,438 20,646 18,205 16,875 20,495 34,360
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
65.0 77.4 71.3 76.0 70.0 57.0 49.1 54.0 57.3 45.3
26.0 21.2 22.7 21.2 23.3 30.5 31.7 40.7 38.3 47.0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.0 1.4 2.2 3.0 6.8 12.6 18.8 4.7 1.4 3.7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6.2 0 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 2.8 3.8
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa
Europe.
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Niger
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
6,846 9,082 8,967 7,347 8,388 6,954 10,963 13,826 18,973 17,436
14,059 15,735 25,487 17,833 20,126 16,680 20,480 24,178 32,813 38,175
120 196 177 119 123 306 81 161 564 311
122 47 24 170 50 302 58 40 4 0
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
160 260 203 87 179 0 41 402 1,957 557
21,307 25,320 34,860 25,556 28,868 24,242 31,623 38,607 54,311 56,479
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
32.1 36.0 26.0 29.0 29.0 28.7 35.0 36.0 35.0 31.0
66.0 62.1 73.0 70.0 70.0 69.0 65.0 63.0 60.4 68.0
.6 .8 .5 .4 .4 1.3 .2 .4 1.0 .5
.6 .2 0 .6 .1 1.3 .2 .1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.7 1.0 .6 .3 .4 0 .1 1.0 3.6 1.0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
Africa
Europe
America
r-4
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Dahomey (Benin)
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
726 1,551 2,066 2,436 3,641 6,029 5,948 4,536 4,799 4,681
12,217 11,532 7,310 9,979 12,976 16,581 21,712 31,930 28,695 41,714
21 373 981 2,148 4,844 2,590 1,602 1,360 995 2,830
65 184 117 626 851 1,596 3,371 3,934 1,991 4,091
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 178 0 0
13,029 13,640 10,474 15,189 22,312 26,877 32,635 41,938 36,480 53,316
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
5.5 11.3 19.7 16.0 16.3 22.4 18.2 10.8 13.1 8.7
93.7 84.5 69.7 65.6 58.1 61.6 66.5 76.1 78.6 78.2
.16 2.7 9.3 14.1 21.7 9.6 4.9 3.2 2.7 5.3
.49 1.3 1.1 4.1 3.8 5.9 10.3 9.3 5.4 7.6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .4 0 0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
Africa
L Europe
r4 America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Senegal
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
8,370 7,887 12,054 9,408 18,592 23,096 35,400 5,660 44,282 53,876
109,119 117,134 133,208 124,224 128,434 95,866 109,224 80,725 162,097 129,324
1,842 658 578 435 775 596 776 648 1,327 638
2,290 2,404 1,969 2,558 3,108 2,239 2,907 1,447 3,399 4,036
843 0 552 662 116 62 0 0 17 15
49 380 569 0 0 1,864 12,274 36,597 4,731 6,680
112,513 128,463 148,930 137,287 151,383 123,696 160,581 124,977 215,853 194,569
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
6.8 6.1 8.0 6.8 12.5 18.7 22.0 4.5 20.5 27.7
89.0 91.2 89.4 90.4 84.8 77.5 68.0 64.6 75.1 66.5
1.5 .5 .4 .3 .5 .4 .5 .5 .6 .3
1.9 1.9 1.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.2 1.6 2.1
.6 0 .4 .5 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 .3 .4 0 0 1.5 7.6 *29.3 .2.2 3.4
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Guinea
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
N 3,402 3,550 4,636 214 353 5,631 6,684 7,527
0 34,050 25,760 26,510 32,234 34,927 40.744 35,452 35,510
14,140 6,900 5,500 5,500 7,000 2,909 2,179 7,511
D 110 372 180 518 97 505 891 1,579
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A 51,702 36,582 36,826 38,466 42,377 49,789 45,206 52,127
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
N 6.6 9.7 12.6 .5 .8 11.3 14.8 14.4
0 66.0 70.4 72.0 83.8 82.4 81.8 78.4 68.1
27.3 19.0 15.0 14.3 16.5 5.8 4.8 14.4
D .2 1.0 .5 1.3 .2 1.0 2.0 3.0
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
%
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Nigeria
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964
20,951
484,620
51,495
30,084
1,709
954
589.813
1965
10,946
619,131
93,125
13,023
1,988
30
738.243
1966
12,866
625,422
122,862
13,292
2,172
448
777,062
1967
7,874
543,841
92,406
21,040
1,137
382
666,680
1968
17,147
466,846
79,808
12,604
1,188
641
578 234
1969
8,439
686,920
173,148
11,453
1,135
39
881.132
1970
8,815
952,379
249,059
14,696
2,753
360
1,227,882
1971
27,196
1,287,484
445,582
32,214
580
114
1,793,170
1972
23,985
1,422,266
615,367
92,404
277
1,842
2.179.999
1973
69,218
1,953,416
1,267,789
168,813
271
2,208
3.461,715
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
3.5 1.4 1.6 1.2 2.9 .9 .7 1.5 1.1 1.9
82.1 83.8 80.4 81.5 80.7 77.9 77.5 71.8 65.2 56.4
8.7 12.6 15.8 13.8 13.8 19.6 20.2 24.8 28.2 36.6
5.1 1.7 1.7 3.2 2.8 1.2 1.2 1.8 4.2 4.8
.2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .1 .2 0 0 0
.1 0 0 0 .1 . 0 0 0 0 0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
Africa
0 Europe
-4 America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
E/EN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Mali
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
8,294 13,938 11,847 7,048 6,042 12,346 20,025 4,792
5,341 1,701 631 1,055 3,282 3,969 11,639
732 60 2 2 2 13 7
1,998 1 1 164 1,234 802 1,788
0 0 0 0 0 0
35 5 718 2 280 180
16,590 15.705 13,199 8,271 10.763 17,310 39,113 26,297
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
50.0 88.7 89.7 85.2 56.1 71.3 51.2 18.2
32.2 10.8 4.8 12.8 30.5 23.0 30.0
4.4 .3 0 0 0 0 0
12.0 0 0 2.0 11.5 4.6 4.6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.2 0 5.4 0 2.6 1.0 0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Ghana
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
4,436 4,410 4,566 4,970 2,547 2,585 3,054 3,648 2,018 4,513
216,005 227,698 183,660 207,075 219,574 225,983 306,760 211,715 295,531 423,026
73,351 58,714 44,950 54,008 70,681 52,881 87,411 86,925 70,706 95,538
17,334 15,993 20,742 24,939 26,782 29,594 36,081 34,642 40,488 62,978
5,790 6,027 6,269 6,380 7,801 8,870 17,598 9,553 11,508 10,883
744 198 592 635 971 1,403 121 93 63 68
317,660 313,040 260,779 298,007 328,356 321,232 451,025 346,576 420,314 597,006
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
1.4 1.4 1.7 1.6 .7 .8 .6 1.0 .5 .7
68.0 73.0 70.4 69.4 66.8 70.3 68.0 61.1 70.3 70.8
23.1 19.0 17.2 18.1 21.5 16.4 19.3 25.1 16.8 16.0
5.4 5.1 8.0 8.3 8.1 9.2 7.9 10.0 9.6 10.5
2.0 2.0 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.7 3.9 2.7 2.7 1.8
.2 0 .2 .2 .3 .4 0 0 0 0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
Africa
Europe
c America
' Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Mauritania
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
1,346 2,087 1,628 2,193 2,969 4,529 2,281 4,147 3,204 4,806
42,402 54,120 63,942 64,544 63,108 64,626 76,749 76,351 90,733 124,139
1,436 1,296 1,728 1,152 369 611 597 0 0 126
513 0 1,757 1,904 4,351 1,819 0 7,010 9,716 21,821
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82
203 99 175 2,256 1,051 5,549 10,483 2,936 3,366 4,111
45,900 57,602 69,228 ' 72,023 71,758 77,134 90,110 90,444 107,019 159,930
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
3.0 3.6 2.4 3.0 4.1 5.9 2.5 4.6 3.0 3.0
92.4 94.0 92.4 90.0 88.0 84.0 85.2 84.4 85.0 78.0
3.1 2.2 2.5 1.6 .5 .8 .7 0 0 0
1.1 0 2.5 2.6 6.1 2.4 0 7.8 9.1 14.0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.4 .2 .3 3.1 1.5 7.2 11.6 3.2 3.1 2.6
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
.Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
%
Africa.
Europe
r-4i America
'.4
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
*most to Equat. Customs Union
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Gambia
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
119 203 90 84 1,276 134 253 304 337 490
9,058 14,516 17,504 13,839 15,426 15,458 14,357 16,331 18,517 26,275
29 8 1 0 0 3 2 280 3 9
0 0 10 3 13 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 6 18 761 473 48 103 38 159 504
9,228 14,733 17,623 14,687 17,188 15,643 14,715 17,038 19,058 27,443
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
1.3 1.4 .5 .6 7.4 .8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8
98.2 98.5 99.3 94.2 89.7 98.8 97.6 95.8 97.2 95.7
.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .5 .2 .6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.3 0 .1 5.2 2.8 .3 .7 .2 .8 1.8
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Liberia
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
960 1,985 2,453 2,735 2,522 2,774 2,732 3,817 3,555
82,269 93,753 105,130 112,757 124,814 143,182 144,035 168,128 233,041
50,139 52,345 49,259 45,741 55,684 51,362 51,657 52,765 67,841
1,967 2,373 1,981 7,757 12,900 16,412 25,567 19,651 19,602
76 1 0 37 19 2 6 32 2
6 1 8 2 5 1 0 1 0
132,417 150,458 158,768 169,029 195,944 213,733 223,997 244,394 324,041
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
.7 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.1
60.8 62.3 66.2 66.7 63.7 67.0 64.3 68.8 72.0
37.0 34.8 31.0 27.1 28.4 24.0 23.1 21.6 21.0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
%
Africa
e Europe
4 America
Oceania
Miscel.
World
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Sierra Leone
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
414 280 343 263 400 402 371 642 1,640 1,556
82,904 79,233 68,826 59,692 88,300 94,787 85,200 81,609 95,245 111,553
1,445 659 5,009 1,544 2,800 5,490 6,233 6,576 7,386 11,120
7 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
3 172 14 1,798 3,400 25 2,341 2,796 1,830 1,270
85,234 80,553 74,727 63,787 95,400 104,599 99,822 98,481 114,419 132,087
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
4.8 .3 .4 .4 .4 .4 .4 .6 1.4 1.2
97.3 98.4 92.1 93.6 92.5 90.6 85.4 83.0 83.2 84.5
1.7 .8 6.7 2.4 2.9 5.2 6.2 6.7 6.5 8.4
.5 .2 .7 .8 .5 3.7 5.7 7.0 7.3 5.0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 .2 0 2.8 3.5 0 2.3 2.8 1.6 1.0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa
'Europe
America
Asia
Miscel.
World
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
E/CN14/STAT/SerA/21, 23, 25
Togo
export (fob)
(US $ 1,000)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
1,008 971 1,417 1,752 1,994 1,614 1,699 1,769 5,326 6,577
22,975 23,220 28,695 26,514 34,421 41,294 51,254 45,429 61,403 77,142
3,386 365 891 294 63 80 106 160 8,781 7,174
1,300 1,181 2,102 1,819 1,728 1,709 1,589 1,686 9,201 9,705
1,507 1,116 2,837 1,601 475 0 0 0 10 48
0 203 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 8
30,176 27,056 35,942 31,980 38,685 44,700 54,650 49,063 84,775 100,654
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
3.3 3.6 4.0 5.5 5.2 3.6 3.1 3.6 6.3 6.5
76.1 86.0 80.0 83.0 89.0 92.4 94.0 92.5 72.4 76.6
11.2 1.3 2.5 .9 .2 .2 .2 .3 10.3 7.1
4.3 4.4 5.8 5.7 4.4 4.0 3.0 3.4 11.0 9.6
5.0 4.1 7.9 5.0 1.2 0 0 0 0 0
0 .7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa
Europe
America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
Africa
Europe
A America
Asia
Oceania
Miscel.
World
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Types of Products Exported to Nigeria from Largest Intra-African Traders
Benin
Cereals, grains, flaked, pearled or prepared in a manner
Macaroni, spaghetti, noodles, etc.
Tomato puree and paste
Beet and cane sugar refined
Sugar confectionery and other sugar preparations
Spices
Whisky
Schnapps and gins
Wine of fresh grapes, still
Beer including ale, porter and other fermented cereal
beverages
Cotton
Crude animal materials
Crude vegetable materials
Other wood simply shaped or worked
Fabrics woven not elsewhere specified
Wadding wicks and textile fabrics for use in machi-
nery or plant
Cement
Finished structural parts and constructions of non-
ferrous metals
Razors and razor blades
Aluminum or enamelled iron and steel
Parts and accessories of machinery
Electric torchlight batteries
Bodies chassis frames and other parts of motor vehicles
Motorized cycles and mopeds complete and no
Bicycles and other cycles not motorized
Sinks, washbasins, bidets, baths and other sanitary
plumbing fixtures of iron and steel
Other portable lamps, electric battery
Handbags, wallets, purses, pocketbooks and similar
articles of all materials
Articles and manufactures of carving or moulding
material
Personal effects
8.40
1,614.20
134.40
224.00
490.00
2,660.00
61.60
98.00
56.00
11.20
1,308,647.20
840.00
67.20
84.00
182.00
67,068.40
2,104,981.20
1,372.00
268.80
56.00
137.20
1,778.00
126.00
104,862.80
155,573.60
294.00
168.00
56.00
56.00
95.20
US $ 3,752,071.40
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1st Quarter 1975
Type of Products Exported from Largest Intra-African Trading States
Niger
Other meat dried, salted or smoked, not canned
Beet and cane sugar refined
Salt including salt put up for retail sale
Scented grease
Shampoo
Color woven cotton fabrics
Other cotton fabrics woven not including narrow or
special fabrics
Printed cotton fabrics
Mats, matting, screens, envelopes for bottles, etc.
Carpets, carpeting & rugs, knotted tapestries, etc.
Other bottles
Articles of base metals, iron or steel, zinc, copper
metal aluminum, magnesium, lead
Electric lamps
Trucks and lorries
Chairs and other seats & parts thereof
Handbags, wallets, purses, pocket books & similar
articles or all materials
Other outer garments knitted or crocheted not elastic
or rubberized
Shirts of all descriptions
Other headgear
Footwear with soles of leather, footwear with soles
of rubber or plastic
Personal effects
1,551.20
42.00
3,169.60
201.60
820.40
131.60
208.60
131.60
744.80
621.60
229.60
28.00
25.20
30,494.80
56.00
25.20
44.80
112.00
56.00
106.40
3,155.60
US $ 41,956.60
SOURCE: Nigeria Trade Summary Mar - Dec. 1975 (1st Qtr. 1975)
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Types of Products Exported to Nigeria from Largest Intra-African Traders
Ivory Coast
Edible nuts, fresh or dried, including coconuts
Fruit juices, unfermented whether frozen or not
Fruits temporarily preserved
Coffee extracts, coffee essences and similar prepara-
tions containing coffee
Crude vegetable materials
Other fixed vegetable oils
Caustic potash, peroxides of potassium or sodium oxides
Insecticides
Starches, including gluten albuminoidal substances, glues
Cement
Articles of base metals, iron or steel, copper, magne-
sium, lead, zinc, tin, aluminum
Parts and accessories of machinery
Passenger cars exceeding 1750 cc but not exceeding
2750 cc
Bicycles and other cycles not motorized
Handbags, wallets, purses, pocketbooks and similar
articles of all materials
Personal effects
3,024.00
5,157.60
7,498.40
151,146.80
420.00
772,273.60
56,375.20
35,691.60
125,050.80
18,888.80
6,622.00
3,150.00
30,587.20
3,530.80
420.00
US $ 1,227,164.40
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Ghana
Milk and cream, dry in solid form such as blocks or
powder
Maize, corn, unmilled
Edible nuts, fresh or dried, including coconuts
Spices
Food preparations
Tobacco, unmanufactured, including serap tobacco and 'tems
Cork, raw and waste, including natural cork in blocks
and sheets
Ointments and linaments
Other medicaments
Products of polymerization and copolymerization, etc.
Plywood, including veneered panels
Machine made paper and paper board, simply finished in
rolls or sheets
Exercise books, register albums, diaries, memorandum
blocks, etc.
Bed linen, table linen, altar linen, napkins, pillow
cases
Locksmith wares, including locks, padlocks, keys, etc.
Articles of base metals, iron or steel, copper...
Other machinery and appliances
Other radio receiving sets, domestic
Passenger cars not exceeding 1200 cc, complete whether
assembled or not
Chairs and other seats and parts thereof
Surveying instruments
Developed Cinematographic film
Books and pamphlets
Other printed matter including printed pictures and
photographs
Personal effects
U
8,428.00
224.00
517,104.00
3,192.00
17,729.60
688.80
1,400.00
12,048.40
29,607.20
5,731.60
5,124.00
56.00
92.40
56.00
8,400.00
3,511.20
5,653.00
120.40
2,800.00
3,474.80
45,634.40
173.60
4,146.80
15,237.60
2,212.00
S $ 1,797,429.20
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Major Exports by West African States to Nigeria
Niger
Other meat, dried, salted or smoked, not canned
Salt, including salt put up for retail sale
Shampoo
Mats, matting, screens, envelopes for bottles, etc.
Carpets, carpeting and rugs, knotted tapestries, etc.
Trucks and lorries
Personal effects
1,551.20
3,169.60
820.40
774.80
621.60
30,494.80
3,155.60
US $ 40,588.00
NOTE: Above constitues 96.7% of Niger trade with Nigeria, 1st Qtr. 1975
Benin
Macaroni, spaghetti, noodles, etc.
Spices
Cotton
Wadding wicks and textile fabrics for use in machinery
or plant
Cement
Finished structural parts and constructions of non-
ferrous metals
Electric torch batteries
Motorized cycles and mopeds, complete and no
Bicycles and other cycles not motorized
1,614.20
2,660.00
1,308,647.20
67,068.40
2,104,981.20
1,372.00
1,778.00
104,862.00
155,573.60
3,748,556.60
NOTE: Above constitues 99.9% of Benin trade with Nigeria, 1st Qtr 1975
Ivory Coast
Coffee extracts, coffee essences and similar prepara-
tions containing coffee
Other fixed vegetable oils
Caustic potash, peroxides of potassium or sodium oxides
Insecticides
Cement
Articles of base metals, iron or steel, copper, metal,
aluminum, magnesium, lead, zinc, tin
Bicycles and other cycles not motorized
151,146.80
722,273.60
56,375.20
35,691.60
125,050.80
18,888.80
30,587.20
US $ 1,190,014.00
NOTE: Above constitues 96.97% of Ivory Coast trade with Nigeria,
1st Qtr 1975
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Major Exports by West African States to Nigeria
Ghana
Edible nuts, fresh or dried, including coconuts
Food preparations
Ointments and linaments
Surveying instruments
Other printed matter, including printed pictrues and
photographs
Other medicaments
1,447,891.20
49,642.88
33,734.40
127,776.32
42,665.28
82,899.60
US $ 1,741,944.40
NOTE: Above constitues 96.9% of Ghana trade with Nigeria, 1st Qtr 1975
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Major Export by Nigeria to West African States
Sierra Leone
Other edible nuts
Food preparations
Other oil sees, oil nuts and oil kernels
Other materials of vegetable origin
Petroleum, crude and partly refined for further refining
excluding natural gas
Animal and vegetable oils and fats, processed and
waxed, of animal or vegetable origin
Pharmaceutical products, other medicaments
Calendars, including calendar blocks of paper
Personal effects
140.00
280.00
280.00
588.00
9,104,684.40
84.00
17,057.60
504.00
694.40
9,124,312.40
NOTE: 99.78% of Sierra Leone purchases from Nigeria, 1st Qtr 1975, was
petroleum.
Senegal
Petroleum, crude and partly refined for further
refining, excluding natural gas
Personal effects
Ivory Coast
Petroleum, crude and partly refined...
Organic chemicals - ethyl alcohol undernatured of at
least 80% strengthe and denatured
Personal effects
Portable containers
10,332,560.00
523.60
US $ 10,333,083.60
20,242,986.00
18,071.20
6,440.00
899,640.00
US $ 21,167,137.20
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Ghana
Coal, anthracite and bituminous
Petroleum, crude and partly refined...
Automotive gas, oil
Oils, lubricating, liquid
Pharmaceutical products, other medicaments
Chemical products and preparations
Newspapers and periodicals
Personal effects
Portable containers
403,760.00
21,709,416.00
24,886.40
65,133.60
23,472.40
4,200.00
268.80
20,599.60
280.00
US $ 22,251,737.00
NOTE: 97.56% of Ghana purchases from Nigeria, 1st Qtr 1975, was
petroleum
Major Export by Nigeria to West African States
Niger
Petroleum products, aviation spirit
Motor spirit, other
Lamp oil, kerosene, illuminating oil
Jet fuel, aviation-turbine fuel
Automotive gas, oil
Industrial diesel fuel
Residual fuel medium
26,555.20
151,914.00
29,604.40
56,196.00
786,136.40
177,497.60
107,716.00
US $ 1,335,619.60
NOTE: All Niger purchases from Nigeria, 1st Qtr 1975,
are fuel products
Benin
Industrial diesel fuel
Residual fuel oil, heavy
Oils, lubricating liquid
Portable containers
8,621.20
280.00
49,117.60
16,800.00
US $ 74,818.80
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Foreign Trade Statistics
Trade By Cowodity E/CN14/STAT/SerB/22
Togo Jan-Dec 1975 IMPORTS
Bovine Cattle Quantity (T) US $ 1,000
Upper Volta 1,149 564
Benin 3 2
Ghana 130 61
Macaroni, Spaghetti
Benin 116 76
Cigarettes
Senegal 14 42
Lumber, Shaped
Ghana 1,792 518
Building Stone
Nigeria 295 45
Clay
Benin 133 33
Salt
Senegal 1,045 109
Ghana 4,684 267
Plants, Seeds, Flowers
Ghana 225 100
Motor Spirit
Nigeria 988 133
Lubricating Oils, Greases
Senegal 267 125
Ivory Coast 742 368
Pitch, Resin, Asphalt
Nigeria 2,289 385
Gas, Natural
Ghana 280 91
Insecticides, Fungicides
Ivory Coast 290 961
Chemical Products
Ivory Coast 62 132
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Quantity (T) US $ 1,000
Plywood
Ivory Coast 112 69
Other Paper
Ghana 65 68
Cotton Fabrics, Bleached
Senegal 53 604
Cordage, Cables, Ropes
Ivory Coast 22 43
Building Materials
Ghana 107 62
Bottles, Flasks
Benin 267 92
Aluminium Worked
Ivory Coast 46 77
Fin Struct Parts Aluminium
Ivory Coast 79 133
Agricultural Tractors
Niger 13 48
Excavating Machinery
Benin 101 158
Insulated Wire
Benin 31 85
Trailers, Not Motor
Ivory Coast 22 53
Footwear
Senegal 24 166
Printed Matter
Nigeria 101
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Foreign Trade Statistics
E/CN14/STAT/SerB/ 22
Trade By Comodity
EXPORTS
TOGO Jan-Dec 1975
Quantity (T) US $ 1,000
Bovine Cattle
Ghana 87 39
Rice Not in Husk
Upper Volta 1,390 462
Other Fresh Vegetables
Ghana 681 68
Waste Textile Fabrics
Niger 77 36
Natural Phosphates
Ivory Coast 6,900 480
Nigeria 3,250 220
Building Stone
Nigeria 1,267 819
Plants, Seeds, Flowers
Ghana 201 89
Cotton Fabrics, Bleached
Mali 602 2,716
Cement
Upper Volta 602 33
Benin 1,892 93
Bottles, Flasks
Benin 294 92
Gas Cylinders
Ghana 132 41
Domestic Utensils
Nigeria 51 77
Pumps and Centrifuges
Ivory Coast 4 43
Pass, Road Motor Vehicles
Ghana 24 106
Trucks and Lorries
Ivory Coast 49 104
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CHAPTER TWO
A CASE STUDY OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP
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OUTLINE
A. History of the African Development Bank
1. Impetus for creating bank
a. loss of SUNFED proposal
b. distrust on IDA proposal by World Bank [lack of African
funding/no voting power]
c. desire (political) to break from colonial ties
d. spirit of self-help
2. Issues on the creation of ADB--Committee of Nine
a. membership restricted to African nations
b. voting power of members (equality v. proportionality)
c. additionality role of ADB (Europe cautious)
d. multinational v. national project focus
B. Problems of Operating ADB-Initial Years
SHORT MONEY
1. reliance on only paid in K in African central bank credits
(the poor funding the poor)
a. IBRD works on mainly borrowings
b. no access to nonAfrican loans/Eurobond mkt. [lack of credit
worthin]
2. Arrears on subscriptions
a. forced to cover operations on short money.
3. Loan ceilings
a. short money limits scope of operatins.
b. lack of "soft loan" window forces bias for "bankable"
( making) "sure thing" projects [until activation
of ADF)
c. bias toward "credit worthy" member countries and
those that could process proposals
d. fear of committing to multinational projects:
1. political need to spread limited money around
Africa
2. fear of losing large investment
3. perhaps, newness of regional authorities
4. slow processing of large loans
4. Erratic performance on disbursements
5. High ratio of administrative cost/disbursements and
commitments.
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6. High rate - result of "holding" money rather than using it
o rate
o Total Revenue/Dev Port
C. Adjustments by ADB-Present
1. Access to Eurobond market and non-member central banks
a. move to open up K-stock
b. increased callable/paid in ratio
c. falling rate of arrears/paid in ratio
d. additional African subscribers to ADB
2. Increasing revenue for dev. projects; not assets--falling
rate
3. Decreasing administrative cost/disbursement (although still
high)
4. Increasing level of operations (number of projects)
5. Creation and replenishment of ADF (African Deelopment Fund)
a. provided additional resources (additionality)
b. created "soft loan window" like IDA--to improve terms
c. ADF staff added administrative and technical support to
ADB
d. improved dialogue with outside funders
6. Creation of NTF (Nigerian Trust Fund)
a. additional resource from within Africa (additionality)
b. add source of concessional financing to mix with ADB loans
D. ADB Group Performance at Promoting Regional Economic Development
1. Early studies on WEst AFrica multinatinal projects
2. Establishment of SIFIDA and African Reinsurance Corp. and...
3. Volume of investments in West Africa.
4. Volume of loans/credits to multinational projects in West Africa.
5. Regional organizations supported by ADB Group.
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E. Constraints on ADB Group in Participating in Multinational Projects
in West Africa
1. Not enough joint financing with larger financers IBRD/Kuwait F/CDC
a. ADB money covers small proportion of total project cost
b. present loan ceiling still precludes against doing many multi-
national projects
c. borrowings not large enough to raise loan ceiling to level
that would cover large enough portion of multinational pro-
jects (compared to IBRD).
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V. Volume of Loans/Credits to Multinational Projects/Programs in
West Africa, by Institution
VI. Average Size of Loan/Credit for Projects in Africa, by
Institution
VII. Volume of Loans/Credits to Multinational Projects/ Programs in
West Africa Per Year and Average Size of Loans and Credits
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A. History of the African Development Bank
1. Impetus for Creating the ADB
The African Development Bank was born after the defeat of the
proposed Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. With the
culmination of independence movements throughout Africa, many African
leaders looked to the United Nations as the agency to take the lead in
financing development projects and programs in Africa. The proposed
fund was appealing to African, and other third world leaders, because,
as a United Nations agency, the voting power of all members would have
been equal. This feature provided a greater degree of influence for the
third world than they would have realized on the World Bank, where voting
power is contingent upon the volume of subscriptions that are drawn. In
having equal voting power with the capital exporting country counter-
parts, African nations would have had a significant impact on the policy
and investment decisions of the proposed United Nations fund. Despite
the attractiveness of the United Nations proposal, the idea for creating
a special fund for economic development was abandoned when the World
Bank proposed the creation of a soft loan window to the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
The proposed soft loan window to IBRD was designed to provide
concessionary aid to underdeveloped countries, offering loans at .75%
and 40 years amortization. In spite of the low cost of financing that
the soft loan window of the World Bank offered, African leaders were not
enthusiastic about the World Bank proposal. Aside from being disturbed
by the loss of the SUNFED proposal, African nations had not perceived a
strong commitment by the World Bank in addressing the needs of Africa.
This impression was supported by the low level of World Bank financing
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in Africa. In 1960-61, Europe and Australia received more than twice
the level of aid from the entire continent of Africa.1  Beyond the
issue of the World Bank's limited activity in Africa, African nations
had to forego the chance of acquiring equal voting power with the SUNFED
in favor of proportional representation, based on the volume of sub-
scriptions drawn, at the World Bank. With the loss of the SUNFED, and
the distastefulness of the World Bank proposal, African leaders began to
look more toward the idea of their own development bank.
The idea of an African Development Bank was formally proposed at
the All-African People's Conference in 1960 at Tunis. In moving to form
a development fund for Africa, the African leaders were not acting
without precedent; they had their Latin American counterparts to use for
reference. It has, in fact, been pointed out by a former official of
the African Development Bank that "it was no accident that the Tunis
resolution was adopted just a month after the Agreement Establishing the
Inter-American Development Bank entered into force.2 It should not be
suggested, however, that African countries were not responding to their
own legitimate concerns in forming an African development institution.
The concept of a development bank, wholly owned by African nations, that
would invest in African development was consistent with the political
climate of the time. At this juncture in African history, independence
was being declared throughout the continent. With the coming of inde-
pendence followed a strong sentiment for African unity and self-reliance.
An African development bank that would invest in continent-wide develop-
ment was a logical manifestation of this ethic. In an effort toward
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developing the Tunis resolution, the United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa, in February, 1961, took up the study of the possibility of
establishing an African Development Bank.
The initial findings of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
were supportive of the creation of an African development bank. To
further investigate the feasibility of establishing such an institution
in Africa, the ECA appointed a committee, comprised of representatives
from nine African nations, to canvas opinions in Africa and the interna-
tional community. The responsibilities of the committee were:
a. to make all necessary governmental and other contacts relevant
to the establishment of the Bank;
b. to complete comprehensive studies into the financial and
administrative structure of the proposed Bank and into the
nature and extent of its operations;
c. to draft a charter, for the proposed Bank; and
d. to make recommendations on its location3
Through their governmental contacts, the "Committee of Nine" were able
to catalogue several controversial issues in the creation of the African
Development Bank.
2. Issues of the Creation of the ADB - Committee of Nine
One of the most hotly debated issues among African countries concern-
ing the structure and resource base of the African Development Bank was
whether membership to the bank should be open to non-African countries.
There was a significant faction that opposed the opening of the bank to
non-African countries. They were most concerned about insuring that the
African character of the bank not be lost as a cbnsequence of a non-African
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presence on the bank. Their fears were based on the potential of outsiders
to dominate the bank by subscribing a majority share of the bank's capital
stock. This concern was compounded by the bitterness that many Africans
felt fresh in their mouths toward their former colonial oppressors. The idea
of inviting the former colonialist, so soon after independence, to partici-
pate in an African development institution was too revolting to a major
block of African leaders. Those taking the other side of the argument
chose to look beyond the emotion of the issue, and instead, consider the
economics of opening the capital stock of the bank to non-African countries.
Those that favored the opening of the bank to non-African countries
were concerned about the difficulty of operating the bank on the capital
subscriptions of only African countries. They questioned the wisdom of
having poor nations fund the operations of a development bank. It would
appear that the bank would only be serving as a means to redistribute the
limited resources of member countries, without an infusion of outside
capital. Allowing non-African countries to participate in the capital
stock of the bank would provide an additional source of capital and would
ease the reliance on poor African subscribers. In response to the question
of outside dominance, it was argued that the bank could have been struc-
tured in such a way to insure that African nations maintain majority shares
in the bank. The resolution of this controversial issue was a compromise
between maintaining the African character of the bank and the securing of
additional resources to Africa.
Restricting the membership of the bank to African countries was
endorsed by the majority of African representatives at the Khartoum meeting
to establish the African Development Bank, however, the principle of
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securing additional resources was also included in the functions of the
bank.
Securing additional resources typically meant obtaining funds from the
capital exporting countries. Having additional funds for the bank was a
goal of African countries that wanted the bank to be less reliant on
African subscriptions and more involved in securing outside funds, however,
there was a concern that the ADB would interrupt the flow of bilateral aid
that member countries received. This concern was expressed at the Khartoum
meeting in 1963 on the establishment of the ADB when a representative from
Mauritania "advocated the insertion of the word "additional" because a
number of countries receiving bilateral aid wished to maintain such aid
without it passing through the Bank." The question of additional
resources coming to Africa, as a result of the African Development Bank,
was an issue that the Committee of Nine investigated during their consulta-
tions with the capital-exporting countries.
The general response of the capital-exporting countries to the pro-
posed African Development Bank was cold. They tended to be uncomfortable
about committing their funds to an institution where they were denied
voting rights. There was also a degree of skepticism about investing in a
newly formed institution that lacked any record of its performance. On
this point the African countries could not come out successful. The
capital exporting countries would not contribute unless they saw a strong
record of performance. How could the bank obtain a track record, if it had
no funds to operate? This formulation made it clear that the African
Development Bank would have to rely solely on its African subscribers,
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unless the oapiral stock was opened up. Given the response of the capital-
exporting countries, the issue of securing additional funds to Africa, by
way of the African Development Bank, should have been a moot point.
Restricting the membership of the bank left the African member countries as
the sole source base of the ADB.
With the understanding that the bank was going to be wholly owned by
African countries, the remaining controversy concerned the formula for
representation on the bank. This issue highlighted the differences between
the large and small countries in Africa. The small, resource poor African
countries were supportive of a one flag-one vote formula that would assure
each member an equal share of votes. They were looking for an arrangement
that was similar to the United Nations, that would protect the rights of
smaller members by assigning equal voting power to all members. Another
feature of their proposal that resembled the United National structure was
that they wanted capital subscription levels to be based upon the ability
of each member to pay, rather than on a strict minimum level. At the
Khartoum meeting on the establishment of the ADB, small countries, such as
the Gambia, complained that the proposed minimum subscription level con-
stituted 20% of the country's annual revenue and that the bank should
consider some other formula for assigning subscription levels.5 Clearly,
setting subscription at levels that asked for 20% of a country's annual
revenue would have precluded many smaller countries from joining the bank.
The basic position of the smaller countries was, to insure fair representa-
tion that would not favor rich over poor and to enhance African unity, each
member that joined the bank should have equal voting power. Several of the
larger countries were not supportive of this proposal, instead, endorsing
the concept of proportional representation.
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The large, resource rich countries, such as Algeria and Nigeria,
advocated for a formula of representation that would acknowledge the larger
financial commitments of their countries. They reasoned that they would be
more concerned about policy decisions than the smaller contributors as a
consequence of their large commitment to the bank. Those that favored
proportional representation were disturbed by the paranoia of the smaller
countries that feared that their position would be dominated by the larger
members. The response of Algeria to this fear by the smaller countries was
expressed in the transcript of the Khartoum meeting in the following
manner;
"Although Algeria's share allocation was relatively large, it was a
very poor country; the large contribution represented a sacrifice and
nothing more. The Bank was a joint venture based on faith in Africa's
future. It could not go far if that faith was lacking. Hence there
ought to be no fear 6that one country or group of countries would
dominate the Bank."
Relying on mutual faith was not a compelling argument to the small
countries. The reasoning of one-flag one-vote for all members as a means
to insure African unity was cogent, however, without some measure allowing
for a degree of proportional representation, there was little impetus for
resource rich members to subscribe more than the minimum level of subscrip-
tions. As a compromise resolution the following formula was agreed upon in
the bank's charter:
"Article 35 (1) Each member shall have 625 votes and, in addition, one
vote for 7each share of the capital stock of the Bank held by that
member."
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Under this arrangement the large contributors to the bank were able to
garnish greater voting power than under a one flag-one vote system, however,
their degree of power was not as strong as would have been possible under
absolute proportional representation. With minimum subscriptions set at
U.S. $1M and maximum subscriptions at $30M, a member with the minimum level
would have 725 votes, while a member with the maximum level would have
3,625 votes; the larger subscriber would have 5 times the voting power
although his subscriptions were 30 times greater.8 This sytem of
representation provided for a more equitable position betwen the large and
small members-, in addition to allowing for the large members to make
sizeable contributions to the bank.
The tensions evidenced between the large, resource rich countries and
the small, resource poor countries highlights the potentially disintegra-
tive influence of imbalances between states within a community. The
traditional neo-classical economic perspective on regional integration
would view the wide disparities between poor states, such as the Gambia,
and rich states, such as Nigeria, as being a prominent obstacle to regional
integration, or even to a regional cooperation venture like the African
Development Bank. In the case of the African Development Bank the poten-
tial for disintegration resulting from imbalances between states is
heightened by the financial obligation of each member to subscribe to the
bank's capital stock. With regional cooperation being based upon the
financial obligation of member states, pressure is placed most heavily on
the resource poor states. As seen in the previous chapter, when pressures,
or rather costs, are placed too heavily on the poorer states (as in the
case of lost import duties resulting from CET), disintegration of a
cooperative effort or community can result. The balancing formula of
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Article 35 of the African Development Bank charter helps to ease the
pressures of financial obligations for the small, resource poor states, in
addition to calming their fears of being dominated by the richer states.
Article 35 effectively deals with the disintegrative potential of imbalances
between states, while allowing for the positive force of the "prime movers"
on the continent to invest in the growth of the African Development Bank.
The concept of "prime movers' in an integration effort, or a region-
ally based cooperative venture, such as the African Development Bank, sug-
gests that large political and economic powers within a community are
needed to lead the smaller states in a cooperative or integrative effort.
The basis for this concept is that large financial investments, fueled by
a strong political will are needed to develop the necessary infrastructure
and institutions of a regional community. The African Development Bank,
as a continental institution, would require a large capital base to func-
tion as a development bank. Based upon the concept of "prime movers" this
support would come from the large subscribers in Africa. As seen by the
terms of Article 35, countries, such as Algeria and Nigeria are given a
level of proportional representation that rewards their large contribution,
and thereby, assures the presence of "prime movers" on the bank. In short,
Article 35 has eased the disintegrative potential of imbalances between
states, while providing for the benefits of large capital subscriptions
from the richer countries.
A final area of contention among African member countries, concerning
the purpose and function of the bank dealt with the scope of the bank's
operations. Countries, such as Mauritania, proposed that the bank's
operations be limited to multinational projects that aided in regional
development.9 The Mauritanian postion was that national projects could
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be funded by national banks and bilateral aid and that the ADB could be the
lead agency on regional, interstate development. Island countries, such
as Madagascar, Mauritius and the Comoros Islands, were naturally opposed
to a multinational focus by the ADB, instead preferring a broader invest-
ment perspective. In an effort to include a preference for projects that
advanced regional development and not preclude the possibility of doing
national projects, African member countries agreed on Article 2 which
states;
"special priority will be given to projects or programmes
which by their nature or scope concern several members
and are designed to make their economies increasingly
complementary and to bring about an orderly expansion of
their foreign trade"10
This article provided the bank latitude in choosing national and
multinational projects, although it did emphasize a preference for develop-
ment that was regional by nature. It should be pointed out, however, that
a national project may be designed in such a manner that it produces re-
gional benefits. This would be especially true where the investment is
made in a relatively poor state of a region, in an attempt to remedy pro-
blems resulting from "backwash." To the extent that national project in-
vestment by the bank reduces regional imbalances and makes the area econo-
mies "increasingly complementary," national projects can be classified as
having a regional focus. To be sure, it is not easy to decide whether a
national project is reducing regional imbalances and making the area
economies "increasingly complementary," therefore a broader look at the
total investments of the bank in addition to the development of area
states is required to determine the regional impact of ADB investments.
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When the ADB began operations in 1967, three years after the ratifica-
tion of the agreement to establish the bank, it was faced with several
constraints. The capital stock of the bank was limited to the subscrip-
tions of countries that were all underdeveloped, and therefore, least able
to pay their share of subscriptions. The ADB's subscriptions were divided
equally into paid in shares and callable shares, with 125m units of account
for paid in and callable shares; a unit of account being equivalent to
US$1. Dividing the subscriptions into paid in and callable shares
placed the ADB in the position of operating on the limited amount of
dollars provided by the paid in capital. At this juncture, the only other
potential source of ready capital came from borrowings from the central
banks of member countries.
To compound the problem of operating with limited resources, the ADB
was being asked tofocus its financing into multi-national projects and/or
programs. The costs for multi-national projects tend to be higher than
national projects and involve more extensive project evaluation than
national projects. In addition to the limited resources and the high cost
of financing multinational projects, as indicated in the annual reports of
the international development institutions, no other development institu-
tion was financing multinational projects at the time. This meant that the
ADB was unable to enter into a joint-financing of a multinational project,
but instead, was being asked to take on the total cost of multi-national
projects. Given the bank's limited resources, ambitious opertions mandate
and the absence of joint-financing for multinational projects, the ADB
began operations under difficult circumstances.
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B. Problems of Operating the ADB - The Early Years 1967-1973
The ADB conducted its investment operations from 1967 to 1974 solely
on its paid-in capital. Not until 1974 did the ADB support its operations
through borrowings from the central bank's of its member countries. With
such limited resources at its disposal, the bank invested only US$119.5m in
its first seven (7) years of operations.12 Operating a development bank
on only the paid in capital of subscribers is not the normal pattern
followed by other development banks. Many of the international leading
agencies, e.g., the IBRD, IDB and the Asian Development Bank fund their
operations principally from borrowed resources, holding back on disbursing
their paid in capital. Being able to conduct their leading operations on
borrowed money help to ease pressure on their subscribers. The ability of
these institutions to secure borrowings in the market place is a conse-
quence of the strength of their callable capital.13 These institutions
can back up their commitments with the obligation of their members to
produce the called capital should the bank require it. The ADB lacked the
same sense of creditworthiness in the international market as their coun-
terparts in Asia, Latin America and the United States enjoyed because of
the questionable standing of their callable capital.
The other leading institutions that have been referred to can support
their credit worthiness by the strength of their members. The members of
these institutions include the capital exporting countries, whose ability
to produce callable capital is acknowledged in the international market.
The ADB's members are comprised totally of underdeveloped countries, whose
individual creditworthiness is considered the poorest in the world commun-
ity. The consolidation of their resources has not improved their credit-
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worthiness in the international market. The outcome of ADB's poor credit
standing and its subsequent reliance on the paid in capital of member
states is that the poor are forced to aid the poorer. This is analogous
to the special funds used by the CEAO, the Entente Council and the ECOWAS,
who depend on the relatively well to do states to make large contributions
to a redistribution fund that is designed to balance gains in the region.
As evidenced with the special funds, the reliance by the ADB on paid in
contributions from its member states provides insufficient capital to
meet the task of investing in African development. Despite the relatively
large subscriptions of states like Nigeria, Algeria and Libya, the modest
size of the paid in capital limits the investment capability of the bank,
in addition to discouraging outside lenders. This problem is exacerbated
by the poor performance of member countries in meeting their paid in
capital commitments.
Judging the credit standing of a development bank by the strength of
its callable capital is conducted by assessing the economic solvency of its
membership. To determine the economic strength of a development bank by
measuring its paid in capital requires looking at the ability of its mem-
bers to meet their obligations. By 1971, the ADB's percentage of arrears
to callable was 26.17%, with the assigned level of paid in capital
set at 110.2m units of account.13 Given the modest size of the paid in
capital required of the member countries, the high percentage of arrears
indicated the weak economic standing (or lack of commitment of the bank's
members) of the member countries and the ADB. With the small size of the
bank's paid-in capital and its high level of arrears on paid in capital,
the possibility of the ADB operating on borrowed monies was nil. Not being
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able to secure borrowings in the international market prevented the bank
from carrying out one of its missions effectively; bringing additional
resources to Africa. Aside from this issue, the ADB was placed in a para-
doxical position; the weakness of its member countries denied it access to
outside support, which placed added pressure on its members to meet their
obligations to the bank. Being forced to operate on a short supply of
money, the ADB had to develop policies that would make the best use of its
resources, while enhancing the bank's standing to outside aid givers and
lenders.
One of the ADB policies that were designed to conserve resources, as a
result of their reliance on paid-in capital for project financing, was to
set loan ceilings for multinational and national projects. The loan
ceiling policy, as stated by the ADB in 1967 was as follows;
"In its initial period of operations, while its resources are depen-
dent upon the continued payment of member countries of their scheduled
subscriptions to the paid up portion of the capital, the Bank will not
be in a position to grant large loans. Therefore an upper limit of
approximately $8 million has been sent for .Tltinational projects and
one of $3 million for national projects...
The loan ceiling constrained the bank from considering a wide range of
development projects. With the ceiling, the ADB was relegated to financing
small projects or small portions of large projects. This situation would
place the ADB in the role of junior partner in projects in which they were
co-financers. The loan ceiling also precluded them from considering many
multinational projects. During the time of the 1967 loan ceiling (until
1973), the ADB made only three direct loans to multinational projects (Air
Afrique, Mano River Bridge, R.A.N. [Ivory Coast, Upper Volta] and extended
one (1) line of credit to a regional organization (East African Development
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Bank).15 The ADB was also in a position, due to the loan ceiling, where
they had to absorb high administrative costs.
Small loans tend to incur greater administrative costs than large
loans. Larger sums of money committed to a project provide more revenue to
the lending agency with which to cover their administrative overhead. When
a project is small, the pay back from the investment has to be stretched
further to cover expenses. Because the cost of processing and implementing
a loan is generally the same for large and small loans, the cost savings
is realized in the volume of revenue obtained from the investment - larger
loans giving greater returns. In order that the ADB would be able to
operate within the limits of the loan ceiling, the bank had to absorb
higher administrative costs, as a consequence of funding small projects.
During the last three years of the 1967 loan ceiling, the ADB's ratio of
loan committments to administrative costs has been, in comparison with the
IBRD and CDC, quite high.
TABLE 1: Ratio of Loan Commitments to Administrative Costs by Institution
(US$m) (US$m) Administrative Cost
Year Commitments Administrative Cost Commitments
ADB 1971 24.69 3.485 14.1%
1972 27.38 3.502 12.79%
1973 43.13 4.366 10.1%
IBRD 1971 2505 66.32 2.6%
1972 2966 78.567 2.6%
1973 3408 91.02 2.6%
CDC 1973 523.25 6.86 1.3%
SOURCE: Annual Reports of ADB, IBRD/IDA and CDC. Figures converted to
U.S. dollars by exchange rates listed in ADB Annual Reports
1971/2/3.
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To be sure, the high administrative costs of the ADB, when compared to the
IBRD and CDC, are a product of the bank's slow "take off" and limited
resource base as well as the smallness of their operations. The small size
of the bank's operations and its limited resource base also had an impact
on the bank's policies concerning project selection.
At the establishment of the bank, the project selection criteria
was to include projects and/or programmes that "contribute to the economic
development and social progress of its members - jointly and individu-
ally." 16 Although the term "social progress" is not entirely clear,
it appears to include projects that might not be judged economically
productive, but still necessary enough to warrant funding. If this is
actually the spirit of the term, by the time the ADB began operations, its
application to project selection decisions was not apparent. The policy of
removing projects that were "social" in nature from the ADB selection of
potential projects was a response to the bank's poor credit standing.
In order that the ADB might gain credibility in the international
market as a sound development institution, the bank decided to try to
attract outside aid and potential lenders through its lending operations.
The bank was going to have a hard time convincing the international market
that it was creditworthy, therefore, the only other way to gain respecta-
bility was by demonstrating wisdom in its investments by using "sounding
banking criteria" in its project selection. This approach appears to
be a product of the response that the Committee of Nine received in their
meetings with the capital exporting countries that wanted to observe the
bank's performance before committing funds to its opeartions. The decision
to direct loans to "bankable" projects may have been a sound strategy for
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attracting additional sources of funds for the ADB, however, the policy
altered the original concept of the bank's purpose.
There is no agreed upon definition of a "bankable" project, although
it generally refers to projects that display good prospects for providing
sufficient return to pay off the loan; in other words, profitability. In
choosing to direct investments into projects that were profitable, the ADB
overlooked "social" projects, e.g., housing, ruralwater supply, hospitals.
In light of the slow pay off on these type of loans and the low rate of
profitability, the ADB chose to not fund social projects. They reasoned
that, due to the nature of these type of projects the bank would need "soft
loan money", which could be offered on concessionary terms.18 The ADB
visualized the forming of a special fund (ADF) that would serve as a soft
loan window to the ADB, much like the IDA does for the IBRD. The ADB, in
limiting its project selection to "bankable" projects, narrowed its opera-
tions to national projects in fairly well to do member countries.
To insure that their projects would pay off, the ADB focussed its
investments in the member countries with the most sound economies. In the
first seven (7) years of the bank's operations the member countries with
the relatively strongest economies (Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Algeria and
Kenya) received the largest volume of loan commitments in their regions.19
Another factor of the loan policy that biased loans in favor of the more
well-to-do member countries was that the ADB required the host country of a
project to invest "approximately 50% of the cost of the project" as a
condition for receiving a loan.20 This clause of the ADB loan policy
eliminated several of its poorer members from considering ADB loans in
their countries. The member countries with the stronger economies were
also better equipped to formulate loan proposals to the bank, since they
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tended to have a greater number of qualified bureaucrats than their poorer
counterparts.
These policies that tended to favor the more well endowed countries
may have provided the bank with a solid record of "bankable" projects that
were funded, but it did not necessarily make the economies of member
countries more complementary nor produce regional development. Imbalances
between states that are engaged in economic union can have a disintegrative
effect on the community. This phenomenon was illustrated in the case of a
laissez-faire economic grouping that failed to account for growing dispari-
ties between states. In this case, the loss of import duty revenues of
the smaller states and the disproportion gain from increased trade flows
for the larger states created an imbalance within the region that disrupted
the economic community. A variant of this problem that has been confronted
by economic groupings that try to balance gains between states is the pro-
blem of "backwash." It is this problem, which weakens regional economic
communities, that the ADB's first seven years of investment exacerbated
by diverting funds to the richer states.
As stated in the previous chapter, when discussing the gaps in the
ECOWAS program, "backwash" is the tendency of capital and development
activity to be centered in regional growth poles. These growth poles are
typically found in the wealthier states of the region, where there is a
substantial level of infrastructure available for development. It was
pointed out that this tendency of capital to concentrate in the wealthier
states turns the poorer states into "back waters." The oucome of this
process is that the poorer state eventually breaks from the regional com-
munity and attempts to develop its own industrial centre behind the pro-
tection of its national boundaries. The only manner in which this disin-
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tegrative outcome can be avoided is to direct investments of the region
into the poorer states. CEAO, the Entente Council and ECOWAS use their
special funds to initiate regional investment into the poorer states.
As was suggested earlier, the special funds are undercapitalized and the
various economic groups of the area look toward foreign aid and the ADB to
make the necessary investment to remedy the problems of "backwash."
The ADB's concentration of investments into the wealthier African
states heightened the problems of "backwash." Without ADB investment,
the tendency of local and foreign investors would be to focus their monies
into projects within the growth poles. The ADB policy served to accelerate
this process, to the detriment of the poorer states. The disintegrative
effects of the first seven years of ADB investment activity was compounded
by the small number of multinational projects that were funded, which may
have served to mitigate against the ensuing disparities between member
countries. Given this scenario, it is not surprising that areas, such as
West Africa, had so few a number of regional economic groupings before the
1970's. During the early years of the ADB's operation, the only device
that the bank used to advance regional development was by distributing
its funds equitably throughout the subregions of Africa which does not produce
complimentarity between the economies of members, nor does it create re-
gional development; balancing industrial development to deal with the
problems of "backwash does produce a degree of complementarity between the
economies of member states.
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TABLE 2: Geographical Distribution of ADB Loans for the Period 1967 to 1974
East Africa 26% Central Africa 14%
North Africa 26% Multinational 6%
West Africa 28%
SOURCE: ADB, Annual Report, 1974.
In defense of the ADB's inactivity in funding multinational projects
during the first loan ceiling period, there were only a small number of
regional authorities or organizations with which to disburse loans to and
to oversee the management of regional projects. By 1973, all of ADB loans
to multinational projects were made to regional entities, with the Mano
River Union between Liberia and Sierra Leone being inaugurated just prior to
an ADB loan commitment to the Mano River Bridge.21 In the absence of a
regional entity, it is difficult to decide which country will receive the
loan, who will quarantee the loan, who will manage the project, how are
rights of access decided and which country will absorb the costs. A
regional body serves as a conduit for loans and coordinates the arrange-
ments between its member countries. The absence of regional bodies in West
Africa, during the first loan ceiling period, give an indication of the
lack of institutional support that the ADB had in financing multinational
projects. Of the approximately 26 regional organizations that now exist in
West Africa 18 of them were formed in 1970 or after.22 Without the
organizational support of regional organizations, it was difficult for the
ADB to fund multinational projects, although it is not certain that with
the presence of the organizations the ADB would have diyerted money from a
wide number of national projects to finance a few multinational projects.
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There is greater pressure on the ADB to fund national projects in the
widest number of countries rather than to fund multinational projects
because the member countries are the sole contributors to the bank's
operations. .Each country feels that if it must pay a certain amount of
subscriptions, it should receive at least a comparable amount in loans.
This is one of the perverse outcomes of the ADB functioning totally on
paid-in capital; money is merely redistributed among individual members.
The political pressure on the bank to spread its loans among its members,
rather than only on good projects, diverts the bank away from projects that
are not geographically bound. The member countries, in addition to wanting
something in return for their money, prefer national projects because
they maintain political control over the project and realize all of its
benefits. An extension of this sentiment is the apprehensiveness of
national political leaders to concede any power to a regional body.
When discussing the political constraints to regional integration it
was stated that national political leaders tend to be uncomfortable with
conceding power to an outside authority. This sense of uneasiness is more
apparent for those leaders that confront internal political instability
or rule with a weak political base. For these nations, multinational
projects that require interstate authorities to administer and control the
project involve a degree of authority transfer that is not always viewed
favorably by the national leadership. The fears of these national leaders
concerning authority transfers to a regional body, with the subsequent loss
of control over the project, is compounded by the volatility of national
leadership within the nations of Africa.
National leaders tend to be cautious when making interstate agreements
as a result of the unpredictable changes in national leadership in Africa.
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Given the numerous "coups" and attempted "coups" in Africa, national
leaders are aware that an agreement made between heads of state can quickly
be undermined by a radical change in leadership. It is for this reason
that some national leaders shy away from multinational projects that re-
quire regional authorities. The skeptics realize that the coordination
between nations that is required to operate these authorities can easily
be destroyed by a change in relations between member states. One way to
allay this concern on the part of national leaders is to establish regional
cooperation, and show the success of their operations. The ADB can be the
lead agency in assisting states to form these authorities as a measure to
ease the pressure for national investments. Another strategy that the
ADB can use to ease pressure from member states to focus its investments
into national projects would be to shift their reliance on capital away
from the member states and expand its resource base by securing additional
funds.
Aside from the lack of institutional support for multinational pro-
jects and the bias of member countries for national projects, the ADB was
apprehensive about committing a large sum of its limited capital into a
small number of projects. Should a few larger investments in multinational
projects fail, the ADB would be faced with heavy losses, which would
further errode its credibility as an investment institution. To add to the
apprehensiveness of the ADB was the obvious absence of other development
institutions in the area of regional projects. By 1972 the IBRD, and IDA
by 1971, had committed, worldwide, only 1.9% of their total financing to
multinational (regional) projects and/or programs.23 Without other
investors contributing to multinational projects, how could the ADB invest
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in a multinational project, without assuming the weight of the total cost.
To compound the problem of not having local political support and co-finan-
cing support, the processing and disbursement of ADB loans was rather slow,
with the'larger projects displaying the greatest delays. As far as the
ADB's performance in multinational and national projections, delays in
processing and disbursements of loans plaqued the bank in its early years
(1967-1973).
The ADB, in the latter part of its years operating under a loan
ceiling of $8m for multinational and $3m for national projects, began to
improve its percentage of loans committed per year that were actually
disbursed. This indicator is important in assessing an investment institu-
tions performance in financing projects because it reflects the ability of
the institution to release its money quickly and to implement projects
promptly. When compared to other major lenders, the poor performance of the
ADB, in its early years, is clear (see Table 3).
TABLE 3: Ratio of Disbursements to Loans, by Institution (1968-1973)
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
ADB
loans (US$m) 2.98 7.92 11.15 24.69 27.38 43.13
disbursements (US$m) .4 .76 2.3 6.3 13.46 20.27
ratio .1243 .0959 .206 .255 .491 .469
IBRD
loons (US$m) 847 1399 1680 1921 1966 2051
disbursements (US$m) 772 762 772 915 1182 1180
ratio .911 .545 .459 .476 .601 .575
CDC
loans (US$m) 423.25
disbursements (US$m) 341.37
ratio .652
SOURCE: Annual Reports of ADB and IBRD/IDA for years listed. Report and
Accounts of CDC for years listed. Currency exchange based on
exchange rates from ADB Annual Reports for years listed.
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The difficulty the ADB experienced in disbursing its loans can be
attributed to a slow start-up period during its first four (4) years of
operations. Comparing the disbursement data of the ADB and the IBRD and
CDC is somewhat misleading also, with the scope of the IBRD and CDC opera-
tions being on a world wide scale and the ADB restricted to Africa. This,
however, should more clearly state the problem of the ADB, whose sucess at
disbursing funds in Africa is not competitive with the success of the IBRD
and CDC, who finance projects internationally. A related problem to that
of slow disbursements, is that the ADB has had difficulty in committing its
capital to actual development projects.
The ADB has been unable to commit a significant portion of its avail-
able capital to development projects. Much of the bank's capital stock has
been invested in time deposits, rather than in development projects. The
policy of investing uncommitted available capital in time deposits does not
help the bank in improving the performance of member countries in meeting
their paid in capital commitments. Member countries rightfully question
the need for additional capital for operations when such a large portion of
capital is being invested but not in development projects. One of the
indicators of the bank's inability to commit its capital to development
projects is the rate of income that it realizes from investments. Most
development agencies that are able to commit their capital to projects tend
to have a low rate of profit (whether it be from projects or investments);
the ADB's rate is consistently high. By 1975, the ADBs profit rate had
reached 37.5% while the CDC had a profit rate of only 2.1%.24 This
problem is referred to in the 1969 ADB Annual Report in the following
sentence;
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"It may be pointed out that the substantial increase in income of
59.7% is the result of the exceptionally high rates offered for
the funds29ot utilized for operational purposes and placed on time
deposit."
The problem of not being able to commit its capital to development
projects was most serious in its first four years of operation, when its
cumulative number of loan projects was only 12.26 The following three
years of bank lending reflect a sharp increase in the number of projects
committed by the bank, with the cumulative number of loan projects reaching
53 in 1973. Fifty-three loan projects in seven (7) years of operations is
not a handsome number of investments, and in fact, appears to be an illu-
sory indictor of progress when considered in relation to the volume of loan
commitments by other lending agencies. Overall, the banks ability to
commit more of its capital stock to projects during its first seven (7)
years was poor.
In summarizing the performance of the ADB's first seven years of
activity, the most fundamental constraint on the bank's operations was the
limited resource base of the bank. The lending operations of the ADB were
funded entirely from the paid in capital of its subscribers. This process
of funding the bank's activities created a situation where the ADB was
merely serving as a facilitator in redistributing a small amount of capital
among its members. The limited size of the capital stock pressured the ADB
to conserve capital, and therefore, to narrow its scope of projects to
those that were "bankable" and within a loan ceiling.
The small size of the loan projects that the ADB funded in its early
years produced high administrative costs. The ADB may have actually been
top heavy as an agency, however, its disbursement to administrative cost
ratio demonstrated a consistent decline, reflecting more efficient output
by the bank, rather than an excess of staff. An additional effect of the
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small loan size, made necessary by the limited size of the capital at the
bank's disposal, was the diverting of a high volume of loans to the most
well-to-do member countries. This diverting of bank loans worked contrary
to the spirit of the ADB; to make member countries economies more compli-
mentary and to advance regional development. A by-product of this policy
was the emphasis of bank loans into national, rather than multinational,
projects.
With the ADB's entire resource base coming from the paid in capital of
member countries, the political pressure to do many national projects
impaired the bank's ability to do more than a few multinational projects.
The lack of regional bodies in which to disburse loans to and to manage
multinational projects further inhibited the bank from carrying out more
multinational projects. Aside from this factor, the small size of ADB
contributions to multi-national projects, as specified by the loan ceiling,
in addition to the absence of co-financers in these type of projects,
served to constrict the banks activity in the area of multinational pro-
jects. Beyond the ADB's inability to carry out many multinational pro-
jects, the bank had a poor history of committing and disbursing its funds.
Despite the modest size of the bank's capital stock, the ADB was
unable to commit significant portions of its capital to development pro-
jects. The poor performance of the ADB in committing its funds to projects
sent discouraging signals to its subscribers and to potential outside
lenders. The ability of the ADB to get its subscribers to pay in the
required shares of capital and its success at securing additional sources
of funds from outside Africa was questionable, with the bank demonstrating
problems at finding projects. This problem was exacerbated by the bank's
poor performance in disbursing loans to projects.
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The loan commitments to disbursements ratio improved for the ADB in
the latter part of its first seven years of activity. Despite its
improved performance in releasing its committed funds, the ADB was not at
a level comparable to the other investment institutions lending in
Africa. As a consequence of this, the ADB loans were not viewed by
African countries as being as reliable as those offered by the IBRD and
CDC. This perception further undermined the bank's credibility. In
spite of all these set backs and constraints, the ADB was able to con-
sistently expand its lending activity.
By 1973 the ADB had more than doubled its cumulative number of loan
projects from the number it attained in 1971 (1971 - 24 projects; 1973 -
53 projects). The increased level of loans committed, combined with the
bank's consistent improvement in disbursing its funds, indicates that,
in spite of the numerous and substantial constraints placed on the ADB's
activity, the bank would be able to survive as a lending institution.
C. Adjustments by the ADB - 1974-1979
The issue of whether to open the bank's capital stock to non-African
countries continued to be debated through the difficult years of the
bank's start up period. The topic was too politically loaded and emo-
tional for an objective debate about its merits to be discussed. By
1974, the question of opening the capital stock remained moot, with the
bank's Board of Governors still not in favor of the proposal. It was
obvious at this point, however, that one of the ADB's fundamental problems
of functioning as a development bank was that it was relying on paid-in
capital to cover its operations. By 1974, the bank began to supplement
its operations through borrowings from the central banks of its members,
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however, this did not provide additional funds to Africa. Borrowing from
the central banks of member countries continued the bank in the role of re-
distributor of resources around Africa. In 1975, the ADB broke from this
mode when it secured a $65m loan from a syndicate of United States banks.27
The ability to secure outside monies to the bank was the path that
the ADB wanted to follow. By having access to borrowed money on the
international market, the bank could begin to expand its operations in
addition to hold back on the use of its paid in capital. This feature
would ease the strain on the bank's subscribers and weaken the political
pressure on the bank from its member countries. It is not clear how the
bank was able to instill confidence in outside lenders, although one factor
may have been its improved record of clearing up subscribers arrearages.
Other institutions that are comparable to the ADB, e.g., the IBRD, IDB
and ASDB, are able to secure borrowings on the international market on the
strength of their callable capital. In the IBRD, the callable capital is
(since 1974) nine times larger than the amount of paid in capital.28
Maintaining such a larger callable capital in relation to the paid in
capital and still be successful at borrowing large sums of money on the
international market reflects the deep faith that investors have in the
strength of the IBRDs subscribers. The ADB does not enjoy that degree of
faith from foreign investors. The ADB's callable capital to paid in
capital ratio, up until 1975 was 1:1, with the paid in amount totalling a
modest figure of 193.93m (UA) [ $217.69m].29 It would not appear that
the ADB could instill confidence in potential foreign investors with those
figures. The data that might have given the lenders in 1975 a feeling of
relative security was the bank's improved record of meeting its paid-in
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capital schedule. The bank's summary statistics on arrearages by 1975
looked like the following:
TABLE
(UAm)
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
SOURCE:
ADB Paid
(A)
Paid In
110.2
127.2
185.58
193.93
In/Callable Capital and Arrears/Paid in
(B) (B/A) (D)
Callable Ratio Arrears
110.2 1:1 28.845
127.2 1:1 29.493
20.496
185.58 1:1 18.729
193.93 1:1 22.9
Capital Record
(D/A)
% of Paid In
26.17
23.18
10.09
11.8
ADB Annual Reports 1971-1975.
As the data indicates, the level of bank arrears in relation to paid
in capital declined substantially between 1972 and 1974. A higher propor-
tion of subscribers meeting the paid in capital schedules reflects a
stronger commitment by the bank's member countries to keep the bank solvent
and operating. Beyond the issue of the ADB's improved record on arrearages,
the size of the bank's subscriptions has grown over the years. Whether the
subscriptions of the bank rise from an individual member drawing more
subscriptions from the bank (as Nigeria has done) or from the Board of
Governors raising the subscription levels for all the members, or from the
addition of new member countries, the increase in paid in capital from
higher subscriptions broadens the bank's operations and tends to reassure
skeptical foreign investors. As the bank continued to increase its sub-
scription levels and cut down on its arrearages after 1975, access to
foreign credit became easier, although policy changes by the bank may
have enhanced the ADB's position as a borrower in foreign markets.
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In 1976 the ADB decided to increase the ratio of paid incallable
capital. By 1979 the ratio had grown to 3:1 (callable/paid in), with the
intention of gaining greater access to foreign lenders by doing so. The
reasoning of this policy decision is captured in a passage from the Presi-
dent of the ADB from 1977 to 1979, Kwame Konkoh Fordwor;
"The callable capital is intended in effect to be the owner's guaran-
tee of the bank's indebtedness. As such, its exploitation in the
operations of the bank is more than an invitation to outsiders to
share the owners faith in their willingness and ability to pay for the
amount of debt on the evil day - which with good management, would
never come - when the bank might have to close its doors because of
insolvency. ...It was in this spirit that I decided - with some
temerity - that this ratio was too high. If we lowered it, there
would be a larger margin of callable capital on the faith of which we
could borrow more. All it needed was faith on the part of36he avail-
able lenders, and that would largely depend on outsiders."
The ADB's access to outside credit almost doubled between 1977 and
1979. Part of this was a result of the bank's success at floating bonds in
Kuwait in 1976 and the bank's first issuance of bonds in the Eurobond
market. This increase in foreign borrowings by the bank, in addition to
the consistent increase in the ADB's paid-in subscription levels, helped to
address one of the bank's earlier problems; limited sources of capital.
Entering into the bond market also allowed the bank to operate more on
borrowed money than on paid in capital. In addition to easing pressure on
subscribers one of the positive outcomes of the banks increased resource
base was the raising of the ADB's loan ceiling from $4m in 1973 for national
projects to $8m in 1979 (double the size in loans). An indication of the
bank's improved resource base is illustratd in Table 5 below:
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TABLE 5: ADB Borrowings, Callable Ratio/ Paid In, Record of Arrears
(UAm) (A) (B) (B/A) (D) (D/A)
Paid In Callable Ratio Arrears % of Paid In Borrowings
1974 185.58 185.58 1:1 18.729 10.09 10.64a
1975 193.93 193.93 1:1 22.9 11.8 75.33b
1976 256.9 362.23 1.4:1 23.933 9.3 34.98c
1977 279.825 430.02 1.53:1 26.444 9.45 150.13d
1978 300.23 490.23 1.63:1 38.092 12.68 164.84
1979 300.23 900.69 3:1 29.619 9.86 281.71e
a - borrowings from member central banks
b - principally from syndicate banks (US$65m)
c - primarily Eurocredits and bilateral contributions
d - first issuance of bonds in foreign market (Kuwait -KD 5m)
- first issuance of bonds to central banks other than from member
countries (US $39.5m)
e - first entrance in Eurobond market (Germany-DM 300m)
The radical change in the ADB's resource base, created by its recent
access to foreign borrowings, should not confuse one into thinking that the
bank has solved its resource problems. The ADB borrowings are still quite
modest, especially when compared to the volume of borrowings of the IBRD
(see Graph I). The additional source of funds of the ADB have allowed for
the bank to make progressive changes in its operations, however, to begin
to meet the needs of its members more effectively, the bank has begun
preliminary inquiries into the possibility of opening the capital stock of
the bank.31
Opening the capital stock of the bank to non-African countries would
increase the paid in capital of the bank through the subscriptions drawn by
the non-regional members. Perhaps more importantly, the presence of
capital-exporting countries in the bank's membership would enhance the
credibility of the ADB's callable capital, and thereby, provide for greater
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borrowing power for the bank. Having the ability to secure credit like the
IBRD, IDB or ASDB would move the ADB closer to being able to state, as the
IBRD has in their 1981 annual report, that the bank's "borrowings in
international capitalmarkets constitute the principal source of funds for
financing its lending operations."32 Naturally, allowing non-regional
members onto the ADB would alter the composition of the bank's membership,
however, with respect to the African character of the ADB, the Board of
Governors had stipulated that any formula for opening the capital stock of
the bank would preserve the African character of the bank in it's leader-
ship, operations and voting power.33 With this clause placed in the
resolution to develop a formula for opening the bank's capital stock, the
Board of Governors of the ADB had diffused the political emotion of bring-
ing in non-regional members to the bank, while allowing for the benefits of
additional capital subscriptions to the ADB.
The suggestion in 1978 that the ADB was moving to open its capital
stock to non-regionals may have contributed to the bank's sucessful efforts
at entering the Eurobond market in the following year. Once the penetra-
tion was made into the Eurobond market, the possibility of reentering it or
eventually entering the Japanese bond market was good.34 This degree of
access that was newly acquired by the bank began to display positive
effects on the loan operations of the ADB.
Between 1974 to 1979 the annual number of projects that the ADB was
committed to increased steadily, from 25 in 1974 to 35 in 1979. The more
important statistic though was the average size of loans that the ADB made
to projects during this period of time. The following table indicates the
increasing size of ADB loans to projects in the six (6):year period being
referred to:
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TABLE 6:
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
SOURCE:
Average Size of Loans by the ADB
Number Amount (UAm) Average (UAm)
25 73.4 2.936
28 85.9 3.06
25 80.45 3.218
30 126.78 4.226
33 157.9 4.78
35 207.9 5.94
ADB, Annual Reports 1974-1979.
Another interesting statistic that reflects the larger development
role of the ADB is the increase in the percentage of the total cost of
projects that the bank is funding. The bank's share of the total cost of
projects rose from 19% in 1978 to 21% in 1979, reflecting an increasing
participation as co-financers in development projects. During the last
six years of operations the bank has also been able to substantially lower
its administrative costs, in relation to commitments and disbursements,
increase the amount of capital going to development projects and improve
its record on disbursement of funds.
With regards to the ADB's cost for administration, in relation to
commitments and disbursements, the bank continues to maintain a much higher
level of costs for operation than many of the other development institu-
tions operating in Africa. This does not seem to be merely a product of
the ADB being restricted to small projects, since BADEA and the Kuwait Fund
for Arab Economic Development have also taken on small projects and emerged
with lower administrative costs. It would appear that the ADB does tend to
be administratively top heavy, with its staff increasing from 258 (1974) to
Average (US$m)
3.54
3.39
3.575
4.695
6.232
7.824
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606 (1979).35 Considering the dramatic increase in the size of the
ADB's staff, the sharp decreases in the bank's administrative cost to loan
commitments and disbursements would seem to be a result of improved effi-
ciency and the expanded scope of the banks loan efficiency and the expanded
scope of the banks loan activity. As encouraging as the decline in these
cost ratios are (see Graph II and III), the high levels maintained by the
ADB signal a level of inefficiency that could prove to be counterproductive
for the bank.
The ADB has been able to commit an increasing percentage of its
capital to development projects. An increasing amount of the ADB's total
revenue is coming from development projects, as opposed to the bank's
assets. By comparing the ratio of the ADB's development portfolio to its
total revenue with the bank's ratio of development portfolio to development
revenue it is clear that the bank is beginning to receive an increasing
portion of its revenue from its projects:
TABLE 7: ADB - Total Revenue/Dev. Port and Dev. Rev./Dev. Port.
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
39.6 40.4 44.9 47.7 62.2
DR
DR 2.4 24.7 37.8 40.1 53.1
SOURCE: See Prof Johnsons data on ADB.
As indicated by the data, in 1979 85.36% of the ADBs total revenue is
coming from its development activity. Another indication of the bank's
increased commitment to investing its capital in projects is the bank's
falling profit rate. In 1975 the ADB realized a rate of profit of 37.5%;
by 1979 it fell to 12.3%.36 With a major portion of the ADB's capital
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used for development purposes, the bank is able to improve its credibility
with subscribers and potential lenders to the bank. Aside from this
concern, the increased number of loan commitments, and the larger size of
loans by the bank, have aided the member countries in developing their
economies.
Another area in which the ADB has upgraded its operations is in its
disbursement of loans committed to projects. The development institution
with the best disbursement record among those operating in Africa is the
CDC, which isconsistently between 60-70% of disbursements to loans. It
should be pointed out, however, that most of the CDC's activities have been
loans or equity participation in continuing projects,37 which are
characteristically different from financing new projects. The ADB's
disbursement record, after an erratic beginning between 1967 and 1974, has
levelled off to a point that is almost equal to that of the IBRD, with 1979
being the only clear exception. The disbursement figures for the IBRD and
the ADB from 1971 to 1979 look like the following:
TABLE 8: Ratio of Loans to Disbursements
1971 1972 1973 1974
ADB (US$m)
loans 24.69 27.38 43.13
disbursements 6.3 13.46 20.27
ratio .255 .4915 .469
IBRD (US$m)
loans 1921 1966 2051
disbursements 915 1182 1180
ratio .476 .601 .575
SOURCE: ADB Annual Report 1979, p.
88.51
23.89
.269
1975
103.64
48.01
.463
1976 1977 1978 1979
97.05
51.39
.5295
154.0
73.06
.474
3218 4320 4977 5759
1533 1995 2470 2636
.476 .461 .496 .457
11; IBRD/IDA Annual Reports
Perhaps the sudden increase in the volume of loans between
is responsible for the sudden decline in the ADB's disbursement
205.72 273.95
92.8 107.65
.474 .3929
6098 6989
2787 3602
.457 .515
1971-1979.
1978 to 1979
record.
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Taking this into account, the ADB has established a general consistency
in its disbursements, comparable to the IBRD, which hovers around 45%
of loans disbursed per year. Part of the ABD's success at improving
its operations go beyond their administrative skills at commitment and
disbursement of loans. One of their major sources of support in
developing their institutions to its present level is the creation of
its two soft loan windows; the African Development Fund and the
Nigerian Trust Fund.
The Creation of the ADF
When the ADB began operations in 1967 it was unwilling to invest in
projects that were in its least developed member countries. The reason for
the ADB's apprehension concerning loans in its least developed member
countries was stated in an ADB working paper in the following manner;
"...that for the time being the Bank should not make any loans from
its own capital resources to countries which are not good risks, that
it should invest its resources in bankable projects in creditworthy
countries..." 38
The ADB's rationale for diverting loans to the more well-to-do member
countries has been outlined previously. The alternative offered for the
relatively poor member countries was a special fund, contributed to by
non-regional coutries, that would provide long term loans on concessional
terms.
Actually, the ADB was eager to erect a soft loan window for the bank,
similar to the IDA with the IBRD, that would supplement ADB loans with
concessionary financing. The idea of this arrangement was to allow the
ADB to mix its conventional financing with soft loan money, so as to
provide better terms on ADB loans and to increase the "Bank Groups" share
of project financing. An underlying issue to the ADB's efforts to develop
a soft loan window for mixing loans was that the ADB was unable to cover
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many infrastructure portions of development projects as a result of their
low profitability potential.39 The financing of these foundation laying
activities were often essential for the successful completion of commercial
projects. In order that the ADB could be able to finance the infrastruc-
ture segment of larger, commercial projects, it required a soft loan window
that would mix in concessionary financing. It was not until 1974 that the
ADB was finally able to attract enough foreign support for the soft loan
window to begin operations.
The ADF was inagurated as a development fund in 1974 with their total
subscriptions equalingU.S. 80,659,050 (US$97,303,045). 4 0  The amount of
subscriptions did not match the goal of UA130m, which the ADB set as its
scale of capital subscriptions. The ADF was designed to be a multilateral
fund that "would receive contributions in the form of grants and not
loans."41 As a fund that was subsidized by grants, the ADF was sup-
ported by subscriptions, in 1974, from the ADB and fourteen (14) foreign
countries. Although the operating capital of the fund was leaner than the
UA130m initial envisioned for the ADF, it was able to begin operations
quickly in 1974.
The Board of Directors of the ADF is comprised of, mainly, foreign
nationals, although the ADB maintains a 50% interest in the Fund and the
President of the ADB serves as the chairman of the ADF Board of Directors.
The ADF carries with it a staff that appraises, processes and implements
its loans. This staff has a number of foreign nationals that provide
technical assistance. Much of the work of the ADF's staff was made easy as
a result of the experience of the ADB in selecting and processing projects,
subsequently the ADF started making loans on concessional terms immediately
202
(6 study projects in its first year).42 Approximately 80% of the ADF's
loans were going to the least developed countries in Africa.43
The eligibility criteria for Fund loans was separated into three
levels of priority. All member countries were eligible to receive fund
loans, however, the highest priority was given to member countries with
per capita incomes that were equal to or below US$280. The next level of
eligibility was for countries with per capita income levels between US$281-
$550. The final category of Fund eligibility included those countries that
either renounced their rights to benefit from the Fund or whose per capita
income was above US$550. The group of countries that had per capita income
levels between US$281-550 were not to receive funding unless they suffered
from "natural disaster or unfavorable geographic position, chronic balance
of payment problems due to factors beyond the countries control, unfavor-
able international economic situation detrimental to the nations develop-
ment process or strained economic situation due to accession to indepen-
dence. The stipulation for funding under the Fund's eligibility policy
could have covered almost every member country in Africa, although the Fund
did try to focus it's operations in the least developed countries.
The ADB's concentration of investments in the relatively wealthy
states increased regional imbalances between states by fueling the process
of "backwash." The creation of the ADF, with its investment focus directed
toward the relatively poorer states offered promise of counteracting the
trend of backwash. This hope was supported by the 1974 investment fixture
for the Fund, which showed 80% of its investments going to the least
developed countries in Africa. WIth the investments of the Fund directed
to the poorer states, the ADB investments were beginning to be balanced
between the rich and poor countries. The balancing of investment, however,
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did not fully address the imbalances caused by backwash.
The phenomenon that causes investments to be concentrated at the
growth poles is primarily attributable to the area amenities, infrastruc-
ture and existing industrial activity of the growth pole area. The
strategy for shifting investments away from the growth poles and toward the
"backwaters" is to develop the infrastructure and amenities of the area,
in addition to investing in new industries. Other strategies, such as,
tax incentives, are also used to develop the poorer regions. The ADB has
the authority to invest in new industries, infrastructure and other support
projects, although it has tended to avoid investments in the poorer states.
The Fund is designed to make the investments of the "Bank Group" in the
relatively underdeveloped states, but it is limited to making investments
in social projects."
Social projects include the construction of hospitals, housing, water
supply, schools, roads and other types of infrastructure projects. These
type of loans by the Fund aid in the fight against "backwash." to the
extent that infrastructure and area amenities for industry are developed.
The scope of Fund investments , as defined under social projects, allows
for the necessary infrastructure and support structures for industry to be
developed. The limits of the Fund though, prevent it from making invest-
ments in new industry. Without the power to invest in new industry
development in the relatively poorer states, the Fund is unable to fully
address the problem of industrial imbalances between rich and poor states.
One of the "Bank Group" strategies for overcoming this barrier confronted
by the Fund is to increase the co-financing activity between the Fund and
the ADB in the area of multinational projects. Without a doubt, this does
not approach the problem of national project financing of new industry in
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the relatively poorer states, however, to the extent that these co-financed
multinational projects are industry related and include poorer states, the
Bank Group is making an impact on the problem of industrial imbalances be-
tween states (see Diama Dam Project [OMVS) 1979 and CIMAO 1976 - Table 10).
Despite the Fund's laudable goals in investing in the relatively
underdeveloped states, the operations of the ADF experienced difficulties
resulting from its limited available capital. in addition to other problems
that were common to the ADB in its early years. The Fund issued loans for
seventeen projects or studies in 1974 with an average loan size of US
$2.74 m. By 1979, the ADF operations had expanded to the point that during
the fiscal year the Fund issued loans to 23 projects or studies, with an
average loan size of US $10.77 m. This surpassed the average size of the
ADB by almost US $2 m. With the Fund issuing loans at .75% and 50 years
maturity (10 years maturity on studies; 20 years on lines of credit),45
the ADF was not going to recoup its investments on the revenues from
projects. Without regular replenishments to the Fund by subscribers, or
absent of the inclusion of new subscribers, the Fund would exhaust its
capital in a short period of time. In 1974, the ADF committed US $42 m to
projects and studies; more than half of its subscribed capital. Without
immediate and regular replenishments, the Fund would be insolvent by 1975.
The Fund confronted problems in receiving firm commitments from its sub-
scribers on contributing additional amounts to the Fund.
Fund contributions had to be approved by the legislature, or head of
state or finance minister of the member countries. Commitments could not
be made, by the representatives from the individual country to the Fund
for announced replenishments. This situation caused the Fund to experience
difficulties in meeting its replenishment goals. One of the factors that
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aided the Fund in increasing its capital was the admission of new members
and grants from donor countries. With regards to new members, by 1979 the
membership to the Fund had increased to 22 with the new subscribers bring-
ing UA136.2m.4 6 Although the Fund has consistently faced problems in
meeting its replenishment goals, the Fund's operational activities con-
tinued to grow.
Despite the volatility of the Funds capital stock, its loan opera-
tions increased appreciably within its six (6) years of lending activity.
The following table illustrates the rapid expansion of the Funds operations
between 1974 and 1979;
TABLE 9: ADF - Average Size of Loans
Year Number Amount (USm) Average UAm) Average (US$m)
1974 17 42.0 2.47 2.74
1975 23 83.68 3.638 4.04
1976 18 71.95 3.977 4.44
1977 17 127.51 7.5 8.33
1978 24 155.1 6.46 8.419
1979 23 188.2 8.18 10.778
SOURCE: ADF Annual Reports 1975-1976, ADB Annual Reports 1977-1979.
The use of the Fund as a soft loan window by the ADB was minimal in the
initial years of the Fund's lending, however, within the past few years,
the ADF has co-financed several projects with the ADB. Co-financing
between the ADF and ADB has been most apparent in the growing number of
multinational projects that the Bank Group has been taking on. The success
of the ADF within the Bank Group must be tempered, however, because of the
administrative problems that continue to hold back the Fund's lending
operations.
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As indicated by Graph II, (p. ) the ADF has maintained exceptionally
high administrative costs to disbursements. The administrative top heavi-
ness, slow start up time and the, initially, small size of its loans (the
ADF loan ceiling has grown to UA8m for national projects and UAl2m for
multinational projects) are probably the causes for the Funds high
administrative costs to disbursements; much like the ADB. It is encourag-
ing to see the costs declining rapidly; however, the continued high level of
the cost is not beneficial to the Fund. The strong record of the ADF on
its administrative costs to commitments (Graphs II, p. ) is probably
attributable to the relatively high amount of units of account committed by
the Fund each year. The administrative costs of the ADF, although high,
are not the total point of the ADF's problems as a lending agency.
Graph IV shows the disbursement record of several development institu-
tions operating in Africa during the last ten years. As can be seen by
looking at the curves, the ADF has maintained the worst record of disburse-
ments of its loans of all the other agencies considered. It should be
noted, however, that the Fund has shown a steady improvement of its dis-
bursements of loans, which-is more commendable in light of the growing size
of the Funds loan commitments. Also shown on the grpah is the Nigerian
Trust Fund, which is another soft loan window of the ADB that was started
in 1976.
The NTF was established by the ADB and the Federal Military Government
of Nigeria with an initial capital stock of 50 million naira supplied by
Nigeria. The Fund was designed to provide financing on concessionary
terms, although not at the low levels provided by the ADF (NTF loans were
at 4% with maturity periods up to 25 yers, including 5 years grace). 48
As a soft loan fund, preference was to be given to non-profit making,
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infrastructure projects, primarily, in low income countries. The first NTF
loan, however, was issued to finance the expansion and development of an
airport (generally a project considered by the ADB). Considering the NTF's
relatively small capital stock when compared to the ADF and ADB, it was
expected that the NTF would take a minor role as a soft loan partner in the
bank (in 1978, NTF accounted for only 7.5% of the Bank Group financing).4 9
The NTF, however chose to make its contribution in the size of its loans,
rather than in the number of loans it funded.
In relation to the number of loans committed, the NTF has funded a
higher percentage of multinational projects than the ADB and the ADF.50
Since 1976, the NTF has committed funds to three (3) multinational projects
contributing a 12.64% share of total cost to the Abidjan-Accra Highway,
29.92% to the Liptako-Gourma Telecommunications project and 36.46% to the
Diama Dam project. By taking such an active role in multinational
projects, the NTF has provided a soft loan base for joint financing by the
ADB. The NTF has also made larger financial commitments per project within
the last four (4) years.
The large NTF presence in multinational project financing betrays the
Nigerian role as a "prime mover" in regional integration. One of the basic
requisites of any regional integration strategy applied to Africa is that
major interterritorial infrastructure must be developed. The concept of
"prime movers" in a regional community suggests that the necessary invest-
ments in areas such as interterritorial infrastructure must come from the
lArge political and economic powers of the region. This perspective is
contested by neo-classical economic theorists, who view economic dispari-
ties between states as being disintegrative. The basis of this viewpoint
is that the small weaker states will repell the tendencies of the larger,
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richer states to dominate, in addition to the disintegrative tendency of
benefits to flow from the poorer states to the richer states. The posture
of Nigeria in the West Africa region has defied the disintegrative tenden-
cies cited by the neo-classical economic theorists. Through its contri-
butions to the ECOWAS compensation fund and the investments of the NTF,
Nigeria has channeled its large economic power into a positive integrative
force in West Africa.
Looking at the types of projects that the NTF has funded, it is clear
that htis agency is dedicated to achieving a greater balance between states
in West Africa and to advancing the goals of regional integration in West
Africa. The Liptako-Gourma Telecommunications project, which the NTF
provided 36.46% of the funding for, establishes a communications infra-
structure between three relatively underdeveloped West Africa states;
Niger, Mali and Upper Volta. With communications links being established
between these three states, the potential for increased transactional flows
in this subregion can be realized. As cited by Jacob and Teune and Deutsch,
a high volume of transactions between states can have a positive influence
on the integration process. Without the communications infrastructure with
which to carry transactions between states, the Liptako-Gourma region was
limited in the degree of interaction between Mali, Niger and Upper Volta.
Prior to the NTF investment, the communication links between these states
was restricted to exchanges resulting from migratory flows. The NTF has
provided another channel through which transactions within the Liptako-
Gourma region may be conducted. Another project that the NTF funded, which
produces a higher level of integration in West Africa by way of inter-
territorial links is the Abidjan-Accra Highway.
Intraregional trade is an essential feature of an economic union.
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To facilitate trade linkages between states within an economic community,
transport infrastructure is required. This type of infrastructure would
include roads, railroads, ports and airports. At the present time, the
existiig transport infrastructure in Africa, and in this case, West Africa
is fragmented and in poor condition. The NTF investment in the Abidjan-
Accra Highway enhances the interregional trade potential between the Ivory
Coast and Ghana. Beyond the benefits to regional integration resulting
from the interregional trade potential, the Abidjan-Accra Highway provides
a physical linkage between the people of the Ivory Coast and Ghana. In
this respect, the NTF investment in the highway increases the potential
for greater transactional flows between these two neighboring states.
In summary, the NTF loan to the Abidjan-Accra Highway is another example
of how Nigeria (as a prime mover) is advancing the integration process in
West Africa. Their investment has the potential of producing positive
integration effects through increased interstate trade and communications.
The contribution of the NTF in advancing regional development can
also be observed in the large financial commitment that it makes to each
project. The NTF averaged UA 2m per project in its opening year of
operations. Between 1976 and 1979, the NTF has increased its average
loan amount per project to UA 9.47m, and US $12.475m.51 With the NTF
taking an active role in financing multinational projects and providing
an average of US $12.475m to projects (higher than the ADB and ADF
averages), the size of concessionary credit to the larger, most costly
multinational projects is being spread out further. To the extent that
co-financing takes place between the NTF and ADF (as in the Diama Dam
Project), relatively underdeveloped states will realize the benefits of
large loans on concessionary terms. Providing such loans from the NTF
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and ADF to the relatively underdeveloped states helps the economic
groupings of the region in dealing with the problems of industrial
imbalances between states. Considering the broader issue of multinational
project funding, the presence of such a large, soft loan contributor
(as the NTF) to multinational projects helps to make the ADB's participa-
tion in these projects more feasible, and in fact, more attractive. In
short, the NTF presence in multinational project financing has provided
the Bank Group with a soft loan window that has allowed the ADF to take a
larger multinational role in the relatively underdeveloped states and
the ADB in a wider range of multinational projects.
Some of the question marks concerning the NTF's operations deal with
its inability to disburse it's funds quickly (see Graph IV, p. ). This
concern appears to be correctable within the near future. The NTF does not
fund a large number of projects, therefore, its staff is closer to the
individual projects. Having a small number of projects, in addition to
gained experience, will end in improving the NTF's record in disbursements.
As indicated by the graph, the NTF is already realizing rapid improvement.
Another concern about the status of the NTF is the funding of its opera-
tions. Unlike the other investment branches of the bank group, the NTF
relies on its funding from contributions from one country. Although
Nigeria is fairly well endowed and apparently commited to leading the way
in regional development, the NTF's source of capital is not as secure as
that of the other agencies. The solvency of the NTF is contingent upon
the sustained commitment of the Nigerian government. The continued sol-
vency of the NTF would be most beneficial to the Bank Group, which has done
several joint financed projects with this soft loan window, particularly
in the area of multinational projects. Having a soft loan window that
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enhances the ADB's activity is essential for the Bank to carry out a man-
date that it had difficulty in upholding inits early years; financing
regional development.
D. ADB Group Performance of Promoting Regional Development (Multinational
Projects) in West Africa
The constraints on the ADB in financing multinational projects in its
first seven years of investment activity have been outlined previously. In
short, the Bank did not have the necessary support institutions, e.g.,
regional authorities, in which to disburse multinational loans to, in
addition to not being able to join their multinational financing with other
development agencies. Aside from these external factors that militated
against the Bank's entrance into the area of multinational project financ-
ing, the ADB was operating on insufficient capital to allow for an active
role for the Bank to emerge in this area. These factors, combined with the
political pressure by member countries to finance national projects and
spread the short money supply among the membership, prevented the ADB from
actively pursuing its regional development mandate. The area that began to
disrupt this mold, by establishing several regional support bodies, was
West Africa.
During the early years of the Bank's activity in the area of multi-
national development, it concentrated its efforts in financing and provid-
ing technical support in conducting studies. Many of the early studies
were in West Africa. The first of these studies involved a joint venture
between the Bank and the Mutual Aid and Loan Guarantee Fund of the Entente
Council (the fund operates as a device for facilitating development within
the Entente states).52 The study concerned the possibility of increas-
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ing economic cooperation between the Entente countries and Ghana. The ADB
and the Entente Council held several meetings to discuss the question and
finally contracted the services of the I.M.F. to carry out the actual
study. In comparison to the present level of financing in multinational
projects in West Africa, the 1969 ADB-Entente Council study appears to be
insignificant, however, it must be remembered that, at this juncture, there
were no other aid agencies active in multinational projects or studies
(with the possible exception of FAO or the ECA).
Before the close of 1969, the ADB had initiated two other studies for
the West Africa region. One of the studies concerned the examination of
the potential for tourism in West Africa, with the expectation of identify-
ing projects and programs in this area.53 The other study taken on by
the ADB during the 1969 fiscal year was a survey of shrimp resources in
West Africa. This particular study was described as being "investment
oriented" in that an objective was "to identify suitable sites for setting
up of shrimp processing plants in various West African countries." 54
More importantly than the ADB studies in West Africa was the Bank's early
attempts at developing a network of support institutions in Africa that
would work to promote economic development; on the national and regional
level.
As early as 1968 the ADB was active examining the potential for
developing an African Insurance and Reinsurance Corporation. The concept,
as originally conceived by the Bank, was to develop and strengthen African
insurance markets by supplementing and reinforcing national initiatives
with "multinational action on a regional level particularly in the field of
reinsurance."55 The hope of the ADB was to tap" potential savings for
development finance "by promoting the insurance industry" in Africa.56
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With respect to regional development, the concept was to initiate "mutual
cooperation among African insurers and reinsurers" and to establish a
"regional Re-Insurance Corporation for Africa."57 The African Reinsur-
ance Corporation was established in 1976 with an authorized capital of
US$15 million, two -thirds of which was available for subscription. As far
as the ADB's relationship with "African-Re", the Bank holds 10% of its
capital and has a seat on the nine member Board of Directors.58 Africa-
Re was only one early ADB effort at developing an institution to increase
development money in Africa and advance regional development; another is
S.I.F.I.D.A.
It should be noted that the early initiatives of the ADB to set up
Africa-Re and S.I.F.I.D.A., as African institutions designed to advance
regional development, were made in the absence of sufficient capital to
finance multinational projects. Africa-Re and SIFIDA were to aid in the
securing of additional resources and provide the institutional support that
the ADB needed to begin to consider broader operations. The effort to
establish Africa-Re took almost ten (10) years before it became a reality;
SIFIDA was proposed in 1969 and began operating by 1970.
SIFIDA was designed as an institution "to ensure an adequate inflow
of private capital and expertise from the capital-exporting countries
Africa."59 The idea was to establish a "multinational finance company
for development in Africa,"60 comprised of contributors from capital-
exporting countries. The original members to SIFIDA (Societe Interna-
tionale Financiere pour les Investissements et le Developpement en Afrique)
were the ADB, France, Italy, Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom.6 1
One of the positive outcomes of the SIFIDA was that it began a flow of
capital into Africa that previously did not exist, in addition to opening a
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channel of communication, in Africa, between the ADB and potential outside
donors. Beyond these two points, SIFIDA provided technical expertise and a
source of investment that could supplement the lending operations of the
ADB. The ADB developed two institutional support mechanisms to advance
their investment operations by creating Africa-Re and SIFIDA.
The creation of these regional bodies by the ADB helped to advance the
integration process in Africa, and thus, contributed to regional develop-
ment. Following the neo-functionalist perspective on regional integration,
the formation of regional institutions that bring together professionals
and technicians from the member states is essential to establishing inter-
regional linkages. Ernst Haas suggested that these regional institutions
(sectorally based), which bring together professionals and technicians
from the member states in a specific joint venture, will create positive
integrative "spillover." The positive outcome of these regional coopera-
tive ventures will create a process that leads to increased accretions of
power to a regional authority. The ADB has initiated this process by
creating these regional institutions, which are charged with specific
goals and include professionals and technicians from the regional member
states. The Bank Group, in fact, with its three constituent parts (ADB,
ADF and NTF) is made up of regionally based institutions that are com-
prised of professionals and technicians throughout Africa. All of these
institutions provide interregional linkages between professionals and
technicians and, through their activities, are producing the kind of
"spillover" effects that Haas cited in Europe as producing positive influ-
ences on the integration process. Aside from this contribution by the
ADB to the integration process and regional development, it has partici-
pated in the creation of other regional agencies and regionally based unions.
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The ADB has been the lead agency, on many occasions in establishing
regional agencies. In West Africa, the ADB has participated in the creation
of CEAO (the West African Economic Community), AADFI (Association of Afri-
can Development Finance Institutions), Africa Re, SIFDA, the Mano River
Union and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). The federa-
list perspective on regionalism would view the ADB role as the creator,
or rather facilitator of these regional agencies as being the most impor-
tant force to regionalism in West Africa. Federalist stress the importance
of declarations and written structures that lead to regional union when
assessing an integration process. They view the development of regionally
based institutions and authorities as being the foundation of any strategy
of regional integration and development. The regional institutions and
authorities are seen as the facilitators of authority transfer from the
local to the federal level. Having these institutions provides the basis
for initiating a transfer process of power and authority from the states
to a federal authority. Based on the federalist approach, federal
authority and power is essential to facilitating regional development and
achieving regional integration. Other than the ECA, the ADB has been the
leader in assisting in the formation of these regional bodies. To date,
its most ambitious venture in forming regional bodies has been in its
role in aiding in the creation of the customs union of the Mano River
Union and the economic union of CEAO and ECOWAS.
One of the constraints on the ADB in its early years in the area of
multinational project financing was the absence of regional bodies. These
regional bodies were necessary for ADB multinational financing to occur
because they would assume the responsibility of the loan, administer the
project, arrange costs and obligations between states and so forth. The
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ADB assisted itself in overcoming this obstacle by participating in the
creation of regional bodies. One of these ventures was the Mano River
Union. This grouping, in addition to carrying out a regional program be-
tween Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea of a customs union, administers a
completed ADB project; the Mano River Bridge. Beyond their contribution in
establishing an agency to administer a multinational project, the ADB has
aided the integration process in the neo-functionalist and federalist mold,
by creating a regional body that is operated by professionals and techni-
cians from the three member states. This does not consider the additional
benefits to regionalism of the Mano River Bridge, realized from another
channel for interstate transactional flows and commerce. The benefits to
West African regional development were greater in the case of the CEAO
and ECOWAS.
The CEAO and ECOWAS are the only regional entities in West Africa
that are commited to economic integration. They function as the regions
only economic unions, with the Entente Council concerned with economic
cooperation between states, rather than forming an economic union. Al-
though CEAO and ECOWAS have not received any ADB project financing, they
aid the ADB efforts toward regional development by providing the institu-
tional support as an economic union. This institutional support can be
observed in the objectives and goals of these two bodies, which provides
the ADB a framework for selecting multinational projects. The ADB is com-
mited to funding projects that advance to goals and objectives of the
nation states and regional groupings. Aside from the guidelines that these
regional bodies offer, they aid the integration process in the region
through the activities of their programs (these activities were outlined
in the preceding chapter). The CEAO and ECOWAS also advance the integration
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process and regional development through the positive spillover effects
of their programs, in addition to the interregional linkages between
professionals and technicians in West Africa.
In the absence of multinational project financing, the ADB has made
significant contributions to regional development. As referred to above,
they have been active in assisting in the creation of regional institu-
tions. Prior to the Bank's expanded operations in multinational project
financing in West Africa, the ADB contributed technical assistance and its
organizational support to regional development bodies, such as PANAFTEL
(the ADB is on the Co-ordination Committee with ECA, OAU and ITU)62 and
the Trans-African Highway (ADB has provided planning assistance to the
Trans-African Highway Co-ordinating Committee).63 The Bank has also main-
tained a close liaison with the various regional bodies, particularly in
West Africa where there is the highest concentration of regional agencies
in Africa. With this as its foundation in regional development, the Bank
Group began to step up its multinational lending in West Africa in 1976.
By 1976 the ADB had increased its paid in capital amount to US256.9m,
with subscriptions now supplemented by outside borrowings. At this junc-
ture, the ADF and NTF were in operation and Arab investors had begun to
finance projects in Africa (BADEA, Kuwait Fund).64 The Bank was also
supported, at this time, by the increased presence of the IBRD/IDA in
multinational project financing, providing the Bank with needed co-financ-
ing. With all of these factors coming into play, the Bank Group emerged,
between 1976 and 1980 as the largest financer of multinational projects in
West Africa (ADB Group US$134.89m; IBRD/IDA US$128.5m).6 5
Table 10 lists the multinational projects that have been funded in
West Africa from 1973 to 1980, with a breakdown of the source of funding
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from the major contributors in the region. Graph V provides a summary of
the yearly funding by the major development institutions to multinational
projects in West Africa. The data from Table 10 highlights the degree of
joint financing between the various agencies in multinational projects in
the region. As the data points out, the Bank Group has been joint partners
with the IBRD/IDA on two (2) occasions (there is greater joint financing
between the two bank groups on national projects, particularly between the
ADF and IDA),66 with BADEA co-financing with the ADB on three multi-
national projects and the Kuwait Fund once. By 1978, there is a greater
level of co-financing between the various branches of the Bank Group, than
there is between any other agency, including the IBRD/IDA. The branch of
the Bank Group with the most pronounced presence in this area is the NTF,
which may have provided sufficient soft loan co-financing in multinational
projects to have permitted the Bank Group to take on more projects on their
own. The pattern of Graph V indicates the larger presence of the Bank
Group in multinational projects during the last few years.
Not counting the large US$60m loan from the IBRD to CIMAO (cement
plant project between Ivory Coast/Ghana/Tago), the ADB Group had a higher
level of investment in multinational projects in West Africa than any other
agency since 1976 (1975, only BADEA had more invested). The Bank Group has
committed more money and funded more multinational projects in the region
than the IBRD/IDA, despite the fact that the IBRD/IDA has more than ten
(10) times the amount of borrowings of the ADB on the international capital
market. It should be noted that the IBRD/IDA are committed to financing
projects/programs on a world wide scale and the ADB is restricted to
Africa, however, with respect to volume of capital invested by the various
lending institution in West Africa, the IBRD/IDA, individually, provide
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more money to the regions than anyone else (see Graph VI).
Clearly, there is no other institution that is better endowed, finan-
cially and administratively, to assume a larger role in financing multi-
national projects in West Africa than the IBRD/IDA. In spite of the
greater capacity of the IBRD/IDA to take on this task, the ADB Group
remains the leader in the area of multinational project financing in West
Africa. Should the IBRD/IDA choose to begin to intensify their investment
in these projects, they could join their investments with ADB Group money,
since the Bank Group is already taking a lead in this type of project
financing.
The ADB Group has chosen to finance a diverse range of multinational
projects. These projects in West Africa have been conducted within the
regional development plans of the agencies and authorities in the area.
With respect to regional integration and the ECOWAS program (the largest
regional union in West Africa), each of the Bank Group loans has advanced
the goals of regional integration and assisted in countering some of the
disintegrative influences caused by industrial imbalances between the
states. The following is a list of the Bank Group projects, with the
regional organization and the funding total given;
1. R.A.N. (Ivory Coast/Upper Volta)
1972(3) - finance procurement of rolling stock - ADB (US$3.619m)
1976 - line of credit to finance 1975-80 RAN investment program
ADB (US$5.5m)
2. Mano River Union (Sierra Leone/Liberia)
1973 - Mano River Bridge - ADB (US$1.568m)
3. OMVS (Senegal/Mauritania/Mali)
1979 - Diama Dam Project - ADG (US$15.807m) - NTF (US$15.807m)
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4. CIMAO (Ghana/Togo/Ivory Coast)
1976 - cement plant - ADB (US$8.2m)
5. Liptako-Gourma Regional Integrated Development Authority (Niger,
Mali, Upper Volta)
1978 - telecommunications project - ADB (US$13.0279m) -
NTF (US$8.598m)
At this juncture, it may be helpful to return to the theoretical
questions posed in the previous chapter concerning the constraints on
regional integration in West Africa, in order that an appreciation of the
Bank Group role in promoting regional development may be gained. Recal-
ling the integrative influences outlined by Jacob and Teune, geographic
proximity between member states oZ a region is an important influence on
the integration process. The application of this variable to West Africa
revealed mixed results. Although the borders of the region arecontiguous,
the transport infrastructure was seen as being too fragmented and poorly
structured to allow trade and communications to be conducted between
states. Migratory flows displayed a high level of interaction between
peoples of the region, despite the weak transport infrastructures, how-
ever, it was agreed that major investment in transport infrastructure is
required to achieve an increase in interregional communication and com-
merce. The investments of the special funds of the economic unions of the
region were judged to be too small to make a real impact on the transport
infrastructure of the region. The ADB Group has begun to meet this need
of the economic unions that are attempting to achieve economic integration
in West Africa by investing in the RAN and the Mano River Bridge.
The integrative benefits of the Mano River Bridge project were dis-
cussed earlier. It must be remembered that these investments, such as the
Mano River Bridge, aid the integration process by strengthening regional
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institutions as well as developing the necessary infrastructure for inter-
regional exchange. These benefits are also evidenced by the ADB invest-
ments to the RAN. The RAN is an interstate agency between the Ivory
Coast and Upper Volta. The agency coordinates the operation of the rail-
road connecting the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, in addition to planning
the development of the rail line. As an interstate rail line in West
Africa, the RAN contributes to the process of integration and regional
development in the region. The ADB Group investments in the RAN further
the objectives of this agency, and thereby, assists in the integration
and development of the region.
Returning to the ECOWAS program, the major constraint on the suc-
cessful operation of this, and other economic unions in West Africa, is
overcoming the imbalances between states in industrial activity. This
problem, generally referred to as "backwash," can have a seriously dis-
integrative effect on an economic community. It may be recalled that
ECOWAS and other economic unions have tried to balance industrial develop-
ment between states by investing special funds into projects in the rela-
tively underdeveloped states. As in the case of multinational infra-
structure development, these special funds have been inadequate in effec-
tively dealing with the problems of industrial imbalances between states.
The type of investment needed to begin to confront this problem are infra-
structure and special projects, in addition to industrial development
within the poorer states or between states. The ADB Group has made in-
roads in this area in the past few years through their investments in
CIMAO, Diama Dam project and the Liptako-Gourma Telecommunications pro-
ject.
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The most glaring example of the ADB Group's contribution to the
regional integration effort in West Africa and the fight against the
disintegrative force of industrial imbalances between states is its US
$8.2m investment in thie CIMAO cement plant. CIMAO is a cooperative ven-
ture between Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Togo, with each of the states con-
tributing to the project's development. The feature of CIMAO that speci-
fically addressed the issue of industrial imbalance between states is
that Togo, the most underdeveloped of the three nations, will be obtaining
a cement plant in their country. The Ivory Coast and Ghana will be pro-
viding the limestone and the electricity to make the Togolese cement
plant productive. By locating the cement plant in Togo, the CIMAO project
is actively countering the tendency of industry to locate in the growth
poles of Abidjan and Accra. It should be noted also that the cement
plant will be supplemented by major infrastructure development in Togo
(port and road construction). The scale of this project was too large
for the special funds of ECOWAS to cover, but the ADB was able to contri-
bute to the pool of financers that invested in the CIMAO cement plant.
Another ADB Group effort that addressed the problem of "backwash" was
the Diama Dam Project.
The Diama Dam project aids the states of Senegal, Mauritania and
Mali in developing the subregions hydroelectric power capacity. This
increased capacity in electrical power provides a necessary infrastructure
item for industrial development in the region. The dam project, as a
tri-state project, advances regional development by investing through a
regional agency (OMVS) and providing benefits on a multinational scale.
The Diama Dam project also counters the disintegrative force of "backwash"
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by providing an infrastructure item that is essential to industrial
development in a region that includes two relatively underdeveloped
states; Mali and Mauritania. This project and the CIMAO project, in
addition to the Liptako-Gourma Telecommunications project are positive
indications of the ADB Group commitment to filling the investment gap of
ECOWAS, which is unable to deal with industrial imbalances between states
on its own. The most encouraging factor of this assistance is that it
has come prior to the actual implementation of most of the ECOWAS program
(first stage is to begin in 1980 -- West African citizenship), thereby
confronting the problems of imbalance before it has a chance to under-
mine the ECOWAS program. The major question at this juncture, however,
is can the ADB Group continue in this role of financing multinational
projects in the ECOWAS community?
The next chapter will consider the investment needs of ECOWAS and
the ability of the Bank Group to meet these needs. Within this chapter
will be a discussion of the other possible funding sources for the
ECOWAS program and other areas of support that the Bank Group can exploit
to promote ECOWAS. The final question will be, can ECOWAS succeed with
the investment support that it is presently receiving and the support
that it can hope to obtain.
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Graph VII
Profit Rates for Various Development Institutions
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APPENDIX I
ADB Paid In/Callable Capital and Arrears
Record and Borrowing Levels
(UAM) (A) (B)
ADB Paid In Callable
1971 110.2
1972 127.2
1973
1974 185.58
1975 193.93
x 1976 256.9
* 1977 279.825
1978 300.23
+ 1979 300.23
(US$m) (A)
World
Bank Paid In
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
2660
2520
3040
3080
3086
3086
3304
3742
3995
3661
110.2
127.2
185.58
193.93
362.23
430.02
490.23
900.69
(B)
(C)
Ration (B/A)
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1.4:1
1.53:1
1.63:1
3:1
(C)
(D)
Arrears
28:845
29.493
20.496
18.729
22.9
23.933
26.444
38.092
29.619
(D)
Callable Ration (B/A) Arrears
23,945
22,677
22,703
27,738
27,774
27,782
29,740
33,686
35,963
32,953
9:1
8.9:1
7.46:1
9:1
9:1
9:1
9:1
9:1
9:1
9:1
D/A
% of Paid In
26.17%
23.18%
10.09%
11.8%
9.3%
9.45%
12.68%
9.86%
Borrowings
0
0
10.64
75.33
34.98
150.13
164.84
281.75
D/A
% of Paid In Borrowings
1368
1744
1723
1853
3510
3811
4721
3636
5085
5173
5069
principally from syndicate of banks (US$65m)
x primarily Eurocredits and bilateral
* 1st issuance of bonds in foreign market (kuwait) KD 5m
1st issuance of bond to central banks other than from member countries
(US$39.5m)
+ 1st entrance into Euroland market (Germany) DM 300m
NOTE: Most ADB borrowings are on bilateral level; from Canada,
Sweden and Austria
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APPENDIX II
Sumary Table
Ratio of Administrative Cost to
Commitments and Disbursement, by Institution
(%)
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
BRD/ IDA
A/C B/C
2.6
2.6
2.67
2.5
2.07
2.1
2.09
2.0
1.97
2.2
5.7
5.4
5.4
4.89
4.04
3.78
3.76
4.46
5.17
4.4
Kuwait F
A/C B/C
71/72
72/73
73/74
74/75
75/76
76/77
77/78
78/79
79/80
ADB
A/CB/C B/C
55.3
26.0
21.5
20.7
12.1
13.4
12.3
12.95
20.2
14.1
12.79
10.1
5.6
5.6
7.0
5.85
5.8
7.9
B/C
0
70.36
32.5
17.0
11.38
14.4
ADE
A/C
2.9
4.3
3.18
2.67
3.59
BADEA
A/C
1.4
5.0
5.9
6.7
CDC
A/C
1.3
2.2
1.88
1.9
1.79
1.68
1.68
1.9
B/C
2.0
2.99
2.45
2.6
2.49
2.7
2.98
3.6
(CDC)
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
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Ratio of Administrative Cost to~Commitments
Disbursements, by Institution (Yearly)
(A) (B) (C)
Administrative
IBRD/IDA Commitments Disbursements Cost*
2505
2966
3408
4313
5896
6632
7067
8411
10011
11482
1150
1443
1673
2244
3021
3722
3934
3849
3824
5774
66.32
78.567
91.02
109.937
122.282
140.802
148.126
172.027
197.967
254.824
Ratio
A/C
2.6%
2.6%
2.67%
2.5%
2.07%
2.1%
2.09%
2.0%
1.97%
2.2%
B/C
5.7%
5.4%
5.4%
4.89%
4.04%
3.78%
3.76%
4.46%
5.17%
4.4%
* does not include interest on borrowings; only administrative expense
+ IBRD/IDA expenses are subsumed under IBRD .'. commitments and
disbursements data have been likewise combined . . . [IDA bills
IBRD for management fees]
(A) (B) (C)
Administrative
Commitments Disbursements Cost* A/C
85.5
62.0
66.29
72.87
1.198
3.111
3.977
4.934
1.4%
5.0%
5.9%
6.7%
(US$m)
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
(US$m)
BADEA
1975
1976
1977
1978
Ratio
B/C
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Ratio of Administrative Cost to Commitments
Disbursements, by Institution (Yearly)
(A) (B)
Commitments Disbursements
24.69
27.38
43.13
88.51
103.64
97.05
154.0
205.72
273.95
6.3
13.46
20.27
23.89
48.01
51.39
73.06
92.8
107.65
(C)
Administrative
Cost
3.485
3.502
4.366
4.963
5.821
6.889
9.02
12.025
21.779
Ratio
A/C B/C
14.1% 55.3%
12.79% 26.0%
10.1% 21.5%
5.6% 20.7%
5.6% 12.1%
7.0% 13.4%
5.85% 12.3%
5.8% 12.95%
7.9% 20.2%
(A) (B) (C)
Administrative
Commitments Disbursements Cost
46.67 0 -
92.98 3.88 2.73
79.79 10.64 3.46
141.68 26.4 4.507
186.07 43.71 4.977
228.36 56.97 8.206
(A) (B) (C)
Administrative
Commitments Disbursements Cost
18.96
9.184
32.3
28.8
161.35
115.8
57.8
100.7
73.53
.574
.633
.666
.608
1.883
2.537
3.686
3.541
4.799
Ratio
A/C B/C
2.9% 70.36%
4.3% 32.5%
3.18% 17.0%
2.67% 11.38%
3.59% 14.4%
Ratio
A/C B/C
3.0%
6.8%
2.06%
2.1%
1.16%
2.19%
6.37%
3.5%
6.5%
(US$m)
ADB
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
(US$m)
ADF
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
(KDm)
Kuwait F.
71/72
72/73
73/74
74/75
75/76
76/77
77/78
78/79
79/80
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Ratio of Administrative Cost to Commitments
Disbursements, by Institution (Yearly)
(A) (B) (C) Ratio
Administrative
CDC Commitments Disbursements Costs A/C B/C
1973 180.7 117.89 2.37 1.3% 2.0%
1974 203.576 150.27 4.5 2.2 2.99%
1975 217.56 167.197 4.1 1.88 2.45%
1976 234.67 169.849 4.47 1.97 2.6%
1977 260.616 187.29 4.68 1.79 2.49%
1978 275.1 170.8 4.632 1.68 2.7%
1979 313.1 176.955 5.28 1.68 2.98%
1980 350.77 185.366 6.69 1.9% 3.6%
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APPENDIX III
Effectiveness at Disbursing Funds
Disbursement/Loans
ADB Group
ADB
ADF
NTF
CDC
Kuwati
BADEA
Abu Dhabi
Saudi
World Bank
IDA
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Disbursement/Loans
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
.255 .4915 .469 .177 .264
1976 1977 1978 1979
.346 .305 .335 .331
.255 .4915 .469 .269 .463 .530 .474 .451 
.393
-
- -
0 .042 .133 .186 .235 .249
-
-
-
- 0 0 .170 .422
.476 .601 .575 .476 .461 .496
.402 .261 .363 .649 .651 .756
.652 .738 .768 .723
.992 .459 .404
.718 .621 .565
.337
ADB Group
ADB
ADF
NTF
IBRD
IDA
CDC
BADEA
KUWAIT F.
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Disbursement/Loans
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
24.69 27.38 43.13 135.28 196.62 179.4 325.59 423.47
Disburs. 6.3 13.46 20.27 23.89 51.89 62.03 99.46
.255 .4915 .469 .1765 .2639 .3457 .305
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Loans 24.69 27.38 43.13 88.51 103.64 97.05 154.0
Disburs. 6.3 13.46 20.27 23.89 48.01 51.39 73.06
.255 .491 .469 .269 .463 .5295 .474
141.89 172.09
.335
1978
.3309
1979
205.72 273.95
92.8
.451
107.65
.3929
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
2.41 29.91 31.68 17.7
0 5.38 7.47
0 .1698 .422
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
180717 203576 217563 234674 260616 275102 313143
117890 150271 167197 169849 187292 170846 176955
.652 .738 .768 .723 .718 .621
**Note: Disbursement figure for CDC derived from difference between loan
commitments and outstanding commitment.
($m)
ADB Group
Loans
1971
Ratio
ADB
1979
520.01
Ratio
NTF
Loans
Disburs.
Ratio
CDC**
Loans
Disburs.
Ratio
1980
350771
185366
.528
.565
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Disbursement/Loans
(US$m)
IBRD
Loans
Disburs.
Ratio
Loans
Disburs.
Ratio
(US$m)
IDA
Credit Amount
Disburs.
Ratio
Credit Amount
Disburs.
Ratio
1971
1921
915
.476
1976
4977
2470
.496
1971
584
235
.402
1976
1655
1252
.756
1974
3218
1533
.476
1975
4320
1995
.461
1972
1966
1182
.601
1977
5759
2636
.457
1972
1000
261
.261
1977
1308
1298
.992
1973
2051
1180
.575
1978
6098
2787
.457
1973
1357
493
.363
1978
2313
1062
.459
1980
7644
4363
.570
1974
1095
711
.649
1979
3022
1222
.404
1980
3838
1411
.367
1975
1576
1026
.651
1979
6989
3602
.515
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Disbursement/Loans
71/72 72/73 73/74
18.96 9.184
1968
74/75 75/76
32.3 28.8 161.35
1969 1970
76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80
115.8
1971
57.8 100.7 73.53
1972 1973
523.25
341.37
Ratio
(US$m)
Kuwait F.
(KDm)
Loans
Disburs.
Ratio
(US$m)
CDC
Loans
Disburs.
.6524
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APPENDIX IV
Volume of Loans/Credits to Multinational
Projects/Programs in West Africa, by Institution
Amount (US$m)
5.187
0
12.4
24.3
5.5
55.8
31.6
(US $m)
35.48
22.82
0
0
0
15.3
Note: BADEA began operations in 1975
1973 or 1974.
IBRD/IDA Amount(US$m)
6.7
14.0
1.0
75.6
0
28.2
0
3.0
BADEA
1975
1976
1977
1978
(US$m)
10.0
20.1
0
0
.'. do not place 0 for
ADB Group has not produced data for 1980; BADEA has no 1979 or
1980 data.
ADB Group
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
ADB Group
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
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Average Size of Loan/Credit in Africa
by Institution
Number Amount (UAM) Average (UAM)
207.9
157.9
126.78
80.45
85.9
73.4
35.4
25.22
24.69
5.94
4.78
4.226
3.218
3.06
2.936
2.95
1.4835
2.0575
Number Amount (UAM) Average (UAM)
188.2
155.1
127.51
71.95
83.68
42.0
8.182
6.4625
7.5
3.997
3.638
2.47
Average (US$m)
7.824
6.232
4.695
3.575
3.39
3.54
3.55
Average (US$m)
10.778
8.419
8.333
4.441
4.042
2.744
Number Amount (UAM) Average (UAM)
28.41
24.32
24.62
9.47
4.05
4.103
Number Amount (KDm) Average (KDm)
10.4
15.1
9.0
26.13
15.75
0
1.628
3.02
2.25
3.73
3.15
0
Average (US$m)
12.475
5.276
4.558
Average (US$m)
5.96
11.11
7.348
ADB
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
ADF
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
NTF
1979
1978
1977
Kuwait F
1979-80
1978-79
1977-78
1976-77
1975-76
1974-75
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Volume of Loans/Credits to
Multinational Projects/Programs in West Africa
Per Year and Average Size of Loans/Credits
Per Year, by Insitution
IBRD/IDA Number Amount Average
1973 1 6.7 6.7
1974 1 14.0 14.0
1975 1 1.0 1.0
1976 2 75.6 37.8
1977 0 0 0
1978 2 28.2 14.1
1979 0 0 0
1980 1 3.0 3.0
IBRD/IDA Number Amount Average
1973 0 0 0
1974 0 0 0
1975 0 0 0
1976 1 60 60
1977 0 0 0
1978 1 23 23
1979 0 0 0
1980 0 0 0
IDA Number Amount Average
1973 1 6.7 6.7
1974 1 14.0 14.0
1975 1 1.0 1.0
1976 1 15.6 15.6
1977 0 0 0
1978 1 5.2 5.2
1979 0 0 0
1980 1 3.0 3.0
Kuwait F Number Amount Average
1974 1 35.48 35.48
1975 2 22.82 11.41
1976 0 0 0
1977 0 0 0
1978 0 0 0
1979 1 15.3 15.3
APPENDIX V
(Summary)
Volume of Loans/Credits to Multinational Projects/Programs in West Africa, by Institution
ADC
5.187
12.4
24.3
39.0837
ADF I MTF
15.807
86.47071 15.807
16.8055
15.807
32.6125
I BRD
60
23
83
IDA
6.7
14.0
1.0
15.6
5.2
3.0
45.5
CDC BACEA
10.0
20.7
1.0
Kuwait F
3.54
14.0
.9588
1.51
20.0058
CIDA
11.71
29.2
CCCE
8.78
40.91 1 8.78
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
TOTAL
Saudi F EDF
18.0
18.0
Total
11.887
17.54
37.4
185.9458
1114.2892
31.614
FIB
25.9
25.9
'.
Multinational Projects in West Africa
Year Projects ADB ADF MTF IBRD IDA CDC BADEA Kuwait F I CIDA I CCCE I Saudi F | EDF EIB | Total
1972(3)IR.A.N. (Ivory Coast/Upper Volta) 13.6191 1 I
1973 IMano River Bridge (Liberia, Sierra Leone) 11.5681 I 1 1 1 1
1973 Improve Bamako-Dakar railway (Mali) 6.7 9.3
1974 ISenegal River Basin Programme (0MVS) 35.48 13400.0 1
1974 !Line of Credit to Six Sabel Countries I 1 114.0 1 14.0
1975 Railway-Tambao-Ouagadougou Line (Up.Volta) 112.4 1 10.0 14.0 71.941
1oMvS) I
1975r Irri tio Projec,., 4. puo1 vrnla I I I I I 1 .0 I I I  I I I 1.251 -
g g 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1975(6)1Dev. Telecom System - PANAFTEL (Guinea) - .1 8.82 1 16.3391
1976 IPANAFTEL (All Africa Telecom Union) .1 -15
(Togo, Ghana,
1976 ICIMAO - Cement Plant Ivory Coast) 8.2 1 60 1 I 1 10.0 1 111.71 1 8.78 1 118.0 1 25.9 1 284.01
1976 IR.A.N. (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta) 5.5 I 9.811
1976 IHwy Dev. Project (NIgria-Niger) Niger 110.6 1 I 115.6 1 10.6 1 1 28.71
IPANAFTEL (Ghana) link with Ivory Coast I I I I I I - 1
1977 land Togo 15.5m I 1 1 I 1 I 1 8.51
1978 R.A.N. (Ivory Coast/Upper Volta) 2.3 5.2 29.2 1 66.21
1978 IPANAFTEL (All Africa Telecom. Union 1.0 1 1.01
1978 Abidjan-Accra Hwy. (Ivory Coast, Ghana) 13.0279 8.20751 1 1 1 I 64.9571
(Ivory Coast, I I I I I I I 1 I
1978 |Power Inter-connection Ghana) 13.0279 1 I 1 I I 1 33.5591
%A
(USs.)
Teat Project ( I ADB ADF NTF I IBRD I IDA | CDC | BADEA | Kuwait IF CIDA | CCCE I Saudi F EDF EIB Total
I (Upper V./Mali/Nige) 11
1978 ILiptako Courna Telecom Project 13.0279 18.5981 128.739
1979 IDiama Dam Project (OMBS) 15.807115.807
1979 
-
1 1 1
(80) IHambori-Gao Project (Mali) I I 1 15.3 149.174
1980 ITech Asut. -Dev. Credit (BOAD) I 1 3.0 3.0
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APPENDIX VI
Average Size of Loan/Credit for Projects
in Africa, by Institution
(US$m) IBRD
Number Amount Average
1981 23 858.8 37.339
1980 20 589.7 29.485
1979 22 583.1 26.504
1978 26 465.8 17.915
1977 34 570.8 16.788
1976 28 507.8 18.135
1975 35 648.1 18.517
1974 20 370.6 18.53
1973 13 234.4 18.03
1972 9 192.3 21.36
1971 17 347.2 20.423
1970 18 281.7 15.65
(US$m) IDA
Number Amount Average
1981 52 953.6 18.338
1980 48 956.9 19.935
1979 48 619.0 12.895
1978 44 603.8 13.722
1977 34 393.5 11.573
1976 37 382.9 10.348
1975 30 432.6 14.42
1974 34 319.5 9.397
1973 27 284.1 10.522
1972 34 245.3 7.214
1971 24 121.5 5.06
1970 27 161.21 6.717
(US$m) BADEA
Number Amount Average
1978 15 72.87 4.858
1977 9 66.24 7.36
1976 10 61.9 6.19
1975 11 81.6 7.418
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APPENDIX VII
Volume of Loans/Credits to
Multinational Projects/Programs in West Africa
Per Year and Average Size of Loans and Credits
Per Year, by Institution
(US$m)
(Loans) ($m) ($m)
ADB Group Number Amount Average
1973 2 5.187 2.5935
1974 0 0 0
1975 1 12.4 12.4
1976 3 24.3 8.1
1977 1 5.5 5.5
1978 5 55.8 11.16
1979 2 31.6 15.8
1980 - -
(Loans) (US$m) (US$m)
ADB Number Amount Average
1973 2 5.187 2.5935
1974 0 0 0
1975 1 12.4 12.4
1976 3 24.3 8.1
1977 1 5.5 5.5
1978 3 39.08 13.0279
1979 0 0 0
(Loans) (US$m) (US$m)
ADE Number Amount Average
1979 1 15.807 15.807
(Loans) (US$m) (US$m)
NTE Number Amount Average
1978 2 16.8055 8.40275
1979 1 15.807 15.807
(Loans) (US$m) (US$m)
BADEA Number Amount Average
1975 1 10.0 10.0
1976 3 20.1 6.7
1977 0 0 0
1978 0 0 0
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Terms of Loans/Credits in Africa by Institution
(Averages) Maturity Grace Grant
Interest Period Period Elemen-
Rate % (in years) (in years) tary
(Africa) IDA .75 40 10
IBRD
1981 9.4195 14.1 4.68
1980 8.0526 14.0 4.68
1979 7.4928 13.09 4.68
1978 7.6557 14.12 4.538
1977 7.4166 16.027 4.7948
1976 7.7448 15.833 5.129
1975 8.1944 16.459 5.081
1974 7.25 16.5 4.714
1973 7.25 16.916 6.3
1972 7.25 17.125 4.88
1971 7.2115 17.307 4.3846
ADF .75 50 10
NTF 4.75 5-25 3-5
ADB
1979 8.75 [7.0; 1.0 stat commis.;]17.3 4.14
[.75 commitm. charge 3
1978 8.75 " 17.2 4.25
1977 8.75 " 16.1 3.6
1976 8.75 13.5 3.0
1975 7.75 [6.0; 1.0 stat commis;] 16.1 3.3
[.75 commitm charge 3
1974 7.75 14.4 3.6
1973 7.75 14.8 3.5
1972 7.75 13.7 3.05
1971 7.75 " 10.8 4.0
BADEA
1978 3.6 15.75 5 49
1977 5.0 17.6 5 52.6
1976 2.6 22.7 4.4 45.4
1975 3.5 23.6 4.0 44.0
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Terms of Loans/Credits in Africa by Institution
(Averages)
Kuwait
Fund
(Total)
1979-80
1978-79
1977-78
1976-77
1975-76
1974-75
1973-74
1972-73
1971-72
Kuwait
Fund
(Total)
1979-80
1978-79
1977-78
1976-77
1975-76
1974-75
1973-74
1972-73
1971-72
Interest
Rate %
3.35
3.208
3.05
3.63
3.02
3.214
Maturity
Period
(in years)
20.9
23.13
22.375
21.397
25.88
23
3.2
3
2.25
3.5
2.9
20.96
24.14
24.25
22.142
26.55
Grace
Period
(in years)
3.996
4.16
4.4625
4.6055
5.5
4.4357
3.96
4.45
4.775
4.9
5.52
Note: Use only Kuwait F interest rates in Africa on graph.
Grant
Elemen-
tary
42.8
45.7
47.29
44
48.142
55.5
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APPENDIX IX
Exchange Rates
1UA=ISDR -
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
U.S. $
1.31733
1.30279
1.11111
1.11111
1.11111
1.20635
1.20635
1.08571
1.0
Sterling
.592325
.640349
.599392
.662361
.544422
.479915
.4166
.4166
.4166
Kuwaiti Dinar
.359776
.354098
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ADB ROLE IN PROMOTING THE ECOWAS PROGRAM: WILL ECOWAS SUCCEED?
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OUTLINE
A. Theories of Regional Integration in West Africa
1. Nkrumahism
a. ideal of continental union not to be realized until
distant future
b. complete political union preceding economic development
abandoned
c. sub-regional economic integration replaces continental
union movement.
2. Federalism
a. institution building of federal apparatus gradual process
to regionalism (variant to Nkrumahism)
b. proliferation of regional institutions in West Africa
promoting integration through gradual shifts in
authority (including ECOWAS institutions)
3. Neo-Functionalism - Incrementalism - Spillover (Haas)
a. sectoral groupings in West Africa producing positive
spillover
b. multinational character of regional institutions creating
linkages between professionals and technicians in West
Africa
c. ECOWAS Program benefits from supports of existing
regional institutions (history, expertise, coordina-
tion, sub-units of authority)
4. Communication Theory (Deutsch) and Jacob Teune
10 Integrative Influences
a. social and political variables difficult to gauge in
West Africa
b. structural influences (geographic proximity and trans-
actional flows) can be measured and advance economic
integration in West Africa
c. ECOWAS Program requires investment in interterritorial
infrastructure to;
(1) improve transactional flows
(2) expand channels for interstate commerce
5. Economic Development Theory (structural economic change in
region) vs. Traditional Neo-Classical Economic Theory
ECOWAS addressing weaknesses cited by neo-classical theorists
through balancing efforts
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a. ECOWAS commited to balancing community gains & costs
through compensation fund (import duty losses and
trade diversion costs)
b. ECOWAS needs investment capital to balance industrial
development within the region
c. funding sources for investmnet need;
(1) special funds of economic unions (insufficient)
(2) foreign aid/grants (no commitment demonstrated
to date)
(3) "prime movers" (Nigeria cannot meet task alone -
dependence on oil revenues for development
finances)
(4) ADB Group - only active investor (contribution
must be increased)
B. Capability of the ADB Group in Meeting Investment Needs of ECOWAS
1. Scale of Co-Financing with Outside Lenders Must be Increased
a. Arab co-financing could offer another soft loan window
b. IBRD/IDA co-financing could provide ADB Group with
senior partner in multinational ventures
2. Open Capital Stock of the ADB
a. expand the bank & resource base
b. improve borrowing capacity of the ADB in international
markets
c. allow for increase in loan ceiling
3. International Bond Market
a. Eurobond and Japanese bond market not assured
b. Arab bond market worth exploring
4. Increase Membership of ADF
C. ECOWAS cannot succeed without investments from funding sources in
the areas of interterritorial infrastructure and industrial
balance between the states of the region
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Graphs
I. Average Sizes of Loans/Credits for Projects in Africa, by
Institution, Appendix VI
II. Terms of Loans/Credits in Africa, by Institution (Interest Rates)
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A Theories of Regional Integration in West Africa
The theories of regional integration that were discussed in the
first chapter provided a foundation for analyzing the role of the ADB
and ECOWAS in promoting regional integration in West Africa. The
various theoretical perspectives that have been presented have dis-
played different degrees of insight into the regional integration
movement in West Africa. Some of the theories have been helpful in
understanding the integration process in West Africa and the role of
support institutions, such as, the ADB and ECOWAS, in advancing this
process. Other perspectives have not fit well into the West Africa
milieu, or have produced uneven results and have not aided in under-
standing the ADB and ECOWAS role in promoting regional integration in
the area. At this juncture, it may be beneficial to summarize the
theories that were discussed in chapter one and consider which
theories were satisfied in West Africa and how they explain the role
of the ADB and ECOWAS in promoting regional integration in West Africa.
The theories that have been discussed are; Nkrumahism, Federalism,
Neo-Functionalism (Incrementalism), Communication Theory, Traditional
Neo-Classical Economic Theory and Economic Development Theory. Nkru-
mahism is a theoretical perspective that grew out of the Pan-Africanist
movement and materialized as a theory of regionalism in Africa under
the personality of Kwame Nkrumah. Federalism, Neo-Functionalism and
Communication Theory have their genesis in the European experience, in
that these theories were developed within the European context as
tools for understanding the integration process in Europe and North
America. Neo-Classical Economic Theory, although grounded in the
European experience as well, clashes directly with the newly developed
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economic development theory of regional integration. To appreciate
this conflict in theory, it is helpful to present these two theories
within the same discussion. The first theory to consider, with respect
to regional integration in West Africa and the ADB and ECOWAS role in
promoting it, is a theory that germanated within Africa and fueled the
earliest attempts at regionalism in post independence Africa; Nkruma-
hism.
Nkrumahism
Nkrumahism, as a practical tool for implementing a program of
regionalism, has not been fully endorsed nor supported in Africa. The
emphasis of this theory on the establishment of a continental political
union preceding economic, sectoral or sub-regional unions has been
eclipsed by the proliferation of economic, sectoral and sub-regional
unions in place of a continent wide political union. The urgings of
Kwame Nkrumah that African states unite around their resources (parti-
cularly export commodities) outside of an association with Europe has
been ignored by most African countries, who have entered into associate
status with the EEC under the Lome Convention. Despite these trends
in Africa that would indicate the obsolescence of Nkrumahism, elements
of the theory have been subscribed to by African leaders that have
engaged in sub-regional unions.
Many African leaders forsee the Nkrumah model of a continental
central authority that will supercede national sovereignty as an ulti-
mate goal for Africa to strive for, however, they preface that this is
a vision of the distant future. To achieve this stage of political
authority, many view the incremental, slow accretions of power to the
center as the correct process, rather than the immediate shift (as
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proscribed by Nkrumah) to continental authority. Given that this
element of Nkrumahism has been rejected as the method for achieving
continental union, sub-regionalism has emerged as the most acceptable
vehicle for achieving the ultimate goal of continental unity. The
rationale for engaging in sub-regional efforts is derived from many of
the arguments presented by Nkrumahism.
Sub-regional communities, such as ECOWAS, have been established
to remedy many of the economic ills that Kwame Nkrumah recognized
would occur under a system of separate, autonomous, national develop-
ment. These problems include diseconomies of scale, duplication,
small national savings, investment capital and foreign exchange, de-
creasing commodity prices from competition, and so forth. In citing
these economic problems and offering a political strategy for addres-
sing them, Nkrumahism has aided the ECOWAS program. Nkrumahism has
provided the ideological basis for West African leaders to consider
their development problems and to enter the ECOWAS community as a
means to rectify their present situation.
In the area of structuring a regional community, Nkrumahism has
provided a model. The theory has placed heavy emphasis on the estab-
lishment of federal institutions and authorities as a device for
achieving broader unity. Although Nkrumah insisted.on the formation
of the federal apparatus before national economic development, African
leaders have modified these features of Nkrumahism by developing *
federal institutions within their regional integration schemes. These
efforts can be better appreciated by moving slightly away from the
theory of Nkrumahism and considering the more generic theory of
federalism.
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Federalism and Neo-Functionalism - Incrementalism
As described in the first chapter, federalists view the declara-
tions and agreements between states that form federal institutions as
being the essential element of an integration process. This theory
suggests that the establishment of regionally based institutions pro-
vides the basis for authority transfer from the states to the regional
scale. Neo-Functionalists, most notably Ernst Haas, have expanded upon
the federalist principles by suggesting that these institutions can
serve as a conduit for interregional linkages between elites (profes-
sionals and technicians). Although other apsects of their theory has
not fit well into the West African milieu (lobby groups within region,
elite complementarity), their extension of the federalist theory on
regional institutions in the area of sectoral groupings has pointed to
some hopeful signs for West African regionalism. As indicated earlier,
Haas has viewed the existence of sectoral groupings as providing a
basis for interregional linkages that can aid in the integration pro-
cess. A closer look at the application of these theories inthe ECOWAS
community will show the strong fit of federalism and neo-functionalism
in West Africa and their relevance to the integration efforts in this
region.
The proliferation of regional institutions in West Africa promotes
the objectives of regional integration. The ECOWAS program hasprovided
the institutional supports of these regional bodies, which makes their
mandate for integration obtainable. As observed by Ernst Haas, re-
gional institutions that bring together professionals and technicians
in a cooperative venture have the potential of producing positive
spillover effects on an integration effort. He further suggested
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that, in the absence of interregional linkages between elite groups,
sectoral organizations that that are regionally based have the poten-
tial for producing positive spillover effects. The ECOWAS program,
which was scheduled to begin the first stage of its operations in 1980
(West Africa citizenship), has the opportunity to realize the positive
spillover effects of almost thirty regional institutions in West
Africa.
One of the many institutional supports that ECOWAS has to exploit
is the regional groupings that have been in existence in West Africa
which have attempted economic union. These organizations provide
ECOWAS with history that can reveal potential difficulties that may
be confronted, in addition to policies that may advance integration.
Aside from the benefits of hindsight, ECOWAS is able to structure its
program around the existing framework of the other economic unions in
the area. In this respect, ECOWAS has the opportunity to build upon
the structural foundations of established programs, while avoiding
duplication and errors. These spillover benefits are analogous to
those realized by the ADF when it began operations in 1974. The Fund
was able to draw upon the history, knowledge and expertise of the ADB
thereby allowing the Fund to begin its investments immediately. The
likelihood of conflict between the existing institutions and ECOWAS
appear to be minimal, with the ECOWAS treaty stipulating the superi-
ority of its policies over other regional agreements. This clause of
the treaty allows ECOWAS to draw from the advances of other economic
unions without having to concede any of its own policy initiatives.
In this area, ECOWAS is able to realize the greatest benefits from
positive spillover, while avoiding the potentially disintegrative
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effects of conflict between organizations.
The sectoral groupings in the West Africa region provide the
ECOWAS program with additional benefits from spillover. Many of the
now defunct economic unions of West Africa were unable to realize the
spillover effects of sectoral organizations within the region. These
organizations could have provided to the economic unions of the past
the technical supports of pre-investment studies, development plans,
management expertise, in addition to the pooling of professionals and
technicians. ECOWAS, as the largest and most recently formed economic
union in West Africa, has the opportunity to realize the full benefits
of the institutional supports of the sectoral organizations. It should
also be noted that the ECOWAS Treaty was conceived with the technical
assistance of many of these sectoral organizations, which highlights
the positive spillover effects of these organizations on the ECOWAS
program and the compatibility of ECOWAS with the existing regional
institutions in West Africa.
The ECOWAS Program has gone a step further in extracting benefits
from regional institutions in West Africa by creating several support
institutions within ECOWAS. Federalists would view this initiative
by ECOWAS as an important and effective step toward regional integra-
tion. They would see these institutions as providing a basis for -
authority transfer from the local level to the federal. These ECOWAS
bodies do, in fact, suggest the presence of federal authority, however,
it is too early in the ECOWAS Program to gauge the degree of transfer
that will occur. The immediate benefit of these institutions to the
integration process in West Africa is the positive spillover effects
of bringing more area states together under a regional effort. Beyond
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the benefits of positive spillover, these support institutions serve to
implement the ECOWAS Program.
Each of the ECOWAS Commissions perform a duty that advances the
ECOWAS Program. These Commissions are staffed by Africans from the
entire West Africa region. Having a wide range of West Africans em-
ployed on these commissions promotes the integration of the region.
Perhaps more importantly than the individual activities of the
Commissions and the multinational character of their staff, in promo-
ting regional integration under the ECOWAS Program, is the coordination
between the ECOWAS institutions and the other regional entities in
West Africa.
The West African Clearinghouse, designed to coordinate the ex-
change of currency between West African states, is one of ECOWAS' most
important institutions. This agency is essential to the advancement
of interregional trade in West Africa, in that it assures member
states of the fair and smooth exchange of currency between purchasing
and supplying states. This agency is supported by the Association of
African Central Banks, which maintains data on the monetary situation
of its member states. Other West African agencies, such as
Africa Re, the ADB and UMOA interact on a regular basis to exchange
information on monetary and economic conditions in the West Africa
region. Each of these institutional linkages between regional organi-
zations creates positive spillover on the integration process of the
ECOWAS Program. These benefits are realized in other areas of insti-
tutional exchanges in the region; many of which are coordinated by the
ADB or the ECA. Despite these positive supports for the ECOWAS
Program, there are disintegrative forces that threaten the program
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and regional integration in West Africa. One of these disintegrative
forces is the lack of investment in interterritorial infrastructure.
Communication Theory and Jacob &Teune's 10 Integrative Influences
Before examining the lack of investment in interterritorial infra-
structure, it would be helpful to restate the theoretical basis for
considering interterritorial infrastructure as an element of regional
integration. Aside from summarizing the theories that are relevant to
this issue, it might also be helpful to separate out those theories
that do not explain nor fit into the integration process in West
Africa. The first of these theories to consider is the ten integrative
influences cited by Jacob and Teune.
As was discussed in the first chapter, many of the integrative
influences cited by Jacob and Teune were difficult to measure in
West Africa. Social variables, such as social homogeneity or cognitive
proximity revealed an uneven set of results that would be hard to
interpret. It would be even more of a task to design an integration
strategy that would positively alter these variables. In the area of
political influences, variables such as sovereignty-dependency revealed
a low level of integration in West Africa, despite the creation of
several regional authorites in West Africa. These influences, which
display a wide degree of variability in their application to West
Africa, are the theoretical elements of the Jacob and Teune approach
that do not answer or explain the questions of integration in West
Africa. Two of their variables, transactional flows and geographic
proximity, have problems in the application to West Africa, however,
they point to areas that the ECOWAS Program can address in advancing
regional integration.
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The concept of transactional flows, as developed by Karl Deutsch,
postulates that the cohesiveness of a community could be measured by
the quantity of transactions between constituent parts of a region.
Phillip Jacob and Henry Teune expanded upon this theory by suggesting
that the geographic proximity between states could advance or hinder
the level of transactions between members of a community. The inten-
sity of transactions (trade or communications) has been used in the
first chapter as a measure of interaction between states in West
Africa and their degree of attachment to the regional community.
The concept of geographic proximity presented the idea of transactional
flows in terms of the ease of transport between states and the conti-
guity of borders. It has been suggested that these factors could serve
to hinder or advance transactional flows between states. The West
Africa region has demonstrated the level of contiguity between states
that Jacob and Teune described, however, the region measured disap-
pointingly in the areas of interstate transport and communication.
The poor condition of interstate transport and communication in West
Africa would be viewed by Karl Deutsch, Phillip Jacob and Henry Teune
as a constraint, or rather, disintegrative influence on the integra-
tion process in the region. It should be prefaced that extensive
migratory flows exist in West Africa between states, despite the poor
transport and communications infrastructure in the region. The con-
clusion, however, was that the expansion of trade and communications
between states in the region would require more sophisticated inter-
territorial infrastructure. The theoretical basis for this assessment
is that improved transactional flows have an integrative influence
in a regional community. To achieve the benefits of these improved
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transactional flows, ECOWAS will have to secure greater investments in
interterritorial infrastructure.
The ECOWAS Program calls for greater interstate commerce in West
Africa. Given the fragmented and poor condition of the regions'
transport infrastructure, itis not clear how this increased trade will
be facilitated. The coordination between states that is required to
regulate commerce within the region is also suspect, with scant com-
munications infrastructure presently established in West Africa.
Utilizing the traditional trade routes in the region and the migratory
patterns of the various ethnic groups in the region will not be suffi-
cient to carry out the ECOWAS attempt at increased interstate trade.
In order that ECOWAS may overcome these formidable barriers to inte-
gration in West Africa, large infusions of investment must be made
in the development of interterritorial infrastructure. Economic
development theory points to another important area for investment in
the ECOWAS program; balancing industrial development within the region.
Economic Development Theory - Traditional Neo-Classical Economic Theory
Neo-Classical Economic Theory provides a framework for measuring
gains and losses of regional integration to the individual member
states. The theory applies basic economic indicators of trade creation
and trade diversion that pinpoint where costs and benefits are falling
and who is absorbing them. This aspect of the theory is helpful to
the integration process in West Africa, in that it allows for the cal-
culation of compensation of member states. This is also a feature of
the economic development theory of regional integration. The essen-
tial characteristic of the Neo-Classical Theory is not the concept of
trade creation and diversion, but rather, the use of static indicators
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to assess the potential for regional integration.
Among the basic conditions that the neo-classical theorists use to
assess the potential for regional integration are the percentage of
trade conducted in the region and the percentage of gross national
product in foreign trade prior to the forming of an economic community,
in addition to the degree of disparities between member states. On
each of these indicators, West Africa has shown itself to be incapable
of successfully engaging in regional integration. Many African leaders
refute the reliability of these indicators by suggesting that, without
regional integration, a good score on these indicators is not possible
in Africa. This line of reasoning follows the economic development
theory approach, which counters the static indicators approach of the
neo-classical theorists by arguing that regional integration is a move-
ment to achieve structural changes in the economies of the region.
This change in the economic structures of the regions' economies is
designed to allow for the accelerated development of industry. One
of the problems that the economic development theorists cite in a re-
gional integration effort is the tendency of these structural changes
to produce imbalances in industrial development within the region.
As mentioned at various points in the research, the problems of
imbalances of industrial development (backwash) have been cited as
having a highly disintegrative influence on an economic community.
Economic development theorists have suggested that the only way to
address this problem effectively is to redirect investments into the
relatively underdeveloped states. It has been shown that economic
unions, such as CEAO and UDEAC have attempted to address this problem,
but have been unable to invest sufficient levels of capital or design
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investment incentives attractive enough to completely eradicate this
problem. ECOWAS has been structured in much the same way as the
other economic unions that have dealt with "backwash" and, as the
others, expects to face the same problems of insufficient capital to
reverse the problem. As with the case of interterritorial infrastruc-
ture development, ECOWAS requires large investments of capital in
industry and infrastructure development to reverse the disintegrative
effects of industrial imbalances between the states. At this juncture,
the question for ECOWAS is, who will provide the needed investment?
The most immediate source of financing for industry and infra-
structure development is the special funds of CEAO, Entente Council
and ECOWAS. The investments of each fund would advance the ECOWAS
Program for regional development and make an impact upon the problems
of poor interterritorial infrastructure and "backwash," since they all
operate within the ECOWAS region. The drawback of these investments,
with respect to the development needs of the region, is that indivi-
dually and collectively the special funds are incapable of meeting the
full development task. It must be remembered that the special funds
are also used to compensate member states for lost import duty reve-
nues. Aside from this drain on the special funds, the total size of
the funds is too small to consider them as a viable funding source
for the region. In the case of ECOWAS, the special fund for 1979
totalled $32 m (paid in). The paucity of this sum of money can be
appreciated when one considers that one multinational investment of
the ADF and NTF (Diama Dam Project - 1979) equalled $31.6 m. Clearly,
with multinational projects costing as much as the Diama Dam Project
and with the special funds being depleted by compensation payments,
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the special funds of ECOWAS, CEAO and the Entente Council cannot meet
the task of investments in industry and interterritorial infrastructure
development.
Another potential funding source for the ECOWAS Program is inter-
national lending institutions. IBRD/IDA certainly possess the largest
resource base of any of the international aid agencies and could
assume a leading role in interterritorial infrastructure and industry
development. This agency, however, has not displayed a commitment to
directing its investments in the area of multinational project finan-
cing nor industry development in West Africa. By 1980, IBRD had made
only one investment in a multinational infrastructure project (US $23
m - R.A.N.) and one investment in industry (US $60 m - CIMAO). IDA
has been more active than IBRD in financing multinational infrastruc-
ture projects. They have contributed to a railway improvement pro-
ject between Senegal and Mali, a line of credit for six Sahelian
countries, an irrigation project in the Senegal River Delta, a highway
development project between Nigeria and Niger and aid to the R.A.N.
These IDA investments have advanced the ECOWAS effort by contributing
to the interterritorial infrastructure in West Africa, however, enthu-
siasm for the IDA role must be tempered. By 1971, the IDA had only
committed 1.9% of its capital to multinational projects. When one
considers the resource endowment of the IDA and the enormous infra-
structure development need in West Africa, it is clear that the IDA
is not filling the investment gap of ECOWAS.
The US $60 m investment by IBRD in the CIMAO cement plant aided
the ECOWAS Program by developing industry in a relatively under-
developed West African state. It is this type of biased investment
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in industry in the poorer states that counters the tendency toward
industry imbalances in an economic community. It should be noted
that the IBRD was the senior partner in the multinational investment
in CIMAQ. As the senior partner, IBRD took the lead in making certain
that this project was initiated. Praise for the IBRD must also be
tempered, however, in light of its tremendous resource base and its
limited activity in interterritorial infrastructure and industry de-
velopment. The IBRD, in fact, would not be the lead agency in infra-
structure development within or between the poorer states; IDA handles
World Bank investments in the poorer states.
Given that IDA has devoted a small percentage of its investment
captial to multinational infrastructure development, the only other
area in which the IDA could confront the ECOWAS problem of poor inter-
state infrastructure and "backwash" would be through its national pro-
jects in the relatively underdeveloped states. To the extent that
IDA invests in infrastructures within the poorer states that link them
with other states of the region or make their local industry more
attractive, IDA is assisting ECOWAS in meeting its development needs.
Making this assessment is not as easy as locating the IDA investments
in multinational projects. Looking only at national investments of
IDA in West Africa, it is obvious that this agency is limited in the
degree of help that is can provide ECOWAS in overcoming one of its
most formidable obstacles; industry imbalances between states. IDA
credits are confined to infrastructure and social projects, which pre-
vents it from participating in new industry development. This fact,
in addition to the IBRD's limited activity in industry development in
West Africa, removes the World Bank from consideration as a funding
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source for balancing industry development in West Africa. A more
promising source of such funding may be the Commonwealth Development
Corporation.
The Commonwealth Development Corporation has refrained from
participating in multinational project financing in West Africa.
ECOWAS would not be able to exploit the investment of CDC in the area
of interterritorial infrastruction development, given the CDC's inacti-
vity in this area. ECOWAS may have greater success in attracting the
CDC in investing in new industry development. CDC has distinguished
itself as an investment institution by its high volume of equity
participating in African enterprises and investments in new industries
in Africa. The businesses initiated and supported by CDC in Africa
have also displayed a high rate of success. One of the basic draw-
backs of the CDC, with respect to investing in balancing industry
development in West Africa, is that it operates in only a select
number of West African states, most of which are relatively well to do
(Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia). Aside
from this factor, a large proportion of CDC investments are equity
participation ventures in existing African industries. To effectively
deal with industry imbalances between states, investments must be
made in new industry development. Unless CDC chose to shift its
investment policies in this direction, in addition to focusing invest-
ments in the relatively underdeveloped West African states, CDC will
not be able to satisfy the development needs of the ECOWAS Program.
Another potential source of investment financing that ECOWAS
could try to tap is Nigeria. This state is the most capable of the
West African states to assume a leading role in this area. As indi-
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cated in the first chapter, under table 5, Nigeria possesses 57.16%
of the region's population and 69.2% of its gross national product.
Applying the concept of "prime mover," which advocates that a major
economic and political power from within a community should lead the
path for regional integration, Nigeria is the best candidate in West
Africa to assume the lead role. Nigeria has, in fact, made signifi-
cant efforts toward this end through their large contribution to the
ECOWAS compensation fund and the creation of the Nigeria Trust Fund
within the African Development Bank Group. The NTF has, by far, been
the most active investor of Nigerian finances in the area of multi-
national infrastructure development and supports for industrial
development in the relatively underdeveloped states.
The NTF has promoted the ECOWAS Program by investing in multi-
national infrastructure development and, to the extent that the Diama
Dam Project leads to new industry development in Mali and Mauritania,
eased the problem of "backwash" within the ECOWAS region. As indicated
earlier, the NTF also advances multinational development by providing
the ADB with an additional soft loan window with which to match ADB
multinational investments. The limits of the NTF in aiding ECOWAS in
filling its investment gap are the modest size of its resource base
and the volatility of Nigerian support.
Much of the Nigerian government's ability to invest in the NTF
and the ECOWAS compensation fund is derived from its oil revenues.
The national development plans of Nigeria are tailored to fit within
the yearly projections of national oil revenues.1 Should the level
of national oil revenues drop for Nigeria, it is uncertain whether the
government would be able to sustain the level of commitment that it
272
has made to the ECOWAS compensation fund and the NTF. Given the
erratic changes in world commodity prices (including oil), the ECOWAS
is not able to fully depend upon Nigeria to make the large multi-
national infrastructure and industry investment that is required to
make the ECOWAS Program successful. This is not to suggest that
Nigeria is not commited to making a contribution in this area, but
rather, to stress the need for an investment institution(s) that is
able to make the investment and is commited to assuming the responsi-
bility. The ADB Group appears to be the one investment institution
that is commited to taking on the task and possesses a sound resource
base, when compared to the NTF and the ECOWAS Compensation Fund.
The commitment of the ADB Group to multinational development in West
Africa can be seen through its relatively large investments in this
area since 1976 (US $134.89 m compared to IBRD/IDA US $128.5 m). The
question mark surrounding the ADB Group's support of the ECOWAS Pro-
gram is, can the ADB Group meet the investment needs of ECOWAS? It is
not being suggested here that only one institution, such as the ADB
Group, assume the entire responsibility of investing in ECOWAS. The
question at this juncture is what can the ADB Group do to expand its
role as the lead agency in West Africa multinational development and
whether the ECOWAS will be able to succeed with this level of support.
B. Capability of the ADB Group in Meeting the Investment Needs of ECOWAS
The development needs of ECOWAS have been stated several times
in the research. Before considering the capability of the ADB Group
in meeting these needs, it may be helpful to restate them and give
the theoretical basis for considering them in a regional integration
effort.
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Interstate trade and communication are seen by many integration
theorists as being essential influences on an integration process.
In order that this type of trade and communication may be conducted,
interstate transport and communications infrastructure is required.
The ECOWAS community lacks sufficient interstate infrastructure with
which to conduct and expand interstate trade and communications, there-
fore, investment must be made in its development to allow ECOWAS to
realize a successful integration process.
In the area of industrial development, economic development
theorists of regional integration in the Third World argue that an
economic community will tend to have industrial development occur in
the established growth regions of the community. This process will
lead to a concentration of activity in the growth poles and a subse-
quent drift away from the less developed regions, creating "backwash."
"Backwash" is seen as being a highly disintegrative force within an
economic community and can only be confronted by large industrial
investments in the relatively underdeveloped regions. The ECOWAS
compensation fund is designed to make this investment, however, it is
admittedly too small to counter the process. ECOWAS requires large
investments beyond its capabilities to develop new industries in the
relatively underdeveloped states of West Africa to make the ECOWAS
Program successful.
In the area of West Africa investments, the ADB Group has had
its greatest presence in multinational infrastructure development.
These investments have included the following type of interstate
development projects; raliroads, a bridge, highways, power inter-
connection, telecommunication and a dam. Each of these projects have
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promoted the ECOWAS Program by establishing new interstate infra-
structure in West Africa. Although these projects have been helpful,
it is not evident whether the ADB Group investments have been suffici-
ent in remedying the infrastructure gap of ECOWAS. Beyond this ques-
tion, the ADB Group has not made more than one clear industrial
development loan in West Africa (CIMAO). Some of their loans, such as
the Diama Dam Project, may be construed as an "anti-backwash" invest-
ment, but this does not change the fact that the ADB has failed to
make investments in new industries in the relatively underdeveloped
West African states.
One of the reasons for the ADB Group refraining from making
investments in new industries is the high project costs of these
type of investments. The total cost of the CIAMO cement plant was
US $284 m, which included seven financers. Clearly this enormous
investment far exceeds the loan ceiling of the ADB, ADF and the NTF.
The Bank Group would probably have a difficult time taking on this
kind of project, even with co-financing from its three investment
institutions. The problems of project costs are compounded by the
limited amount of co-financing of these projects between international
aid agencies. In light of the fact that investments in new industry
development in the relatively underdeveloped West African states is
essential to a successful ECOWAS Program, the ADB Group will have to
consider other financial supports or expansions in its resource base
to effectively meet this challenge. This will also have to be the
ADB Group approach to increasing its presence in multinational develop-
ment projects. The following is a list of potential sources of support
and resources which the ADB Group could try to exploit;
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1. increase scale of co-financing with outside lenders;
2. open capital stock of the ADB;
3. increase activity in the international bond market;
4. increase membership of ADF.
Each of these need to be looked at closely to consider the degree of
support that they could provide the ADB Group in promoting the ECOWAS
Program.
Scale of Co-Financing with Outside Lenders Must be Increased
As indicated by the data in Table 10, in the previous chapter,
the degree of joint financing between the Bank Group and other lenders
is low. At the present time, the ADB Group's average loan size is
significantly lower than the IBRD/IDA (see Graph I), with their aver-
age loan size for multinational projects not much higher (see Appendix
VII, previous chapter). In the case of the Diama Dam Project for
OMVS, ADF and NTF had to cover the total cost of the project; co-
financing would allow the money to be spread around to cover more
multinational projects or take on large industrial projects.2 There
are two potential sources for joint financing for the Bank Group that
could provide additional soft loan money for infrastructure develop-
ment or hard money for industrial development. Both of these sources
of co-financing would aid ECOWAS in developing interstate infrastruc-
ture and industry.
Infrastructure development generally requires soft loan invest-
ment, as a result of the slow payoff and low profit return of these
type of projects. The Bank Group uses its two soft loan windows, the
ADF and NTF, to invest in much of its infrastructure work, particularly
in the poorer states. These states are given credits at .75% (ADF) or
276
( % ) Interest
Rates
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
GRAPH I
Terms of Loans/Credits in Africa, by Institution
* *
Interest Rates
Terms of Loans/Credits (Averages), by Institution
IBRD
NTF
Kuwait Fund
* IDA
ADF
'71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81
(Year)
IDA and ADF are soft loan windows of the World Bank
respectively... their credits are @ .75%; IDA has 40
10 yr. grace; ADF is 50 yr. and 10 yr. grace.
(IBRD) and ADB
yr. maturity and
See Appendix VIII for base data.
277
4% (NTF) interest, which is far lower than the 8.5% interest charged
by the ADB. This kind of investment by the Bank Group could be esca-
lated if it possessed another soft loan fund with which to combine
with the ADF and NTF. A potential source of soft loan credits that
the Bank Group could try to tap is the Arab investment institutions;
BADEA and the Kuwait Fund. The resource capacity of these agencies is
strong, although their capital stock and investments are by comparison
far more conservative. The attraction of these aid agencies is that
they provide loans at terms comparable to, or lower than, the NTF
(see Graph II). The Arab financing, combined with ADF and NTF invest-
ments, would provide the Bank Group with a larger presence in multi-
national infrastructure financing. This increased presence, in
addition to the concessionary terms of the loans, would aid the ECOWAS
Program by raising the level of interstate infrastructure development
in West Africa. With regards to industry development, the Bank Group
could try to increase its West Africa investments by increasing its
co-financing activity with the IBRD.
As mentioned earlier, industry development requires large capital
outlays. The Bank Group can only hope to be a junior partner in such
an undertaking, with their loan ceiling for multinational and national
projects standing at such a relatively low level. Even with joint
financing between the three investment institutions of the Bank Group,
there are not many new industry projects that the Bank Group could
take on alone. The IBRD is the best candidate for joining the Bank
Group as a senior partner in this area of investments. Despite the
IBRD's inactivity in the area of new industry development in West
Africa, the IBRD holds the greatest promise for carrying out the task
278
GRAPH II
Average Size of Loans/Credits for Projects in Africa, by Institution
(US $ Million)
35
30
25
20
15
10
5.
0
Average Size of Loans/Credits for Projects in Africa, by Institution
4e
IBRD
IDA
Kuwait Fund
BADEA
7 ' I I '75 I ' '
'71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81
see Appendix VI for base data
Pip.;
279
in light of its large average loan size (see Graph I), and its enormous
resource capacity. Without the presence of a large investor to serve
as a senior partner for Bank Group investments in new industries, it is
not certain whether the Bank Group will be able to mobilize sufficient
capital to carry out this effort on its own. Should the IBRD resist
the offer to engage in this type of co-financing venture, the Bank
Group would be faced to attempt a major expansion of its resource
base. Assuming that the Bank Group is unable to attract the IBRD in
joining in an investment effort in new industry development, how could
the Bank Group expand its base to allow for increased industry invest-
ment (and multinational infrastructure development) by the Bank Group?
Before considering strategies for expanding the resource base of
the Bank Group, it should be made clear that the likelihood of IBRD/
IDA, BADEA or the Kuwait Fund co-financing with the Bank Group in
multinational projects is nil. The absence of these agencies in multi-
national project financing to date has been shown. The annual reports
for each of these agencies makes no reference to a shift in investment
policy, from national to multinational. Beyond this point, these aid
agencies tend to prefer a national focus because it provides them the
ability to wield political influence with individual nations. In the
case of the Arab investors, this would appear to be particularly true,
where they would prefer to "reward" political allies with loans and
steer other nations in their direction with the promise of aid.
Clearly, this degree of influence on a national government would not
be as strong if investments were made on a regional (multinational)
scale. Given this scenarios, it is questionable whether the Bank
Group would be able to secure IBRD/IDA, BADEA and Kuwait Fund co-
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financing. In short, the point being made here is that these aid
agencies are attractive sources of co-financing for the Bank Group in
multinational development, but their receptiveness to joining in the
task is suspect.
Open the Capital Stock of the ADB
The Board of Governors of the ADB have already approved the ini-
tiation of exploratory studies into the receptiveness of the industri-
alized states to participating in the Bank's capital stock. The most
obvious and immediate benefits of bringing the industrialized states
on to the Bank is the increased capital base of the ADB. This would
allow the Bank to expand its investment operations, raise its lending
ceiling and relax pressures on their African member states to meet
paid in obligations. By realizing these benefits the Bank would be
able to assume a fuller role in the ECOWAS Program, by increasing its
proportion of project financing for multinational infrastructure and
new industry development, or scattering their investments to serve as
the catalyst for other area investments. Either path that the Bank
should choose would aid ECOWAS, because it would raise the funding
level of investments in multinational infrastructure and new industry.
Perhaps more importantly than the potential for increased investment
activity from a growth in the paid in capital of the Bank, would be the
increased borrowing capacity of the Bank in the international market.
The addition of the industrialized nations to the ADB's capital
stock would elevate the Bank's standing in the credit markets of the
world. The Bank would be able to alter its callable to paid in capital
ratio appreciably, with the addition of large economic powers to its
membership. As was evidenced in the preceding chapter, when Kwame
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Fordwar changed the ratios of the Bank's callable to paid in capital,
positive results were realized by the ADB when it attempted to float
bonds in the Eurobond market. Aside from the gains realized from
changing its callable to paid in ratio, the ADB should receive a
warmer reception in the Eurobond market, where many of their subscri-
bers would probably come from. It could be expected that the Bank's
credit rating would go up, with the addition of industrialized nations,
who tend to enjoy much better credit ratings than their African
counterparts. The dimensions of these gains are difficult to assess
prior to the opening of the Bank's capital stock. The consistency of
the international bond market is also difficult to determine, despite
the formal criteria for assessing potential borrowers.
The International Bond Market
The World Bank operates principally on its borrowings in the Euro-
pean market. The access of the World Bank is assured by the large
number of member states that support the Bank, the credit standing of
the membership, and the financial commitment of the member states.
It is also important to note that the World Bank borrows within states
that are members of the institution. There are many factors that dis-
tinguish the World Bank from the ADB, i.e., capital base, arrearages,
creditworthiness of member states, race, etc. Each of these factors
or the sum of them can work against the ADB in its attempts to enter
the international market for borrowings. The ADB has had two success-
ful issuances of bonds in the West German market and one successful
issuance in the Kuwaiti market. It is assumed that an upgrading of the
ADB's creditworthiness and financial backing will increase its access
to the Eurobond market. This access, however, is not assured to the
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same degree as the World Bank.
Until the ADB opens its capital stock to non-regionals, it is not
certain how many industrialized nations will choose to join the Bank.
A further question is how large will the subscriptions of these indus-
trialized states be, should they choose to join the Bank? These
variables will effect the accessibility of the ADB to the Eurobond
market. Another variable that will be considered is the ADB's success
at meeting its current obligations. Should the ADB default or require
rescheduling, it is not likely that they will have success at re-
entering the European market. Aside from these tangible variables,
there are factors that the ADB could not control that may deny them
access to the Eurobond market. These factors include tightening credit,
rising interest rates and other world economic patterns that may cur-
tail the availability of credit in the European market. The ADB has
inquired about the possibilities of entering the Japanese bond market,
but the same constraints that are present in Europe will be present
in Japan, or even Kuwait (ADB had floated bonds in Kuwait in 1977).
Given the volatility of the international bond market, with respect to
the ADB access to bonds, it is difficult to determine whether the ADB
will be able to increase its resource base through this route.
Increased access to the international bond market is the direction
in which the ADB would like to go. The opening of the Bank's capital
stock would appear to be tailored to achieve this end. With this
access, the ADB would be able to assume a much larger position in
multinational and industry development. The size of the ADB borrowing
capacity can only be conjectured, but it is assumed that a major pre-
sence in the Eurobond market (for example , cutting the World Bank's
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distance on borrowings from ten times to five times greater than the
ADB) would propell the ADB into a major investment position in the
area of development that ECOWAS requires to succeed. Given the riski-
ness of predicting the ADB's investment potential on this variable,
another source of additional funding should be considered; increase
the membership of ADF.
Increase the Membership of the ADF
The ADF began as an investment institution that was supported by
the ADB and non-regional nations. Being structured in this manner,
the ADF has been able to tap the financial resources of many of the
industrialized nations. These nations have insured that the ADF capi-
tal has come from new subscribers rather than from the regular
replenishments. Expanding upon this funding pattern, the ADF could
attempt to increase its resource base by attracting new subscribers to
the Fund. To the extent that this policy initiative increases. the
Fund's resource base, the ADF would be able to increase its investment
activity. This increase in ADF investments, if directed in multi-
national infrastructure development, would aid ECOWAS. The level of
this increased assistance to the ECOWAS Program would depend upon the
degree of receptiveness demonstrated by potential subscribers and the
extent to which the ADF channels its money into multinational infra-
structure development.
C. Conclusion
The success of the ECOWAS Program is dependent upon large invest-
ments of capital within the West Africa region. This investment
effort must be tailored toward the advancement of regional development;
establish multinational infrastructure in the region and balance
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industrial development between states. Without this investment, the
ECOWAS Program will be limited to the interaction of bureaucrats
from the various regional bodies, who complain to each other about
the difficulty of implementing an integration program in West Africa.
The potential investors in the ECOWAS Program are many, but their
commitment and capabilities to assume the task are uneven.
It has been seen at various points thus far that the special funds
of the economic unions are inadequate to assume a prominent role in
the development effort of the ECOWAS Program. The international aid
agencies have the resource capacity that the special funds lack in
meeting the problem, but they have not demonstrated a consuming
interest in participating in a large multinational infrastructure and
industry development effort. The IBRD/IDA could certainly serve as a
lead agency in this effort, should they decide to shift their invest-
ments in this direction. The Nigerian government, unlike the inter-
national aid agencies, has displayed a strong cOmmitment to making a
financial investment in the ECOWAS Program. They are the major sup-
porters of the ECOWAS compensation fund and have made the bold step
of forming the NTF. Both of these funding sources are helpful and may
provide needed co-financing in the region, however, the resource base
of each of these funding bodies is dependent upon the sustained
capacity of the Nigerian government to provide regular replenishments
of capital. This factor makes the Nigerian investment in the develop-
ment of ECOWAS region an unpredictable source of aid.
The one funding source that has demonstrated a commitment tomulti-
national development in West Africa is the African Development Bank
Group. It has been shown on Table 10 in the previous chapter, that
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the ADB Group has invested more of its money into multinational
development in West Africa than any other aid agency since 1976. The
weakness of the ADB Group investment in West Africa is that the rela-
tively modest size of their resource base has prevented them from
taking on more multinational infrastructure development and national
industry development in the poorer West African states. It is diffi-
cult to determine the amount of multinational infrastructure develop-
ment that is needed to make the ECOWAS Program operational (especially
prior to the implementation of the ECOWAS Program), therefore, it can-
not be argued that the ADB Group is not meeting these needs of ECOWAS.
In the area of national industry development in the poorer ECOWAS
states, however, it is clear that the one ADB investment in the CIMAO
cement plant is not enough to remedy the problem of "backwash." To
make the ECOWAS Program workable it has been seen that the ADB Group,
as the leading investor in the area, must increase its resource base
to allow it to make more investments in new industries.
Various areas of potential support or additional capital for the
ADB Group have been outlined. Each of these sources display a variant
degree of hope for the ADB Group. In the area of increased co-finan-
cing, it is not clear whether the Arab institutions or the IBRD/IDA
would be interested in joining the ADB Group in advancing the ECOWAS
Program. Although each of these potential co-financers have the
resource capacity to assist in this effort, their present inactivity
and policy focus makes predicting their support a risky proposition.
There are also question marks surrounding the receptiveness of the
industrialized states to subscribing to the ADB's capital stock, in
addition to the availability of the international bond market. As
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there are questions concerning these two potential sources of capital,
it is uncertain whether the ADF will be able to attract more countries
to join the Fund. The ability of the Bank Group to assume a larger
presence in promoting multinational infrastructure and industry
development in West Africa is contingent upon its ability to expand
its resource base or attract other investors.
In summary, it should be restated that without large investments
in multinational infrastructure development and linking and balancing
industrial development between states in West Africa, the ECOWAS
Program will not be able to realize the ultimate goal of economic
union in West Africa. The ADB Group has taken the lead in promoting
the ECOWAS Program through its institutional supports and multinational
investments, but a larger presence is required. Given that other
funding sources may choose to refrain from entering the field ofmulti-
national development in West Africa, the ECOWAS Program will have to
depend upon the continued support of the ADB Group. Under these
conditions, the growth, development and strength of the ECOWAS Program
will be directly tied to the strength of the ADB Group and its invest-
ments in West Africa.
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